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send button. 
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humans. We are miraculously fortunate to only gingerly and contingently experience this elegant life 
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  Given the state of the planet at present —specifically, the linked global ecological and 
economic crises that conjure dark imaginings and nihilistic actualities of increasing resource 
depletion, poisonings, and wide-scale sufferings and extinctions—I ask What might we hope 
now? What points of intervention offer possibility for transformation? At best, the response can 
only be partial. The approach this thesis takes initiates from specific pre-discursive assumptions. 
The first understands current conditions as having been produced, and continuing to be so, 
through practices that enact and sustain neoliberal relations. Secondly, these practices are 
expressive of a subjectivity tied to a Cartesian worldview, which, therefore, needs to be 
interrupted at its foundational roots. Thirdly, the scaffolding that supports this subjectivity draws 
on Newtonian science and neo-Darwinian narratives deemed to be natural law and, therefore, 
ontological, immutable reality. Contrary to modernist thinking, I premise that these two strains, 
subjectivity and science, are neither autonomous nor ontological, but that they are materially and 




 An integral framing of science and subjectivity provides a productive method of feminist 
science studies analysis and theorization. Observing the capitalist Western social imaginary 
through this lens reveals its philosophical and scientific infrastructures to be outdated and 
deteriorating. Observing how emerging scientific narratives in quantum physics and systems-
biology intersect with marginalized theories in process-philosophy and subjectivity reveals a life-
affirming imaginary of difference, one that arrests nihilism and sets ethical trajectories in motion. 
Certain, though not all, percepts of feminist new materialism engage twentieth and twenty-first 
century sciences successfully to show that ethicality matters. Though many questions remain, this 
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The whole universe depends on everything fitting together just right. 
If one piece busts, even the smallest piece, the entire universe will get busted. 
Mama, is that you? I’ve broken everything. 




 When, following a presentation on the vulnerabilities of transcorporeal bodies to toxic 
environmental conditions– intubated and bubbled people with multiple chemical sensitivities, 
dissolving shells of marine life in an acidified ocean– a scholar of 19th century German 
naturphilosophie, questioned the speaker, Stacy Alaimo, on how a feminist post-human 
materiality committed to a Baradian “ontology” of intra-action and flow arrives “naturally” at a 
leftist politics and political activism, he was drawing lines in the sand. Her talk chafed against his 
credo, common to Western philosophy, of the implausible rationality of direct connection 
between theory on one hand and ethics and enaction on the other. His question intended to 
challenge, to corner, to diminish, to discount, but he was also mystified, for he could muster no 
mooring in the feminist logics of embodied experience, and found himself uncharacteristically 
immersed in a strange and intellectually foreign zone with no handholds, no fixed points, where 
his terra firma was not, instead it moved and undulated without transcendental idealisms of 
capital N-Nature and capital T-Truth, where queer desires disrupted purities of what he had 
always known (expansive, essential, and timeless) but was turning out to be seeming passing 
straight and narrow and largely blind. And this gave rise in him to anger, to fear, but at what? 
That was the worst part, at what exactly, I cannot say, he thinks, not even knowing the words of 
his thinking or the object of his rage, just that curious affective mixed-up rise in the chest that 
must find form, make sound, aim old familiar words at the “catty and indecorous” to wrest the 
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rules back to those of his own domain and regain the higher ground of composure, control, and 
authority and find along with Robert Browning again, that “God’s in his heaven, all’s right with 
the world.” It’s obvious. It was a rhetorical question. A philosophy of materiality does not and 
cannot unfold a leftist ethics, he knows-knows-knows this, the thinking is wrong, for it is not 
thinking, because it is not logical, linear, and deductive like a mathematical proof, all (w)holes 
barred. And yet there he was, exiled in an abyss of acid radioactive sea of chalky tests, meant to 
shelter, but disintegrating. 
 Stacy Alaimo quickly responded, “I have no idea, but it is already happening in the 
environmental movement and in community economies.” (February 3, 2014 Rice University).2 
Another chafe! She answered that she takes activism seriously academically, that this as an 
academic practice has been legitimized within cultural theory, and that citizen science engages 
the politics and ethics of theory. Plastic, formless matter, inorganic biogenic product of millions 
of years of sequestered decomposed photosynthetic and marine life, once extracted, cause what 
could not have been predicted, global toxicities (woops, there is no putting it back in the ground, 
no turning back, no not breathing its airborne forms, no genetic or cellular isolationism, no 
absenting corpuscular sentience and systemic learning).  
 Another lacuna gapes, how do feminist post-human and new materialist projects, which 
rescript the Western thinking about embodiment and the world in their hopeful envisioning of 
collective ethical subjectivities, anticipate heading off detractors and attackers on various fronts–
intellectual, theoretical, structural, and in praxis? How does this radical feminist vision of life-
itself (Life) and Earth and world— however soundly reasoned, evidenced, and inspired—confront 
thousands of years of dualities, hegemonies and exclusions, kept in place to service a status quo 
of patriarchal and economic power? Could healing the long genealogy of rifts between body and 
mind, nature and human, adequately lay the foundation for ushering in a new paradigm of 
affectively grounded life-affirming political values? Would ridding the Western mind of its 
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compulsion to predictive certainty and obsession with control ease the terrors and shames of the 
unknowable and uncertain, and make space for ethical enaction? The response cannot be “I have 
no idea.” As much as the feminist vision for posthuman and new materialist possibility inspires 
and makes urgent ecological and economic sense, its hopes must also be strategic and tactical, the 
project must critically engage what it is up against, ivory tower isolation is no shelter. While I 
have no answers to these questions in this project, nor do I lay out a war room strategy, it is in the 
spirit of these framing questions that my project reflects on Western thinking itself, specifically to 
arrive at a deeper understanding of the intaglio of scientific thinking and subjectivity in the early 
twenty-first century, as if all lives depend on it. 
 
 The telling interchange between Stacy Alaimo and the scholar of German philosophy 
encapsulates scholarly tensions both within feminist new materialisms and over its reception in 
wider academic circles. Critics of new materialism charge that these thinkers fail to show, as they 
claim, a natural ‘ontological’ link between its theoretical positions and its politics. The ‘material 
turn’ in feminist theory has been driven largely, but not only, by literary and cultural theory 
scholars, and these new materialists do suggest this link, but they largely fail to make their case 
for reasons I will show. I aim to explain the intransigence of this debate, and make a case for how 
new materialist theoretical positions, if grounded in particular approaches to science, and 
differently argued, do incorporate ethicality in a way that directly informs possibilities for a 
transformative politics. 
 
Segue: Defining terms (enaction) 
I’m recording my story for the scientists in the future. 
–Hushpuppie 
 
 Initially, Francisco Varela explains enaction in the context of bioneurology, “perception 
and action are embodied in self-organizing sensorimotor processes” (Varela, 1999, p. 15). The 
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body, environment, and consciousness––defined as sentience and awareness as it arises in the 
interaction of affect and cognition–– act and enact in concert to produce novel functional 
structures.  
…the essence of cognitive intelligence…resides only in its embodiment. 
When cognitive intelligence is approached from this self-situated 
perspective, it quickly becomes obvious that there is no place where 
perception could deliver a representation of the world in the traditional 
senses. The world shows up through the enactment of the perceptuo-motor 
regularities (Varela, 1999, p. 59, italics in the original). 
 
Varela here rejects the common view in science and philosophy that ‘nature’ or the ‘world-
out-there’ can be represented as one objective reality, a theme also central to fifty years of social 
and feminist scholarship of science. Varela later develops his earliest strictly science-bound 
concept of enaction to an expanded sense of enaction as skills-based radical embodiment, whether 
political, scientific, economic, etc. The delicacy of his stance relates to embodiment. Enaction is a 
cognitive function of embodied entities living in a ‘context’ (its environment), but, as he 
emphatically makes clear, the enactive dynamics of radical embodiment are not transferrable to 
how social systems–which are not autopoietic (living biological entities)–function or should be 
modeled. Enaction is a cognitive function of the embodied subject, not to be confused with 
agency. While there is advantage in a metaphoric application of autopoiesis and enactive 
cognition for understanding the interactions of social and living systems, that is quite different 
from engaging biological science as a social model.3 Social living for Varela is a product of 
epistemology, which is itself a form of enaction, it brings into being forms of social living, and, 
on that ground, epistemology matters politically. (Protevi in Clarke & Hansen, 2009) By 
extension, because epistemology is a cognitive function of embodiment, the body, too, is a 
political event. Enaction projects a subject’s worldview onto a world that responds, and, in a 
reciprocal dialogic ricorso, subjectivity responds, but its form is not one of call and response. The 
form of enaction is engagement, improvisation, and emergence (bringing forth).4 There is no 
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linearity or cause and effect, there are no hard borders (and thus no categories or binaries), no 
telos. What emerges does so by virtue of interactive energies without definable origin, cause, or 
source. Enaction may be envisioned as a dance, not a choreographed dance but a structured 
improvisation by subject(s) and world, the dance arises as an emergent property that is the whole 
of the motions of “a network of interactions of components” (Maturana, Varela, & Uribe, 1974, p. 




 This project aspires to be an experiential read, somewhat out-of-the-ordinary. 
Accordingly, I invite you to adjust your stance as a reader, to rest from disciplinary academic 
critique, and to suspend expectation, even disbelief. I echo Gibson-Graham in inviting you to read 
for “difference rather than dominance” (2006, p. xxii). The technique of reading for difference 
has a number of effects. It produces “interventions that unravel and dissolve this structural power, 
imagines specific and yet context-shaping dynamics, and enlarges the space of agency of all sorts 
of actors – noncapitalist as well as capitalist, disorganized as well as organized, non-human as 
well as human” (2008, p. 626). It produces recognition of the always already diverse, and, by 
bringing together things from different domains, it “excavates”, “spawns” and “proliferates” 
possibility (p. 625). Gibson-Graham’s technique of reading for difference borrows from Bruno 
Latour’s “learning to be affected” rather than to critique (2010, p. 322). I have attempted to 
embrace these approaches myself in the writing of this project, rather than challenge arguments 
(which I also do) I pay attention to patterns, I notice errant capillary variations on dominant 
themes, and wonder about them. Questions emerge not necessarily to be answered but to orient 
inquiry. The contemplations of this paper cover a large and broad swath of time and themes, it 
necessarily moves loosely and necessitates a similar looseness in its reader, some give, much like 
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the tolerances a builder leaves between the meeting of planes, gaps that make space for tools and 
fingers to twist and shape and create, gaps for coming back later for repairs and changes. 
Dynamic interdependence defies precision and requires a bit of mess. 
 Another invitation for my reader is to go with the jumps and transitions and gear shifts as 
one might read a poem. The sequence of chapters and their internal organizations might be read 
as sequences of verse, and to grasp the meanings of the whole demands of its reader to leap along 
side the writer. My aim is to evoke in my reader a fresh imaginary, one decoupled, for a fleeting 
moment, from the ‘Cartesian-capitalist’ worldview, one that leans into ‘bringing forth’, inspired 
by insights of feminist new materialisms. If successful, I see this experiment in reading as a 
resource for political hope in the confrontations with the global violence being done economically 
and environmentally to wellbeing. The text on these pages is no more than tactic in a strategy to 
tease out surprise, to shine a light on what we know and see nothing known. I invite you to take 





...  and, then, proceed 
 




Framing the Context 
 
Everything is part of the buffet of the universe. 
Anyday now, fabric of the universe is comin’ unraveled,  
ice caps gonna melt, water’s gonna rise, and  
everything south of the levee is goin’ under.  




    
Figure 1. Scylla, daughter of Poseidon. She was a many-headed, tentacled monster  
who fed on passing sailors in the straits between herself and Charybdis.  
Figure 2. Charybdis, daughter of Poseidon. She had once been the beautiful daughter of Poseidon,  
but she stole some of Heracles’ sheep, causing the angry Zeus to turn her into a monster. 
 
 
Scylla and Charybdis 
Stemming from the social relations and conditions of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries organized around capitalism, anthropogenic harm to the planet proceeds with gruesome 
alacrity. Unlike at the turn of the twentieth century, humans now understand the myriad 
anthropogenic violations perpetrated on ecological interdependencies, to such an extreme as to 
render imaginable and certain the unimaginable, that given its present trajectory, Life, Earth, and 
humans hurtle towards a pyrrhic Homo sapien victory that annihilates that on which many species 
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depend, and in so doing, also gives witness to its own self-annihilation. This auto-immune 
behavior refutes any vestigial credibility of the economic axiom of the individual as a rational 
actor of his own self-interest. Alternatively, these path-to-extinction energies might be analyzed 
as group selection– a darkly ironic manifestation of altruism played out on a planetary scale, 
either a Gaian event or, perhaps, some supreme extreme Malthusianism. The twentieth century 
planet, as an epiphenomenon engaged by humans empirically, experientially, rationally, 
materially, and affectively, is at stake. The scientific uncertainties surrounding the present and 
imminent quotidian betrays (or befits) the rapturous promises of capitalist mythologies. An 
affective subtext, ranging from desperation, urgency, poignancy, exasperation, anxiety, and denial 
to hope and possibility suffuses multilogues about power, the posthuman, globalization, critiques 
of capital, embodiment, and the politics of knowledge. Earth provides habitus for much more than 
the human, a fact that serves to erase the legitimacy of myopic anthropocentric orientations.  
A critical social theory asks why hunger, poverty, and other forms of human, animal, and 
planetary suffering persist despite the technological and scientific potential to mitigate or 
eliminate them altogether. Seeing freshly, seers abound. According to Theodor Adorno, the root 
cause lies in how capitalist relations of production have come to dominate society as a whole, 
leading to extreme, albeit often invisible, concentrations of wealth and power (1973). This nexus 
of production and power, he states, prevails in an exchange society. In this kind of society, nature 
as a static given obscures social relations, which, according to Donna Haraway, congeal into 
decontextualized things-in-themselves (1991). A capitalist exchange society is constructed on a 
philosophy that insists on misunderstanding relational processes as fixed, simple abstractions 
(1997), or as Alfred North Whitehead would attribute the error, on the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness. This confusion, perhaps conveniently intentional, is not only philosophical, but at 




Framing the context: Science 
Relativity and the quantum era have has not yet manifested in fundamental change to the 
social imaginary; paradigmatic intellectual change at the hands of science last happened in the 
seventeenth century when Copernicus reversed the places of the sun and the earth and Galileo 
substituted motion for rest as basics in physics. At this particular temporal moment, the 
ecological, environmental, and biological/genetic sciences have re-described nature as resource-
limited, non-linear, messy, and leaky. Advancements in evolution theory and physiology since 
Darwin have dispelled myths of autonomous individuality and essentialism, replacing them with 
narratives of emergent and interdependent self-organizing systems that explain and are explained 
by autopoiesis, symbiogenesis, hybridities, chimeras, cellular biology and genetics, the 
maintenance of an unlikely atmospheric composition, ocean pH, Earth. “Nature hates a purity” 
(Margulis aphorism, personal communication). Paleontologists, climatologists, earth and life 
scientists have redefined brinksmanship according to the limiting parameters of Holocene 
systems of Earth and life, and they have waved the Anthropocene warning flag, a term of 
coterminous power and vulnerability that ironically matches human immobilization in response, 
marking the challenge that accountability presents for our species.5 We know now what was not 
known at the turn of the twentieth century, or at mid-century, that the environmental conditions 
on Earth that make life possible are regulated by living systems, and that life and the environment 
co-evolve. We know from Darwin that forms of life evolve from other forms of life as fit to 
environmental conditions, and that Life and matter become other than they once were, these 
stories of evolution and Earth history are endless. We know that individual protists, plants, 
animals, and fungi are in fact living co-evolving communities of multiple cell types and bacteria 
that function indivisibly as an ensemble. Physics and complexity theory have undone certainty, 
revealing that claims to ‘know’ merely feign false arrogance, while also opening ‘reality’ to 
contingency and the poised realms of possibility at the edge of Chaos. With the collapse of the 
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guiding authorities of certainty, rationalism, and reductionist science, what’s left is a realm of 
questions, liminal zones of Life and not-Life without clean boundaries or entire edges. We have 
learned that categories don’t hold up, they dissolve and leave in their wake an affective, 
becoming-in-community; nature is anything but fixed, but it opens possibilities for actuality if 
conditions are favorable. Quantum ‘reality’ with its dark matter, dark energy, quark theories, 
Higgs boson, etc. is totally different from the ‘reality’ of 1900 or 1960. We also now understand 
that Life and environment, as familiar to us now, are at risk of collapse caused by anthropogenics-
who-know-better. The paradigm change in science is indisputably well underway, a new set of 
references re-orient Life and its productions as emergent properties of a historicity, one that 
becomes in natureculture-context-matter community –contingent, wildly exceptional, and hardly 
expected.  
It is the disjuncture between the above given ‘state of affairs’ in the social order of advanced 
capitalism and the above given ‘state of affairs’ in science that contextualize and premise the 
political question that motivates my project– knowing and accountable to all of that, what next? 
 
Segue: defining terms (science, imaginary, social imaginary) 
I address ‘science’ as a particular narrative structure that tells the tale of a modern, Western 
inquiry-driven practice that constructs particular sorts of knowledge about the objects it studies. It 
observes, measures, experiments, interprets, and communicates in specialized, discipline-specific 
languages. Science, for this project, is a highly structured way of thinking and doing, one that has 
its own history, philosophy, and communities. Applied, it affects all facets of Western worldview, 
subjectivity, and social life, as well as all facets of Life and Earth systems. 
 The social imaginary, as theorized by Cornelius Castoriadis, is constituted of an 
animating web of meanings that “permeate, orient, and direct the whole life of the society” 
(Castoriadis & Curtis, 1997, p. 7) and of bodily individuals. They form a ‘magma’ of social 
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imaginary significations, such as spirits, gods, God; citizen, nation, state; commodity, money, 
capital; taboo, virtue; thing, tool. The feature that classifies these items within the magma of the 
social imaginary is that they are posited through creation, and not through the “rational” or “real.” 
What Castoriadis presents that translates to my meaning of the imaginary in this project is the 
immediacy of connection between the social imaginary and the human imaginary, tethered by 
subjects who “are what they are by virtue of [embodiment and] the social imaginary significations 
that make them that” (Adams, 2014, p. 71). My meaning of imaginary in this context has nothing 
to do with ‘fictitious’, it has to do with the imaginary as the ‘open interval’ (see Method section 
of this introduction) that produces the subject as a body, and as a socially defined individual, and 
as affective (see below), these misleadingly separate phrases in fact describing something 
heterogeneous and indissociable. The materiality of the imaginary shapes the subject. I follow 
Castoriadis in his attribution to the imaginary of a capacity for reflectiveness and of will (desire), 
as a source of creation that ultimately leads to enaction. The imaginary is the initiating source of 
political enaction:  
One must be able to imagine something other than what is to be able to will; 
and one must be able to will something other than what is to liberate the 
imagination. … When one does not will anything other than what is, the 
imagination is inhibited and repressed; in this case it only represents the 
eternal perpetuation of what is. And if one cannot imagine something other 
than what is, every “decision” is only a choice between possible givens––
given by life as it existed beforehand and by the instituted system––which 
can always be reduced to the results of a calculation or some form of 
reasoning (Castoriadis & Curtis, 1997, 160). 
 
Recent and present history presents horrific cases of the social (political) institution eradicating 
the last traces of subjects’ secular desire (will of one’s own) and reflectiveness. Castoriadis sees 
reflectiveness as a key creative project of human subjectivity, to make and challenge itself and, 
since the social imaginary and subjectivity connect directly, the world brought forth in 
‘worlding’6. In the absence of engaged and reflective subjectivities, states Castoriadis, “not only 
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does every attempt at truth and knowledge collapse but every ethical effort disappears, since all 
responsibility vanishes” (1997, p. 169). Subjectivity and the social imaginary each frame the 
other, through stories told and experienced, through personal meanings and those structured in 
social conditions. These narrations function as myth, engaging metaphor to make sense of the 
world, to make and change (and resist changing) knowledge. For these reasons, the subject 
imaginary is also the battleground of propaganda and marketing, of military and religious 
training, of economic coercions, it is a target of persuasion tactics, and so it can be or be made to 
be vulnerable and shut down. I engage the imaginary of Castoriadis’ vision, the one that questions 
conditions and laws of closure, and that initiates ethical enaction. 
 
 
What my project does.  
 
Knowing and accountable to all of that, what next how? 
 Similar to how the mechanistic, teleological thinking of 19th century science imprinted 
the 20th century social imaginary (Goldman, 2008), the temporal lag between the process thinking 
of uncertainty and contingency that 20th century scientific revelations engender and their as yet 
largely absent expressions in a revised social order has generated a political and social vacuum 
where fools and techno-capitalism rush in. How would a different social imaginary, grounded by 
and inspired by current scientific understandings of Life and Earth, bring forth a world we might 
hope for? What collective imaginary provokes a subjectivity that makes space for the possible 
and enacts conditions for ethical practices? Of course, that question embeds its reciprocal, what 
subjectivity provokes a collective imaginary that makes space for the possible and enacts 
conditions for ethical practices? I am interested in ethical enaction as a political and 




In the literature 
Political and ethical questions of memory and desire have been the mainstay of feminist 
science studies that focus on critiques of androcentric scientific knowledge used to legitimate 
social atrocity, and racial and gendered subjugations. Feminist scholars in the humanities and 
social sciences currently celebrate a ‘new’ and ‘post-human’ thinking beyond binaries, beyond 
nature-culture (J.K. Gibson-Graham, Vicki Kirby, E. Wilson, Haraway), borne, say more feminist 
theorists affiliated by a loosely categorized scholarship of ‘new materialism’, which re-conceives 
matter and bodies (living entities) not as tethered by binaries and essentialized within hard edges 
and entire boundaries but as ‘vibrant’, ‘becoming’, ‘transcorporeal’, ‘nomadic’, ‘intra-actively 
entangled’ and transtemporal (Bennett, Grosz, Alaimo, Colebrook, Braidotti, Barad). Issues of 
subjectivity formation as social and political construction is well-worn feminist territory; a 
vantage that uses social and political conditions of capitalism as ways to read subjectivity are also 
present in the literature, but less so (Stengers, J.K. Gibson-Graham, Haraway, Braidotti). Seldom, 
however, do the literatures of science studies and the philosophy of science cross-pollinate in 
feminist literatures on subjectivity (at the micro-political scale), while holding a critique of 
capitalism and the political at center. This is the intersection within which this project works, and 
I follow Haraway, Barad, Braidotti, and Varela, each of whom put their em-phá-sis on a different 
syl-lá-ble of the science-social-subject triad. 
 Epistemological analysis by feminist scientists and scholars of science from Sandra 
Harding to Evelyn Fox Keller to Donna Haraway and Karen Barad have rightly situated scientific 
knowledge claims as bearing responsibility, as accountable to the world. With the social relations 
of science closely yoked to sustaining the power and profitability of global and American 
capitalism (Werskey, 2007), some material feminisms respond by addressing political change 
through subject politics. “We need to devise new social, ethical, and discursive schemes of 
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subject formation to match the profound transformations we are undergoing. That means we need 
to learn to think differently about ourselves” (Braidotti, 2013, pp. 11-12). The literature of 
feminist new materialisms extends deeply, and unfolds robust visions and epistemological 
arguments for those visions, but once it gets to a certain point it stops, failing to ask the “what, 
then?” question, by what pragmatics might visions be made actual and what are they up against? 
One exception is the academic-activist work of the community economies collective organized 
around the economic geography scholarship of J.K. Gibson-Graham, and my project is largely 
inspired by their affective politics of the ethical subject as an intervention on capitalism, however, 
their project’s focus targets economic subjectivity and practices, while I invert that, my project’s 
focus targets subjectivity, the stories that narrate the subject’s and the collective imaginary of Life 
and Earth, which bear directly on well-being.  
 
Ricorso: What my project does (asks questions). 
 What narratives of what science, then, move subjectivity from affirmative, hopeful theory 
to strategy and useful tactics, or are we lost? This project interrogates science, in order to re-think 
its possibilities for a twenty-first century world. What is an affirmative and hopeful politics of the 
subject up against? What tools are there to use? I claim that questioning the Earth can tell us 
about the social and the subject, in that it allows us to reflect on how we imagine and question the 
Earth and cosmos, and to observe how we respond to those questions. As social beings, we 
question and respond to what we have brought forth and, therefore, to what we are accountable.  
 
Framing the context: Science as iterative narration  
 Wetland ecologist Erik Kiviat’s large study of the New Jersey Meadowlands wetlands 
restoration project found profit-driven corruption by the academy, NGOs, and political 
institutions writ large on the landscape of the restoration project. His research as an ecologist and 
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botanist also found that one taxon does not predict another at any scale. These two facets of his 
findings, the one experiential and the other ‘hard’ science, demonstrate how teleological and 
taxonomic thinking, which characterizes both conventional science research and the subjectivities 
of advanced capitalism, both produces political and economic corruption and is inadequate as an 
epistemology for explaining ecosystem function. According to science historian Steven Goldman, 
the contemporary knowledge problem in science over the ontological divide between experience 
and objective ‘reality’ (the world-out-there) has its roots in the origins of Western philosophy, 
namely the war between the Gods and the Earth Giants. The Gods are represented by the eternal, 
good, and just of Platonic realities, and Earth Giants, as represented by the Sophists, are 
experiential, uncertain, contingent, and particular. This battle over Greek rationalism gets 
perpetuated in the ambivalences within the scientific community, even as the rhetoric of the 
community acknowledges its own temporal character, that science is never done. To resolve this 
dilemma, Goldman, drawing on John Dewey, suggests that experience is the “greatest warrant” 
for both, experience is literally about a “world out there,” which he calls actualities (‘reality’ 
being too controversial and emotional a term) and all experience is uncertain and particular. We 
don’t experience necessity or certainty or truth or any other intellectual construct. Science— as 
the only truth— cannot be defended, and the same applies to other ‘truth-telling genres’ such as 
religion, or social construction, or philosophy, etc. No theory ever achieves the status of empirical 
fact. Science is continually changing at the levels of data, physical instruments, analytic and 
conceptual tools (Heisenberg used matrix algebra to inform relativity theory), assumptions (e.g. 
definitions of the atom or matter), and theories. Scientific changes are unpredictable (Kepler did 
not anticipate Newton, who did not anticipate Einstein, etc.). He underscores Mary Hesse’s 
dictum that we need to keep in mind that the theories we hold to be true are just as likely to be 
falsified in the future as the theories that have been falsified up to the present. The overriding 
message is that claims to scientific knowledge are always influenced by the collective process and 
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language by which it gets produced, and is always corrigible. 
 For all these reasons that Goldman articulates, I concur that one of the keys to 
understanding science as a knowledge-making practice is an understanding of the logics exposed 
by the history of science, as was the focus of William Whewell, Thomas Kuhn, Marjorie Greene, 
Lynn Margulis, and many feminist science scholars. The history and development of evolution 
theory and its progeny, cellular genetics, for example, provide a series of narratives about how 
humans think about Life, and how lives live with other lives. Evolution tropes– survival-of-the-
fittest, descent by modification, competitive struggle, symbiogenesis, inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, self-organization, emergence– become the descriptive metaphors that saturate 
political perceptions of whether, what, and why choices and possibilities of Life do or do not 
exist. These narratives, moving through the imaginary, shape social relations and conditions. 
What is at stake in scientific method, then, in its premises, assumptions, and expectations, is 
fundamentally a way of being, the kinds of people we want to be, and the ways we live 
(Addelson, 1994).  
 Science provides but one of many stories, and its mode of deductive reasoning obscures 
its temporal and corrigible character and fosters false expectations,7 such as for precise certainties 
relating to the future mechanisms, temporalities, and manifestations of global climate change, or 
the laboratory synthesis of oil from synthesized bacteria, but, Goldman states, it may be one of 
the best tools available for dealing with the mysteries and vicissitudes of experience. As much as 
my project draws on Goldman’s scholarly observations about science and society, it lands on one 
critical disagreement with him. I passionately object to his absolution of scientists and the 
scientific community from political and social accountability for their work, he places that 
responsibility instead on an informed democratic citizenry, and in the same breath agrees with the 
Aristotelian notion that human action is non-rational. Goldman’s position does not hold up. 
Erasing the feminist science literature altogether, this position of his, in odd contrast to many of 
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his lectured arguments, represents what this project tries to move on from, an outdated and 
fictitious perception of science that pre-emptively sanctifies its working community with an 
innocence from social and political influence. Given corporate and state sponsorship of academic 
scientific research and its commercial applications, given competitive funding and publishing 
pressures and the risk of skewed and negative results, given that capitalism produces subjects 
driven by growth and profit motives, and given the uninformed citizenry of an undemocratic 
American society, Goldman’s political stance dangerously obstructs engagement and 
accountability.  
 
What my project does (asks questions and makes claims). 
 Science incompletely shapes meanings; something is missing. Though, on the largest of 
scales, scientific knowledge may be considered as one kind of metaphor we use to make sense of 
the world, the discourse of hard science does not trade in metaphor, and it is metaphor that 
functions as the catalyst that makes possible shared meanings and imaginaries. If a re-oriented 
science is to ascribe meaning, to engage and be accountable, then a revised approach to the 
practice and function of science can no longer pretend to exile metaphor. But do we expect 
scientists to also be poets? This thesis treats science as narrative, and attempts to weave a story of 
meanings from scientific theories of embodiment and subjectivity, and therefore my project is 
also about making metaphor, and never about ontology. 
 I show how the ethical takes on a scientific materiality that cannot be quarantined from 
processes of unknowing and a generative world. Can methods and practices and players of a 
scientific inquiry based on deductive reasoning alone explicitly incorporate ethical accountability 
into their methods? In other words, can a science based on an Enlightenment ideology, ruled by 
its conceits of explanatory power, predictive success, and control of nature, accommodate non-
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Euclidean insights about nature and reality made since the early twentieth century, or has the time 
come additional tools for needed for doing science?  
 This project attempts to imagine what it might be to rethink science in ways better 
equipped to deal with the mess, confusion, and relative disorder of current global economic and 
environmental challenges.8 The phrase ‘better equipped’ refers to the reductionist scientific 
research methods characteristic of the Enlightenment which seek the definite, and, according to 
Law, have produced a nature in the image of its limiting methods, because linear determinate 
thinking and methods fail to capacitate understanding the ‘natural’ world. Though scientific 
methods, “orchestrate themselves hegemonically into purported coherence” (Law, 2003, p. 6), 
they cannot describe the complex, impossible, and almost unthinkable world that exceeds our 
capacity to know it. Law asks how are the social sciences– and I amend this to ask of all the 
sciences – to represent mess, the “deliberate imprecision … of private emotions that open us to 
worlds of sensibilities” (p. 3), what I describe as the realm where affect and sentience and 
surprise connect in all-of-a-sudden, creative, and indistinguishable ways that elude definition and 
direct verbal articulation. I look at the interplay, at the co-(m)motions of science and subjectivity, 
to question the status quo of dominant scientific practice and ways we think about scientific 
knowledge claims and how those claims imprint subjects. I make a case for demanding a broader 
epistemic and ethical accountability from the informing and, regrettably, discrete hard and soft 
science disciplines.  
 
Framing the context: Science in terms of the social 
Advancements in science lead slowly to changes in thinking and the collective imaginary; 
early twentieth century scientific insights have yet to find their analogues in a cohesive new 
worldview, though as Alaimo points out, as do J.K. Gibson-Graham, there are rumblings in the 
jungle from ubiquitously dispersed radical environmental and economic movements. Resurgent 
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faith movements, climate change denial, political and economic opportunism of environmental 
disasters, and creationism evidence that the former, unquestioned social authority of science has 
been lost. Is it, perhaps, because the ‘new’ science is contingent, probabalistic, interdisciplinary, 
and too complex for confident assurances of simple teleologies?  Is it because the W.E.I.R.D.9 
mentality of 19th century science still prevails to legitimate imperialistic “benefits from 
atrocity”(Dimock, 2012, p. )? Astrophysics professor Adam Frank observes that in current 
society, “it is politically effective, and socially acceptable, to deny scientific fact” (2013, p. A27). 
Referring to the lack of collective consensus and political action on climate change, Slavoj Žižek 
quotes environmental writer Ed Ayres,  
We are being confronted by something so completely outside our collective 
experience that we don't really see it, even when the evidence is 
overwhelming. For us, that 'something' is a blitz of enormous biological and 
physical alterations in the world that has been sustaining us (Ayres, 1999, p. 
141). ... In order to cope with the threat, our collective ideology is mobilizing 
mechanisms of dissimulation and self-deception up to and including the 
direct will to ignorance (Žižek, 2012, p. 997): ‘a general pattern of behavior 
among threatened human societies is to become more blinkered, rather than 
more focused on the crisis, as they fall’ (Ayres). Catastrophic, but not serious 
.... (Žižek). 
 
 Though academic and science communities retire former ‘truths’ when, as Kuhn, 
observed, anomalies aggregate sufficiently to displace previous ‘knowledge’ with new 
knowledge, the rate of social change, while directly connected to the scientific, moves 
independent of revisions in thinking within scientific communities. Even as ‘reality’ may be 
fundamentally changing for some, dominant inertias persist, inside of which different realities and 
imaginaries gestate, foment; latent energies find ways to push cracks wider, possibility is actual, 
that the implicit may transform into the explicit. Bacterial symbionts bring forth the chimeric 
eukaryotic cell (symbiogenesis). Hybrids, like Geosiphon periforme,10 cyborgs, and the 
reproducing Mycoplasma mycoides,11 transect biological and technological kingdoms. These gaps 
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lacunas, foster both creative tension and opportunity to influence the kind of paradigm shift 
inevitably underway. Rationalism’s hard line that had delineated ontological separation between 
self and other gets blurry. It turns out that what is Life and what is not Life is not so clear-cut; 
making sense, a new and different sense of these animations demands that humans re-think and 
re-know life all over again, a project that is as political as it is scientific and technological.  
The intellectual legacy of science in the Euclidean-Cartesian-Newtonian-capitalist worldview 
functions rhizomatically,12 its reach extends from its origination centuries ago to twenty-first 
century subjects. This worldview, explored in greater depth in Chapter 3, dominates early twenty-
first century Western notions of success and power, and consequently, leaves the larger structures 
of the neoliberal world bereft of effective means to address the crises it generates. These 
structures socialize the populace, who in turn are deprived of tools to avert the certain 
catastrophes at which their trajectories orient. Historically, extinction is a relatively recent 
concept, it hasn’t sunk in; this controversial revelation is at odds with the still-active 19th century 
understanding, as an example, that species are fixed, eternal, and immutable entities of nature. A 
worldview so enmeshes its subjects as to render its calamitous normativities invisible and without 
hope for escape, this is the Foucaultian disciplinary power of hegemony that a radical science and 
politics of collective well-being exposes and destabilizes. 
 
More Pre-Discursive Givens (philosophical ricorsos) 
Against this backdrop, and within its context, germinating in relatively obscure niches of 
the history of natural science and philosophy, another enmeshed narrative quietly unfolds13. 
Going against the reductionist grain of their Cartesian / teleological counterparts, scientific and 
philosophical energies surface which are based on process thinking that builds on contingency, 
relations, indeterminacy, and sentient experience. This minoritarian narrative, explored in Chapter 
4, also constitutes a legacy that the late twentieth century inherits, however nascent and scattered. 
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It finds new form in some ideological structures of late 20th century science, philosophies of 
science, and feminist critical theory. Accordingly, I pay attention in Chapter 5 to the historicity of 
concepts that posthuman / new materialist discourse (they are not synonymous but there is 
significant overlap) puts forth, because ideas come from somewhere (e.g., see Chapter 4), and 
significantly, the social and intellectual context of a particular scholar or philosopher gets 
embedded in the meanings of his (the usual gender) ideas. Periods of history engender particular 
affects. When relocated to new theory, the idea’s initial import, as well as the thinking style and 
conditions that originally contextualized it, continues to reverberate in the meanings of its new 
engagement. The originating philosopher’s mark remains a presence critical to the locus of its 
new life (e.g. Hegel in Žižek, Spinoza’s monism in Braidotti’s new materialism), requiring a 
scholar’s sensitivity to the former setting and disciplined practice in its re-engagement. 
 
Segue: Defining terms (affect / affective). 
 The “affective turn” has proliferated a great deal of literature exploring the connection 
between affect and politics that cuts across post-structuralist, materialisms, and technology and 
media studies thinking, initially re-energized, perhaps, largely by a conversation between Brian 
Massumi and Eve Sedgwick in the early 1990s. But times are different now. Inspired by 
Francisco Varela’s neurobiological explanation of cognition, I locate affectivity in the autopoietic 
flux of the organism.14 I understand thinking and feeling and creating as affective practices. I 
reject the Massumi/Sedgwick framing splits between experience and processes of materiality, 
between perception and experience, between sensation and sentience, between sentience, 
cognition, and consciousness, between affect and emotion. Instead, I engage affectivity in this 
project more in the interest of what affect does politically and less about what affect is (Bargetz, 
2014, p. 302), although I like Kathleen Stewart’s open-ended understanding of affect as 
“individual and collective forces that have gathered to a point of impact to instantiate something” 
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(as cited in Bargetz, p. 302). Brigitte Bargetz distinguishes between a “politics of feeling” and 
“feeling politics” (italics in original) to “make explicit how power and politics materialize 
affectively within subjectivities and everyday practices and, therefore, how they affect political 
agency” (Bargetz, 302). Mark Hansen’s material approach to affect effectively, for me, pulls 
together my affinities with Varela and Braidotti, that affectivity is “the fundamental mode of 
operation of the energetico-material universe in itself” (and of experience in individuated living 
entities)… Affectivity, in short, is the relational force of process as such” (Hansen in Timing of 
Affect, 86). I pay attention to affect, as one element of materiality by which to reflect on 
imaginaries and subjectivities that either impede or potentiate meaningful interventions and 
destabilizations to hegemonic practices of neoliberal power. 
 
Ricorso: what my project does (makes claims). 
 I argue that these perpetuated inflections (monism) in newer theory (new material 
feminisms) by its old meanings, associations, and affects risk sustaining the very conventions that 
‘posthuman new materialisms’ wish to end, and, rather than lending support, they serve to 
undermine important projects. I claim that an open interval directly connects scientific thinking 
with subjectivity and operates through the imaginary, both of the subject and the social. I take the 
imaginary seriously as that which generates and challenges processes of ethical subjectivity and 
power. This space is, therefore, a fiercely contested political site. Discourses in support of what 
Hannah Arendt called the ‘love of the world’, however, are not enough to effect fundamental 
political change. Visionaries of new theoretical models of ethical subjectivity must also think 
strategically, and in terms of tactics and trainings.  
How we think and imagine and act on this connection between science as narrative and 
subjectivity affects (pun intended) lives and environment, and, therefore, demands ethical 
accountability. This feminist critical theory looks at the processes by which subjects are 
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“environmentally based, embodied, embedded, and in symbiosis with each other” (Braidotti, 2011, 
p. 92) and reflects qualitatively on the politics and poetics of these inter- / intra-actions. I explore 
how dynamic, process understandings of science and subjectivity matter in a feminist politics that 
aspires to the transformation of planetary productions of inequality and toxicity through ethical 
relations of collective card and well-being.  
 
Segue: Defining terms (subjectivity, politics, poetics, and ethical)  
 Subjectivity is a process of materiality, an epistemological, not ontological, process of the 
imaginary. It is a dynamic, constantly becoming embodied relation to, in, by, of, and with worlds, 
it references the subject’s experience, actions, narratives, the social imaginary, and discourses that 
generate and are generated by the subject, inclusive of worldview, affect, beliefs, and desires. The 
subject enacts. Enaction is affective. Rosi Braidotti carries subjectivity further, to mean the 
historically contingent “conscious, willful form of political resistance” (2011, 157). 
 To build a theory of subjectivity specific to my project, I follow Francisco Varela’s lead, 
starting with his concept of the autopoietic, enactive entity and of cognition, which is 
topologically connected (see Method section of this introduction) to Lynn Margulis’s concept of 
symbiogenesis and to quantum notions of consciousness; drawing on Varela, Margulis, and 
others, I re-orient a material meaning of ‘self’ (or ‘subject’). I then layer this with J. K. Gibson-
Graham’s politics of affect. These foundations provide for an enriched understanding and critical 
analysis of subjectivity in Braidotti’s critical theory of the posthuman, zoe-nomad. It requires all 
the chapters of this paper to construct this palimpsest of subjectivity, to allow the foundational 
ideas to be explained, contextualized, and built up. It comes together in the end in Chapter 5.  
 It is this extensive and politicized feminist sense of an expanding subjectivity that I look 
at in conversation with sciences and scientific thinking. I call the reciprocal dynamics between 
science and subjectivity, each already independently dynamic on their own terms,  
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‘co-(m)motions’, full of contingent, unpredictable, improvisatory movement that generates 
pattern and shape. 
 By politics, I mean the space of tension in the development of ideas and practices that 
impact collective life, a space open to deliberation and questioning and struggle in working 
through choices, innovations, transformations, practices, and reproductions. Gibson-Graham 
write that “politics is a process of transformation instituted by taking decisions in an undecidable 
terrain” (2006, p. xviii). Effects of anything that affect others, Life and Earth, as such are, 
thereby, political and demanding of ethical accountability, such as knowledge.  
By ‘poetics’ I mean structures and points of view. I apply the term to science as a way to look 
at it in terms of narrative function and metaphoric devices that provide a way to interpret science 
and its history qualitatively. Qualitatively framed, it becomes possible to look at science as 
operating in the imaginary and at its discursive strategies. By looking at science as a poetics, it 
becomes possible to question and re-narrate scientific thinking, its practices, findings, and effects, 
its subjects, its social context, and its scientific objects.  
To explain what I mean by the ethical, here I simply follow Gibson-Graham, “ethics is the 
continual exercising in the face of the need to decide, of a choice to be/act/think in a certain way. 
Ethics involves the embodied practices that bring principles into action” (2006, xxviii). By this 
definition, ethics is active; like a verb, it moves, as in its own motion and as in other things. It 
does things in a context of relationality, like thinking, feeling, writing, and creating, becoming 
with others. In these ways, the ethical is closely tied to affect, with the added action of decision 
making in the face of choice for a “certain way”. The ethical, then, in the context of post-
Cartesian process and new materialist thinking emerges, it is brought forth through skilled 
practices. The ethical, then, is not a feature of dogma, command, control, or power-over, it is a 





If you can fix the broken piece, everything can grow right back.  
It didn’t matter that the water was gone.  
Sometimes you can break something so bad that it can’t get put back together.  
When you’re small, you gotta fix what you can.  
Everybody loses the thing they’re made of.  
That’s even how it is in nature. 
—Hushpuppie  
 
The question of how to enact ethical becoming-in-community gets much attention from 
practicing Buddhists Francisco Varela, a scientist, and J.K. Gibson-Graham, feminist economic 
geographers. They are theoretically joined by feminist theorists committed to an unknowing that 
fosters a collective well-being by relinquishing control and committing to processes of 
emergence. Nothing could be less Cartesian, less Kantian. There are many forces that resist these 
directions. If cultivation of ethical subjectivities that resist a dominant context of advanced 
capitalism’s “blissed-out, techno-sublime euphoria” (Haraway, 2004, p. 324) is serious, then 
theory and possibility alone, while constituting a necessary form of activism on their own terms, 
are insufficient and lack tools to generate fundamental social change. A counter-hegemonic 
politics of possibility necessarily invites and engages struggle; to effect new and particularly 
visioned subjectivities requires skills, training, and assessment;15 as a social movement it must 
prepare strategically and enact tactics, however unconventional and resourceful these may be. 
The initiative must be deeply informed about the thinking behind what it takes on, what it is up 
against.  
One presenting challenge is the politics of a global response to climate change, for example, 
what imaginary does the subject’s attachment to life and extinction get measured against, 3.5 
billion years of life on Earth, 600 million years of eukaryotic life, or a few human lifespans? Each 
of these possibilities shapes a response to the driving anthropocentric desperation that, perhaps, in 
the grand scheme, ‘my life’ may mean nothing? Humans are not so wise –“Next time no big 
brains” (McHarg, 2005) – we will not be here forever. From a posthuman Gaian perspective, that 
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human life has no more meaning than the life of an amoeba is not necessarily highly threatening 
or a source of terror. Living, then, in relation becomes a matter of ethics. I propose that there is 
value in mobilizing a deep time perspective to look at narratives of past crisis, change, and 
emergence that arrive at current and foreseeable Earth conditions and social relations. The natural 




From the perspective of geologic time, Homo sapiens occupy a momentary blip of time, yet the 
change to planetary conditions proceeds at an unprecedented, anthropogenically-induced 
exponential rate, too extreme to remain within the set points (or ‘tipping points’) by which life 
regulates environmental conditions conducive for life, and too rapidly for co-evolutionary 
processes, by which Earth and life systems produced over a span of 3.5 billion years the planet as 
we now know it, to adapt. How and why these pieces –Life, Earth, geosphere, biosphere, 
noösphere (see Chapter 2)– move potentiates radical forces and energies. In the current quantum 
age, both science and subjectivity are in rapid motion. I am interested in how we, as Western 
subjects, might choose to embody these transitions. A response to the ‘what next’ question hangs 
on affect.  
If we accept, as I suggest in this project, that we may now be enmeshed in a transition away 
from a fundamental set of dominant paradigms, then we understand that we are living within the 
cracks and fissures of an historical transformation; this may be a threatening place of terminal 
fear and it may also be a space of creativity, a place of temporal/ spatial gaps from which shadow 





What my project does not do. 
 Outside the scope of this project is an envisioning of what a radical revolution to the 
Western imaginary might look like. While the abstractions I outline in this project deserve 
translation to strategic practices and tactics, I get as far in this project as to provide a context for 
this next phase. I do not make claims as to what might be the skill-set of this new imaginary, or 
where such skills and practices that would cultivate or (re)train subject imaginaries might already 
be modeled. Nor do I make claims as to how a change from marginalization to substantive power 
might come about temporally (saltation, gradualism, catastrophic, etc.), materially (activism, 
violence, attrition, collapse, emergence, etc.), or affectively. I make no claims of how a new 
subjectivity might perform new social conditions, or be performed by new political practices of 
ethical secularity and difference. Transformed social realities are not to be defined in advance, 
only might emerge from conducive, fostering conditions. 
 I hope that issues I identify here may be explicitly interrogated and leveraged in work 
that recognizes various praxes that develop skills of a new subjectivity, such as those exemplified 
by alternative community economy practices, the young farmer movement, environmental 
activisms, and the training of fine and performing artists, that these might become more 
effectively and meaningfully interconnected in strategic and skilled movements. Conceivably, an 
exploration of this phase of the project could follow later! Accordingly, I stay with the co-
(m)motions between science and subjectivity as a politics and philosophy with critical effects, to 







Oil rig ferry driver: Want a chicken biscuit? It’s good for ya’. 
I’ve been eating these all my life. I keep the wrappers in the boat  
cuz they remind me who I used to be when I eat each one.  
The smell makes me feel cohesive. 
 
Hushpuppie: I want to be cohesive. 
 
 
 John Law’s description of the goals for alternative methodologies initiate from his 
premise that method is performative, it enacts and produces realities, and so he addresses both 
their process and politics: 
Other possibilities can be imagined, for instance if we attend to non-
coherence” (2004, p. 85). The task is to imagine methods when they no 
longer seek the definite, the repeatable, the more or less stable, when they no 
longer assume that this is what they are after (p. 6). …We need to unmake 
our desire and expectation for security (p. 9) … to find ways of living with 
uncertainty…ways of making methods without accompanying imperialisms 
(p. 12).  
 
Law romanticizes in theoretical sloppiness, overlooking the performative problems he creates by 
dividing method, defined by him as the ‘enaction of boundaries’, from the emergence of ‘realities 
of presence, manifest absence, and Otherness’. Ultimately his slippery and imprecise language 
cannot support his arguments, and though, in contrast to a premise of my thesis, he separates 
relational assemblages from materiality, his objective to foster politically responsible imaginaries 
elucidates my goals. In this project I experiment with two separate but, nevertheless, paired 
qualitative methods of my own invention, which I engage as a particular approach to re-narration 
that, I hope, accommodates movement, unknowing, and uncertainty. I call these two methods 





I borrow ‘topological’ from the mathematics discipline, but put it to conceptual use 
metaphorically, dictionary defined as: 
 
Figure 3. Definition of topology 
 
While I embrace both meanings metaphorically, the specific reference to patterns of computer 
and artificial intelligence networking has no application within my use of the term. To explain 
how I engage topology as a methodology in this project, I begin from an elementary description 
of its mathematical meaning. In a topological imaginary, if a cube gets pulled askew, it is still a 
cube, a sphere that gets dented, twisted, or deformed is still a sphere. A circle is topologically 
equivalent to an ellipse, gender differences would be topological equivalences, too. Topological 
edges and points, whether in two dimensions or three, potentially, may be flexibly defined, 
variously constituted, and multi-functional, depending on the shared features that contextualize an 
entity’s structure and relations. Depending on the situation, light behaves either as a wave or a 
particle. The bioluminescent endosymbiont Vibrio fischeri mimics moonlight in dark waters to 
mask the shadow of the night-feeding bobtail squid, Euprymna scolopes, from shadow-seeking 
predators, the same endosymbiont’s luminescence in the fish Monocentris japonicus functions to 
attract mates. The bacterium’s systems of quorum sensing (bacterial cognition) allows V. fischeri 
to recognize whether it is in the open sea waters, inside the M. japonicas, or inside a light organ 
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 A strip of paper with its ends joined with a twist becomes a Mobius strip, two planes 
becomes only one continuous surface. But it does have edges. A three dimensional Mobius with 
no edges is a Klein bottle, the inside is the outside, a form with no volume. The marketing 
brochure of the Acme Klein Bottle Company calls it "the finest closed, non-orientable, boundary-
free manifolds sold anywhere in our three spatial dimensions".16 Not being a mathematician, 





Figure 5. Klein bottle. image credit: Torolf Sauerman, Bathsheba, Satgnu: darkroastedblend.com 
 
Topology has to do with the study of spatial objects such as curves, surfaces, 
the space we call our universe, the space-time of general relativity, fractals, 
knots, and manifolds (which are objects with some of the same basic spatial 
properties as our universe), phase spaces that are encountered in physics. … 
Topology can be used to abstract the inherent connectivity of objects while 
ignoring their detailed form (Weisstein, 1999-2016). 
 
One of the ways topologies may be built up is from open intervals, the space between a and b that 
does not include its end points a and b: 
 
 
Figure 6. Open interval.  
An open interval is an interval that does not include its end points (Weisstein, 1999). 
 
 
To me this concept is significant in providing a conceptually clear tool for focusing on the gap as 
a material potentiating space of change and innovation, of epigenetic sentience and regulation, of 
consciousness, of synaptic leaps, of creative enactions liberated from (un-anchored by) node-
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centric thinking.17 It is not Bergson’s or Massumi’s temporal, affective space. I think of the open 
interval as a phase space or as Kauffman’s space of the poised realm of the adjacent possible (to 
be explained later), and as Vico’s chaos (explained in Chapter 4), and as the empty spaces for 
breath and juxtaposition and complexity by which poetry structures and evokes its can’t-be-put-
into-words meanings. The open interval is the realm of limitless possibility that pre-exists 
actuality. For my methodological interests, then, topology is about the connectivity of qualitative 
properties and characteristics across spaces (inclusive of temporalities) and their inter-/intra-
relationships. 
 I engage this topological method by analyzing qualitative traits, both descriptive (e.g. 
deterministic, conflicted, iconoclastic, linear, diffractive, patriarchal, minoritarian, conforming to 
dominance, unpredictable, etc.) and affective (e.g. melancholic, hopeful, anxious, caring); noting 
these, I observe the patterns they form as a sort of connective (or disconnective) tissue across the 
organs and fluid systems and skeletal structures of thinking about biosphere, noösphere 
(explained in Chapter 2), and geosphere, and across the historicity of living / once-lived / and to-
be lived bodies. As a method, topology allows for porosity, layering, a closure that is open (or 
v.v.), for paradox and self-dilation, for interaction, for motion. 
 
 Technê 
 My second methodology, technê, the Greek word translated usually as ‘craft’ or ‘art’, 
works in tandem with my topological method.18 In this project I engage one specific mode of 
technê, weaving, as a process to assemble and pull apart identified topologies in order to create 
something new, a life-affirming ethical subjectivity, and/or deconstruct something old, Cartesian-
Newtonian thinking. This methodological weaving, as technê, draws metaphorically from the 
literal practice of the craft, the skilled process that makes (poiesis) one fabric from many 
disparate threads in science, philosophy, and feminism. 
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 Technê is the know-how (as opposed to knowledge, in this case the topologies) that 
brings into existence products separate from the technê itself, the carpenter builds a table, the 
weaver makes a cloth. As a methodological technique technê breaks down the divide between 
theory (‘theôria’-looking) and practice, to dismiss from right out of the gate any pretense to 
value-free philosophies of knowledge and reality. While my project finds problems with the 
teleologies and binaries of hegemonic Western thinking that were seeded by classicism, I find 
Aristotle’s sense of technê in the Nichomachean Ethics, the praxis (or action) that deals with 
change and everyday contingencies, and Plato’s sense of technê, that which accounts for and 
seeks the welfare of its object, to be consonant with a contemporary feminist politics of care and 
well-being that places value in what gets brought into existence, whether that be the health of 
humans or animals, laws for the ethical governance of a city, or a garden. From technê, something 
advantageous to collective well-being emerges. Technê refers to the achievement of a skill that 
gets taught and practiced. My engagement of this concept as a feminist methodology by which to 
evaluate contemporary contexts and possibilities allows me to identify ethical enaction as an 
embodied and skilled form of materiality. I incorporate in my methodological precept of technê 
what the Stoics integrated into the concept: technê expresses and generates feelings that lead one 
to act, and to be held accountable, and so technê deals with the subject’s affect, described by 
Zeno as, for example, the love of music and the arts. Technê is the skill that makes possible 
creating and innovation. For Zeno technê represented the “systematic collection of cognitions 
unified by practice for some goal advantageous to life” (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta I, 73). 
Plotinus develops Zeno’s affective technê further, similarly found in process thinkers, as the 
capacity to enact paradox, the skill of blending contrasting elements of the universe, commonly 
practiced, as Plotinus notes, in dance, music, drama, and as I note in Chapter 4, in Vico’s Chaos. 
As a topological trait, paradox characterizes Karen Barad’s onto-epistemologies (Chapter 4),19 
Francisco Varela’s autopoiesis and ‘ethical know-how’ (Chapters 4 and 5), Rosi Braidotti’s zoe-
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nomadic subjectivity (Chapter 5), and quantum physics. (Newtonian physics works, but the more 
accurate quantum physics proves energy and matter to be controvertible.) Transecting the 
chapters of this project, I intend the reader to follow such tropes as paradox, monstrosity, 
tensions, affect, motion, and bringing forth.20 These form the long threads of material for this 
weave, that in its weaving traces ricorsos, layerings and knottings that lengthen, fold back, repeat, 
change, and which, along with unravelings, mark new patterns, new fabric in the becoming of 
shifting topologies, like Penelope at her weaving and unweaving to stave off the offending, 
predatorial interests and effects of a too-long patriarchy.  
 
Motion 
 The methodological pairing of topology with technê reveals movement and energy, 
creative-unchoreographed-emergent-observable motions. If one imagines this dance of rhythms 
and events placed on a proscenium stage, observed against a backdrop of chronological moving 
images (in reverse) of the historicity of the moment, patterns emerge that inform a task of this 
project, the political and ethical radical act that asks, how and why do we come to know, and by 
what worldview? How different was the male bourgeois subject of Victorian England (Darwin) 
from a Žižek or a techno-savvy American urban millennial? How different was the planet Earth 
in 1950 from Earth in 2015? The atom in 1900 was a very different particle from the atom after 
the Higgs boson. Genetic determinism as understood in 1960 bears little resemblance to the 
understandings after 2000 of the cellular mechanisms of genetic modification by either epigenetic 
processes or laboratory synthesis. Tensions between convention and change characterize 
transition, and the old adage–the more things change the more they stay the same– shows up. 
Craig Venter, credited as the inventor’ of a bacterium with a computer-synthesized genome, 
exemplifies neo-Darwinism taken to a digital extreme; frighteningly, he defines Life as “DNA 
software-driven machines” (Freeman, 2013). This we know not to be true, life is not a machine, 
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but myths retain great power long after their origination. Stuart Kauffman points out we will need 
new myths, new narrative resources, new imaginaries.21 Ultimately, transformations of the 
imaginary change social and economic conditions, and in another grand ricorso change 
subjectivities. These dynamic timespace topologies between context and entity equally pertain to 
the micro-political level of the affective subject. Such transitions, though, are not neat or 
necessarily permanent.22 As research methodologies, topology and technê may be engaged as 
tools in the navigation of the perilous, life-threatening channel between Scylla and Charybdis,23 
between environmental and economic cataclysms, between neoliberal utilitarianism and 
patrimonies of power. 
 
Picking a course between Scylla and Charybdis 
Hushpuppie (in chair next to oil rig ferryman, looking out at the gulf):  
Which way we goin’? 
Ferryman: It don’t matter, baby. 
 This boat’ll take you exactly where you need to be.  




 A self-reflexivity that considers How and why do we come to ‘know’ what, and by what 
worldview? opens space for ambiguity, flexibility, complexity, and for changes to worldview. 
Such curiosity drives the spirit, if not the practice, of scientific, philosophical, and feminist 
inquiry. Serious attempts to respond to the question immediately render disciplinary divides 
between politics, science, philosophy, feminism, and art moot, and inevitably break with the 
norms of institutionalized academic inquiry, for the discursive productions that result can only be 
unwieldy and incomplete, and these traits certainly characterize this project. My retort, however, 
is that large questions still need to be asked, and the judgmental expectations of academic 
convention, which effectively serve to sanction reductionist inquiry, must be resisted, however 
partial and incomplete the product. Large questions lead to expansive and interconnected 
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discourse, which in a frame of feminist desires gives access to and hope for fundamental change 
to normative Western subjectivities.  
 Much like sending a stone (flat, weighted, edges soft and rounded, slate is best, not larger 
than your loosely cupped hand, not too small) jettisoning across a vast liquid plane, a large flat 
plane-of-immanence lake just after a hard rain, skipping first in large leaps, progressively smaller, 
until it just skims along the surface tension, then appears to float momentarily before it gently 
sinks from view, I have had to pick my narrows to manage broad dangers. Because my incentive 
is to study the co-(m)motions between science and subjectivity as a matter of political and ethical 
significance, even as a process of materiality, I steer clear of psychoanalytic and psychological 
dimensions of subjectivity in my analysis. This choice has caused me to steer clear, as much as is 
feasible, of post-structural thinkers, because the “linguistic turn” of this ‘school of thought’, 
which privileges language over embodiment, draws directly on psychoanalytic theory and on the 
metaphysics of representation and the sign, and in so doing reinforces a gendered Cartesian split I 
don’t accept, namely between body/substance and mind/thought/form (in word as deed). This 
means that I do not take the path of Althusser, Lacan, Freud, Saussure, Butler, Sedgwick, Irigaray 
(less post-structural as essentialist), Grosz, and Elizabeth Wilson. And while Vicki Kirby 
positions her arguments about the body as framed to enable possibility and to deny such discrete 
splits (nature/culture, matter/representation, self/other), her allegiance to a Saussurian post-
structuralism leaves her in the awkward position of having to modify metaphors of the body as 
inscribed by culture by inverting the claim, presenting an awkward pseudo-biological metaphor 
that flesh and matter speak to us (Kirby, 1997). I reference J.K. Gibson-Graham more for their 
attentions to the politics of affect in cultivating post-capitalist ethical practices than for their post-
structuralist positioning in, for example, performativity. The post-structural privilege given to 
verbal text necessitates the wearing of blinders that channel and center its academic gaze on 
humans, leaving thinking about the subject and Life as all life entities, as the phrase ‘more-than-
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human’ suggests,24 corporeality, and the non-verbal as remainders relegated to the margins, to the 
effect of constraining the imaginary within anthropocentrism; the human, like the sun, centers 
others’ orbits. While a full evaluation of human subjectivity could not be complete without an 
acknowledgement of the psychoanalytic, many scholars do this work, and I needn’t. Additionally, 
I have intentionally steered clear of what is also important work that focuses on the co-
(m)motions between technology, specifically, and subjectivity, and the related cyborgian, 
formalist, and computational questions that go along with this. Luciana Parisi does this well. She 
argues based from her sophisticated understanding of computational algorithms to make claims 
congruent with what I argue here about uncertainty as a material space of possibility for political 
change.25 The stakes for my project concern planetary processes of Life, in its broadest 
conceptualization, from bacterium to complex eukaryotes. While technology and Life admittedly 
are neither functionally discrete nor autonomous, the field opens a vast forum of investigation 
that is also already done well by others, setting it aside allows me to constrain my thematic focus 
to matters of Life, which at this point in the history of science and technology, according to the 
definition of Life that autopoiesis provides, computers and laboratory syntheses are not.  
 Another criteria by which I have limited my scope in order to make a point, is that I am 
primarily concerned in this project with pursuing questions of Life, materiality, and subjectivity 
as framed by the philosophy of science and science, as opposed to by anthropology, sociology, 
political philosophy, cultural studies, and contemporary literature. That, too, is well-covered 
terrain by the impressive likes of Myra Hird, Butler and Grosz (again), John Protevi, Carey 
Wolfe, Claire Colebrook, and Vicki Kirby (who also grounds her work in psychology). This does 
not mean that I reject the relevance of the concerns of such disciplines, and I especially embrace 
the qualitative emphasis of these modes of inquiry, and I find they importantly contribute to a re-
conception of what science does, only that a focus on their literatures would hijack and confuse 
my look at the generation and assimilation of narratives from the history, philosophy, and 
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practices of science. That said, to emphasize the contemporary political relevance of my topic, I 
do engage the work of interdisciplinary scholars whose works transect critical, philosophical, 
scientific, and feminist scholarship in critiquing capitalism and/or locating affirmative, embodied 
and embedded political possibility. After all the filtrations mentioned above, the primary models I 
engage come from Giambattista Vico, Charles Darwin, Francisco Varela, Lynn Margulis, Stuart 
Kauffman, Suzanne Langer, Karen Barad, and Rosi Braidotti. I also take great fun in using the 
Hegelian Slavoj Zizec as my poster child of affective despondency and Waiting for Godot that the 
conventions of three hundred years (minimally) of patriarchal capitalist domination produce. By 
setting these limiting parameters, my project becomes not as unwieldy as it might at first seem. 
Surely I have missed some critical contributors and threads [I still need to incorporate Sara 
Ahmed], and simply chosen not to take on others,26 in the way fine silk textiles in India or fine 
Turkish rugs might leave sections of its base fabric unadorned, imperfections are expected and 
obligatory.  
 
What my project argues. 
This’s the most important thing I can teach y’all.  
You gotta learn how to take care of people  
smaller and sweeter than you are. 
—Bathtub teacher 
 
 I argue that, having debunked the myths of objectivity, the legitimacy of patriarchal 
power, rational individualism, and the divine exceptionalism of the human (a euphemism for the 
white European male), we need to reinvent science and discover for the first time secular 
thinking. Current planetary conditions mandate that scientific practice come out of its reclusive 
refuge in the timelessness of solitary confinement and acknowledge its relationality and 
embeddedness in a complex, embodied world. Knowledge, being of, by, about, and in the world, 
is inherently political, it has real effects in the world and on others, and so all knowledge 
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obligates accountability. The ethical is at the center of, entangled in, knowledge practices. This 
premise of feminist epistemologies exposes the thinking of the scholar of German 
naturphilosophie looking for a linear deduction that would legitimize feminist theory of 
materiality (he used the same argument to object to Barad’s argument for an ethical politics), as 
archaic, patronizing, defensive in its offense, and melancholic27 about the obsolescence of 
intellectual power structures that had ‘brought him forth’. One of the most salient and to-be-
celebrated properties of science as a discipline, irrevocably established by Thomas Kuhn, is that 
scientific revolutions reflect and generate fundamental changes in worldview and philosophy and 
change how worlds get lived. Acknowledging that we may be in the midst of some sort of 
transition, a quantum/techno-scientific revolution, contemporary debates about embodiment, 
subjectivity, life-itself, and materiality are not idle concerns of the elite, but integrally entangled, 
politically prescient practical issues. 
  
Outline of thesis to come  
I see that I’m a little piece of a big big universe and that makes things right. 
When I die, the scientists of the future, they’re gonna find it all, they’re gonna know. 
Once there was a hushpuppy and she lived with her daddy in the bathtub. 
—Hushpuppie 
 
 I observe stories told by the interaction of science and worldview, which reveal patterns 
not only of domination but also of radical possibility for change to Western subjectivity and its 
collective imaginary. To contrast the modern tale of Cartesian dichotomies and teleologies, I also 
trace patterns that reveal a paradigmatic move in the offing, one that moves toward self-
organization and possibility, a shadow story that is rich in political possibilities for gathering a 
movement that resists economic hegemonies and environmental utilitarianisms integral to 
advanced techno-capitalism.  Tracing these stories is useful for making sense of current 
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conditions, processes, and hopes, and sheds light on how the historicity of contemporary energies 
either inspire or immobilize, depending on which narratives incite what actions.  
 Chapter 1, Why Žižek Is Miserable and Rosi Is Not, establishes the significance of affect 
and intellectual moorings to a subject’s worldview. By contrasting Žižek with Braidotti, I 
emphasize the subject’s imaginary as a critical site of political contestation. At issue in the 
contrast between these two subjectivities are very different narrations of how imaginaries of life 
and materiality interconnect to either foster or foreclose political possibility. At stake are the 
human praxes that such opposing subjectivities confer, which make critical differences to a planet 
in crisis as inscribed by twin anthropogenic events, ecological and economic. 
 Chapter 2 What is Earth? looks more closely at these stakes in scientific terms of the 
planet as a scientific object of study, as a system of systems that provides the habitus of life-itself. 
This chapter responds to the question, What is Earth in the twenty-first century as a scientific 
object of new and politicized knowledge practices? as simultaneously a question of science, 
subjectivity, the imaginary, and ethics. I connect the systems-thinking by Vladimir Vernadsky 
(biosphere, geosphere, noösphere), Lynn Margulis (Gaia, symbiogenesis), and Francisco Varela 
(enactive cognition) to the embodied process feminisms of Alaimo’s transcorporeality, Baradian 
intra-actions, and Haraway’s beings-as relatings. The intended function of this chapter is to 
contextualize the need for an expanded imaginary of the planet, and to deepen an understanding 
of the interconnections at play in articulating the stakes of a Western subjectivity incited to 
account for a human ethics of life and planet.  
 Kant asked, what may I hope?, and this question frames the explorations of Chapters 3 
through 5. In Chapters 3 and 4, Memory I and II, I look separately at two opposing 
scientific/philosophical genealogies of a contemporary Western subjectivity: the organizing 
premise of the first is that science narrates subjectivity, the premise of the second is that 
subjectivity narrates science. The first, Chapter 3, focuses on the philosophical assumption of 
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telos as the expression of a patriarchal and deterministic worldview tied to Cartesian-Newtonian 
convention; the second, Chapter Four, uses the trope of Vico’s Chaos to trace an anti-Cartesian 
minoritarian thread of process-thinking. These two orientations set the stage for my analysis in 
the last chapter of recent feminist (mostly) scholarship on science and subjectivity as mattering 
political hopes. 
 The merger of Enlightenment science with Cartesian rationalism in the 17th century 
continues, in my opinion, to narrate the contemporary “genetic social imaginary,” a phrase used 
by Sarah Franklin (2000) to describe advanced capitalism and its Western subjects. Chapter 3, 
Memory I: The Monster in Our Midst, science narrates subjectivity, looks at the historicity of 
what I see as explaining this contemporary immobilization. To make this argument I put Kant and 
Darwin in conversation on the topic of telos. I show two things simultaneously. I show that the 
dogmatic precepts and qualities of monotheistic church power were merely appropriated by the 
men and institutions of so-called secular science, and, secondly, that these constraints imposed a 
great weight of social normativity on Kant and Darwin, to different effects. In the end, Kant got 
stifled and Darwin broke free, but neither Kant nor Darwin resolved what for them was an a priori 
dichotomy of reason and the imaginary. While the dominating charismatic of monotheism 
remains a monster in our midst, and largely explains what an alternative politics is up against, 
Darwin’s contributions to scientific thinking may be just coming into focus.  
 Because of the negative effects associated with the subject positions produced by the 
Cartesian/ rationalist/ reductionist genealogy of the genetic social imaginary, process thinkers 
prior to the late-20th century attract renewed attention. Chapter 4, Memory II: Vico’s Chaos looks 
back to a counter-hegemonic memory that contrasts the tale told in Chapter 3. With the 
displacement of telos and objectivity by process and engagement, whole new approaches to 
science open, other worldviews are made possible, and subjectivity, in the not-always explicit 
richness of its social, cultural, political, and gender attachments, narrates scientific inquiry. 
 
 42 
Understanding life-itself, the imaginary, cognition, and experience as embodied processes of 
materiality fundamentally affects subjectivity. I negotiate this vast terrain thematically by using 
Vico’s science of history, the Ricorso, like Ariadne’s thread to guide a way through crosscurrents 
of chaos, myth, the social, and the scientific in an Other twentieth century subjectivity.  
 Chapter 5, Desire: The Queer Co-(m)motions of Science and Subjectivity, puts into 
conversation new work in theoretical and evolution science and feminist theories of matter and 
subjectivity. These are not distinct one from the other. The theoretical constructions of new 
materialist feminisms articulate new understandings of matter and politicized visions of 
subjectivity, drawn from Memory (the contrasted thinking styles, telos and process, presented in 
the previous two chapters) and from more recent scientific and technological developments, in 
imagining the bringing forth of an Other and ethical world / planet. After introducing new 
thinking in science, I look at how the works of scientists and theorists Varela and Barad illustrate 
a very different paradigm in which scientific understandings of ‘natureculture’ inextricably 
entangle the social and the subject.  Rosi Braidotti explores from her perspective as a critical 
theorist the political implications and possibilities of this radical change to the imaginary through 
a focus on her theory of nomadic subjectivity. I review and critique Braidotti’s work in light of 
her aspirations for new materialist feminisms as a political project of transformation within 






 1  Hushpuppie, a character in the film Beasts of the Southern Wild. Each epigraph in the 
Introduction has been taken from this film. 
 
 2  This exchange bears striking resemblance to Lynn Margulis’ response to Richard 
Dawkins: Dawkins: “[The standard story for (the evolution of) ordinary animals (by selection 
pressures)] is highly plausible, it's economical, it's parsimonious, why on earth would you want to 
drag in symbiogenesis when it's such an unparsimonious, uneconomical-?” [35:01]  
Margulis, “Because it’s there.”  
 
 3  Varela was extremely conscious of the political dangers of this in leading to eugenics, 
war, and fascism. He analyzed the Chilean civil war as a “wrong epistemology” (recording, 
1978). 
 
 4  Varela does not love the word emergence, saying we need a new one. He prefers 
bringing forth, as a whole that leaves behind no parts. 
 
 5  Lynn Margulis reminds that Homo sapiens are irrelevant and superfluous to Gaian 
function. 
  
 6  My surprise neologism, I kind of like it so I did not delete it. Subsequently, I’ve 
discovered the neologism has been coined by the likes of Heidegger, Spivak, and many others. 
 
 7  Goldman lectures, Science, Technology, and Social Progress, 1989. 
 
 8  This statement is an adaption of sociologist and STS scholar John Law’s After Method: 
Mess in Social Science Research (Routledge, NY 2004). 
 
 9  White European Intellectual Rationalist Democratic 
 
 10  A fungus (a eukaryote with intracellular motility) latches on to a cyanobacterium, 
Nostoc. They merge; the fungus engulfs the Nostoc. This parasexual fusion produces a little green 
bladder organism. 
 
 11  This is a bacterium generated by transplanting a computer synthesized laboratory 
genome into, and replacing the genome, in an existing living cell. Craig Venter gets the credit for 
this accomplishment in the field of ‘synthetic genomics’, his reward being a $300 million deal 
with EXXON for research and design of an algae that produces diesel fuel. Industrial techno-life-
capitalism at its finest. 
 
 12  Rhizomatic growth is a mechanism of cell motility. It potentiates indeterminate 
growth of a genetic monoculture, it is not a mechanism of reproduction. It is a common motility 
mechanism of invasive species, such as in phragmites and Japanese knotweed in the Northeast of 
the USA. 
 







 14  This is also quite Whiteheadian. 
 
 15  The military and religions have long understood and modeled the effectiveness of 
skills training. 
 
 16  Read more at http://www.darkroastedblend.com/2013/05/topological-marvel-klein-
bottle-in-art.html#Tm2smR5IQRVaZKrE.99. 
 
 17  Node-centric thinking characterizes both the agencies of an actor in terms of what  
I consider to be the limiting but very popular actor-network theory, and ‘ontologies’ of the 
performative subject in Gibson-Graham’s post-capitalist politics that is at odds with their  
visions for cultivating stances that produce embodied “new affective relations with the world” 
(2006, p. 7). 
 
 18  I am indebted to Mary Ingle for this insight into technê as weaving, and to Steven 
Smith for his reminder that without technê, there is no poiesis. The following is informed by: 
Parry, Richard, "Episteme and Technê", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/episteme-technê/>. 
 
 19  Varela anticipated Barad in this concept, but she coined and popularized the term. 
 
 20  Bringing forth, less accurately referred to as emergence, is a post-Cartesian theme 
underscored by Varela through neurobiological research, by Karen Barad in quantum field theory, 
and in the zoe-nomadic subjectivity of Rosi Braidotti’s critical theory. 
 
 21  Given my objection to the lack of secular thinking in the sciences, explored in 
Chapter 3, I feel Kauffman goes too far in calling for a reinvention of the sacred. 
 
 22  Pernicious books that argue for genetic explanations for racial behavior, Western 
exceptionalism, and Caucasian supremacy still find mass-market publication, such as A 
Troublesome Inheritance, Genes, Race and Human History, 2015. Perhaps equally horrific is that 
its 19th-century-style British author, Nicholas Wade, was recently a long-term science writer for 
two powerful publications journal Science and The New York Times, reflecting the newspaper 
corporation’s five generations of 19th century style dynastic control by the Sulzberger family. 
 
 23  Perhaps the metaphor reaches too far or, perhaps, about right. Ulysses’ crossing 
suffered great losses, the ship destroyed, but a few survivors, clinging to a raft, made it through 
alive. 
 
 24  The phrase itself— more-than-human—is case in point. 
 
 25  I wonder whether the “blissed out techno-euphoria” of contemporary quotidian 
computing is explained, in part, as a holdover of [reassuringly familiar] deterministic, linear 
teleologies that buffer the disorienting nature of actuality that new insights in physics and biology 
narrate. 
 
 26  I talk about ethics, but leave off at the gate of power, again because its discussion 
would swell this body of themes beyond what could be managed. Discourses of power are 





 27  Walter Benjamin describes ‘left melancholia’ as “attachment to a past political 
analysis or identity that is stronger than the interest in present possibilities for mobilization, 
alliance, or transformation” (Brown 1999, p. 20). As opposed to mourning, which frees a subject 






WHY ŽIŽEK IS MISERABLE AND ROSI IS NOT 
 
 How different worldviews manifest different and particular affects in its subjects may be 
shown by contrasting the subjectivities of two critical theorists of advanced capitalism, Slavoj 
Žižek and Rosi Braidotti. The witings of the former, Žižek, are framed by the legacies of 
patriarchal privilege that follow an education in Western philosophy (e.g. Less Than Nothing, 
Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism); the latter, Braidotti, is allied with a radical 
feminism built on Continental process philosophy (Bergson, Deleuze & Guattari). Exemplifying 
feminist claims regarding the affective productions of advanced capitalism, Žižek is melancholic 
(Gibson-Graham, 2006) while Braidotti remains affirmative and hopeful. At issue in this contrast 
are, respectively, their very different narrations of how life and materiality interconnect in the 
social imaginary either to foster or to deny political possibility. The juxtaposition of the different 
affects in Žižek and Braidotti illustrates the imaginary, both the subject’s and the collective social 
imaginary, as a contested site of political struggle; where Žižek identifies dialectical conflict, 
Braidotti identifies engagement and paradox. At stake in their opposing stances is nothing less 
than an ethics of human praxis as Earth encounters current twin anthropogenic crises, ecological 
and economic.  
 In making my case I figuratively engage two representations, one of Žižek as the most 
intelligent of dinosaurs, the Dromaeosauridae, whose fossil remains are found in Slovenia 
(Žižek’s home country), and the other of an Australian (Rosi Braidotti’s home country) lichen, 
the Baeomyces heteromorphus. Putting Žižek, as extinct dinosaur, and Braidotti, as lichen, in 
contrasting relief depicts the clash of intellectual cultures these two critical theorists represent. I 




produces a fundamentally different subjectivity and affect than that schooled to the linear binaries 
and taxonomy-driven traditions of Cartesian thought. Both Braidotti’s and Žižek share a desire to 
reform or end unfettered neoliberal capitalism by tilting theory towards radical contingency and 
emergence. Unlike Žižek, Braidotti’s project is not centrally one of philosophy; Braidotti engages 
theory to support her centrally ethical project, which is one of political activism and feminism. 
The ‘cartographic’ method Braidotti engages to define her ethical subject is far removed from the 
oppositional methods of Žižek’s Hegelian-inspired dialectical thinking. Hers “is a map that draws 
the trajectory of changes, transformation, and becomings … for these are strange times, and 










Figure 7. Dromaeosauridae, a Slovenian dinosaur. Illustration by Michael Skrepnik (2005) 
 
The dromaeosauridae ((meaning "swift lizards") were small (wolf-sized) to large (up to 30 feet long!) theropods which 
had specialized features such as a well-developed slashing talon on their second pedal phalanx (toe), a stiffened tail 
which possibly functioned as a dynamic stabilizer, and large grasping manus (hands). They were well-equipped with 
claws, muscular toothy jaws, and agile bodies. These dromaeosaurs have been assumed to have been active, fierce 
predators …Truly an example of evolution producing a killing machine (jrh & Smith, 2006). They were the most 
intelligent group of dinosaurs (Dinosaurs and Paleontology Dictionary, 2005-2016).  Fossil remains have been found in 






Rosi is not. 
Lichens are formed from a combination of a fungal partner (mycobiont) and an algal partner 
(phycobiont) growing in symbiotic association on a solid surface (as a tree or rock).  
 
baeo – small 
hetero– a combining form meaning “different,” “other” (dictionary.com, 
2002);  
origin: combining form of Greek héteros:  the other of two, other, different 
morph– 1.Biology. an individual of one particular form, as a worker ant,  






Figure 8. Baeomyces heteromorphus, an Australian lichen. Photographer: Heino Lepp 







thallus: a plant or plantlike body (as of an alga, fungus, or moss) that lacks 
differentiation into distinct members (as stem, leaves, and roots) and does 
not grow from an apical point (Merriam-Webster Science Dictionary, 2016). 
apothecium: a fungal reproductive structure, in which the fungus reproduces 
itself through the production of spores. These spores will disperse and 
germinate into new fungi, but they will not produce new lichens. For a lichen 
to reproduce, the fungus and alga disperse together (Regents of University of 
California, 2016). 
 
 A lichen may absorb certain mineral nutrients from any of these substrates on which it 
grows, but is generally self-reliant in feeding itself through photosynthesis in the algal cells. 
Lichens growing on rocks, though, may release chemicals which speed the degradation of the 
rock into soil, and thus promote production of new soils. Lichens are hardy creatures able to 
survive in scorching deserts and frosty tundra. Their secrets of success are not well understood 
however. Two key features suggested as having important roles are (1) their ability to survive 
drying and (2) their complex chemistry. 
 Lichens manufacture a host of chemicals that presumably serve to reduce attacks by 
predators. The most serious threat to the continued health of lichens is not predation, but the 





Žižek and Rosi 
 
 My intention in engaging Slavoj Žižek, my favorite and entertaining provocateur of 
theory, to initiate my project is not so much to critique or reject his work, nor to set him up as a 
straw-man, but to illustrate the impossibility that a theory of transformative radical politics might 
emerge from a subjectivity (e.g. Žižek’s Hegelian) that has been trained and disciplined, in the 
Foucaultian sense, to Newtonian/Cartesian thinking conventions. Such logics of transcendent 
causality, as I will show, engender not hope, but a fatalism that incapacitates action, aptly 
described by Francisco Varela and Evan Thompson as “Cartesian anxiety” and ambivalence 
(1992, 140). Žižek’s political affect as expressed in Less Than Nothing and in his 2013 article 
Trouble in Paradise reveals him to be an exemplary victim of his own backfired education. Rosi 
Braidotti's project, too, is overtly political. Her intent for her project is that it be seen not only as 
“the creation of new ways of thinking” (2011a, p. 63) but also as a form of “ethical and political 
practice of subjectivity suited to the task of actualizing qualitative dissonances to late-capitalism” 
(2011b, pp. 20-21). In response to the treacheries of late-capitalism, both Žižek and Braidotti seek 
a way out. To get there, Braidotti focuses on practices of subjectivity, while Žižek focuses on the 
task of global structural transformation which, I claim, cannot both find form and simultaneously 
sustain the logics of the Western worldview of, loosely, the last three hundred or so years. I do 
not presume to say that Rosi’s vision, which eschews conventions of a Western worldview, stands 
a more likely chance of success in transforming capitalism. Žižek’s reasoning, however, provides 
a portraiture of radically-intentioned political impossibility, which I show in Chapter Three to be 
a trope of modern Western patriarchy. Braidotti, on the other hand, locates political possibility 
and hope by drawing from a different philosophical genealogy grounded in process thinking, as 




worldviews fundamentally condition their subjectivities differently. As a result, Žižek gets stuck 
in misery, while Rosi emerges hopeful.  
 
Trouble in Paradise  
 
 In his article Trouble in Paradise published in the London Review of Books (July 18, 
2013), Slavoj Žižek is up to his old quagmired tricks. The politically brilliant Slovenian 
intellectual revolutionary, whose own Marxist politics position him in opposition to global 
capitalism, commenting on the phenomena of promising but failed global protests between 2012-
2013, abandons the sympathetic reader to wait for Godot in that timeless purgatory of No Way 
Out. The reader is not alone, Žižek is there in Purgatory, too, abandoned and companioned. 
None of the 2010-2012 protests in Greece, Turkey, Brazil, Europe, and the Middle East, nor the 
Occupy Movement, he states, can be reduced to the pursuit of a single issue; rather they reflect a 
“fluid feeling of unease and discontent that sustains and unites various specific demands” (2013, 
p. 11). Collectively, they react against global capitalism as a system, which inherently produces 
the excesses that its ideologies, cannot contain structurally. For Žižek, the “hegemonic ideology 
of today” (Žižek, 2011, p. 408) is materialism. He supports that these protests resist the capitalist 
marketplace where value gets located. But this is where Žižek gets tangled up. On the one hand, 
he recognizes this kind of ‘materiality’ as the translation of universality and necessity to the 
“monstrous mixture of living subjectivity and dead automatism” that produces capital, a subject 
of alienated substance (2011, p. 222). At the same time, in his closer investigation of materiality, 
he merges that of Karen Barad’s quantum field theory with his psychoanalytic attachment to the 
vulgarity of the Lacanian Void of Reality (2011). This corroboration produces, for Žižek, a 
conception of matter that conjoins Lacan’s conception of the death drive of impossibility as the 




a field of energies’ in modern physics” [that] a true materialist should fully embrace” (p. 407). 
Non-reductionist matter opens up to immaterial phenomena, “a specific positive non-being (p. 
407)…material reality is non-all, not ‘material reality is all there is’ is the true formula of 
materialism” (p. 408, ital. in the original). What Žižek’s blending of a Barad-ian ‘non-all’ 
materiality with a Lacanian “ultimate Void of Reality” produces for Žižek, is an Hegelian 
dialectic, an ontologically incomplete paradox characterized by the death-drive of impossibility. 
In his efforts to resolve this death-driven material Void with his political desire to thwart 
neoliberal capitalism within a frame of Hegelian immortality and universality, Žižek can only 
arrive at unsatisfying conflict. 
 This philosophical background helps to explain the affective stance Žižek brings to his 
analysis of the globally distributed local resistances to the capitalist order of the 2010-2013 
protests. What in the hands of economic geographers J.K. Gibson-Graham provides the grounds 
for possibility and hope of a post-capitalist politics of the subject, falls into the domain of 
impossibility and defeatism in the hands of a Žižek.  
 He strategically identifies cracks in the system where resistance might incubate…  
To demand consistency at strategically selected points where the system 
cannot afford to be consistent is to put pressure on the entire system. The art 
of politics lies in making particular demands which, while thoroughly 
realistic, strike at the core of hegemonic ideology and imply much more 
radical change. … (2013, para. 9). This may mean coming to see that 
democracy can itself be a form of un-freedom, or that we must demand more 
than merely political democracy: social and economic life must be 
democratised too (para. 13). 
 
but that subjects cannot overcome their own identification with ideology, described as…. 
…the misapprehension of the condition of possibility … as the condition of 
impossibility– the ideological subject is unable to grasp how his entire 
identity hinges on what he perceives as the disturbing obstacle… the 
immanent antagonism which generates the dynamic of the social system’s 





and yet Žižek radically states (in what might be good advice to new materialists), … 
 …after a true historical break, one simply cannot return to the past, one 
cannot go on as if nothing happened – if one does it, the same practice 
acquires a radically changed meaning (2011, p. 202).  
 
He does imagine a way out for Greek and Turkish protesters,… 
Leave behind the two countries’ historical enmity and seek grounds for 
solidarity. The future of the protests [Žižek’s desire] may depend on it. 
(2013, p. 12).  
 
… but despite this radical imaginary that initiates the political movement, Žižek explains why this 
will never come about:  
Such demands, while feasible and legitimate, are de facto impossible. 
…Humanity poses itself tasks it cannot solve, and thereby triggers an 
unpredictable process in the course of which the task itself is redefined … 
This realization—that failure may be inherent in the principle we’re fighting 
for — is a big step in political education (2013, p. 12). 
 
Žižek may desire political and social/economic democracy, but he is unable to lend hope to its 
possibility. Why does Žižek back off from auspiciousness into resignation?  
 In Žižek, desire and memory uncomfortably comingle to produce an affective futility. 
Taken out of his Hegelian context, Žižek might be misread as supporting the same political hopes 
for transformative radical subjectivity as found, for example, in the affirmative posthumanism of 
Rosi Braidotti. Each look to radical contingency, which Žižek locates in Lacan and Braidotti in 
Deleuze, and emergence as the material framework within which to reform or end the ravages on 
collective well-being of neoliberal capitalism writ large. For example, Žižek grounds hope for a 
transformative politics as analogous to Stephen Jay Gould’s post-neo-Darwinian punctualism; 
Žižek states “eminently ‘historical’ moments are those of great collisions when a whole form of 
life is threatened, when the reference to the established social and cultural norms no longer 
guarantees the minimum of stability and cohesion; in such open situations, a new form of life has 




stuck amidst irreconcilable tension, Žižek also references the science he misinterprets, evolution 
as gradualism, not realizing that the theories of gradualism and punctualism are at odds 
scientifically. In another reference to science, specifically quantum field theory, Žižek adopts a 
non-reductionist philosophy of ‘non-all’ matter, and, in good Margulisian spirit, he spoofs the 
hierarchical assumptions that humans engage to rationalize their own break from the animal 
domain. In spite of these sympathies with feminist discourses, Žižek’s entrenchment in Hegelian-
Lacanian ideology prevents the theoretical realization of the radical theory of his desires, unlike 
for example, Braidotti and feminist economic geographers Gibson-Graham. Where their 
responses look to the affectively affirmative and to diverse, distributed micro-political practices, 
Žižek asserted in an interview with Julian Assange that a strong, centralized, superpower wards 
off the dangers of a Deleuzian multi-centered world (2012). He locates desire as externalized in 
the marketplace, identified by Lebrun as the object of consumption that “contains the desire of an 
other” (as cited in Žižek, 2011, p. 209). Žižek thus skirts the edge of transformation, and as much 
as he would like, he just can’t bring himself to jump. Žižek’s political thought remains mired in 
traditional categories rather than finding the radical space that opens by challenging the 
categories themselves. Reluctantly he steps back form the edge, committed to the memories of 
dialectical determinism and preformed necessity. He states that “classical change no longer 
works” in today’s late-capitalist world (2012, p. 1010), but in Hegel’s words, “things become 
what they are” (2012, p. 212); echoing Pythagorean and Aristotelian preformationism, Žižek 
extends Hegel’s statement, “nothing emerges that was not already there” (2012, p. 220). The 
Hegelian dialectic, in Žižek’s self-ascribed unconventional reading, fails to free him from, at best, 
his own affective paralysis and, at worst, his commitment to the futility of action. 
In his political analysis of the 2010-13 protests as necessary but ultimately abject, Žižek 
(unconsciously?) voices the personal and political defeatism that his own ideological constraints 




…every social reconciliation is doomed to fail, that no organic social order 
can effectively contain the force of abstract-universal negativity. This is why 
social life is condemned to the ‘spurious infinity’ of the eternal oscillation 
between stable civic life and wartime perturbations (2011, 223).  
Žižek’s own negativity and passivity careens not towards novel and innovative democracies, but 
towards self- and other- annihilation. It is no wonder that Žižek despondently concludes his 
recent tome, Less Than Nothing, with a nod to the history of all radical-egalitarian rebellions as 
lost causes, and a quote from G. K. Chesterton’s What’s Wrong with the World, “the lost causes 
are exactly those that might have saved the world” (p. 1010).  
 In a virtual self-mockery, Žižek claims that the “‘great underlying problem’ is how might 
subjectivity fit into reality. We need a theory of the subject which is neither that of transcendental 
subjectivity nor that of reducing the subject to a part of objective reality” (2011, p. 415). The pre-
discursive framing of the subject within the Lacanian Void of Reality constitutes the conflicted 
imaginary of Žižek’s political and historical subjectivity, such that there can be no possibility. 
“Know[ing] that his thought already is the form of reality, so it can renounce enforcing its project 
on reality, it can let reality be the way it is” (2011, p. 209). Žižek can’t help but equate the “very 
core of modern subjectivity” to his own positionality, an entitlement ordained by a white 
European male educational legacy, a dominating hubris he coyly structures as the hero’s 
heterosexual conquest between the “drink before” and the “cigarette after.”1 This androcentric 
and cultural context also serves to frustrate and obstruct Žižek’s capacity for hope. His 
subjectivity of impossibility is the emergent property of a historicity that privileges dialectics 
over embodied becoming, of knowledge as certainty over affect and uncertainty. Žižek embodies 
this Cartesian legacy, which finds one form in his particular worldview that sees as universal and 
necessary the equating of the reproduction of life to the death-drive’s compulsion-to-repeat. 
Žižek’s representation of Hegel describes himself, ‘contradiction’ is the core of ‘pure’ [self-] 
identity (2012, 411). For Žižek, the “highest contradiction” is Being/Nothing, which gets resolved 




gradual contingent emergence) of necessity itself” (2011, p. 217, ital. in original). Žižek 
begrudgingly abandons himself to a purgatory of conflict and necessary misery. 
 This is in dramatic contrast to Braidotti, who emerges within the continental tradition of 
Bergsonian/Deleuzian philosophy, and for whom Becoming dissolves fixed forms in an 
affirmation of possibility. Deleuze bluntly states, “what I most detested was Hegelianism and 
dialectics” (1995, p. 6). It is against the “gloomy and pessimistic” energy devoted to Thanatos2 
and the technological propulsions of bio-power that Braidotti’s affirmative vitality of life rebels 
(2006, p. 39). She rebels against the dialectic that “myopically” positions what we call life at “the 
liminal state of non-life”, “the horizon of death”, and the “never-dead” … death is over-rated” (p. 
40). Braidotti envisions subjectivities that reject dualisms and displace capitalist norms.  
I take the posthuman  predicament as an opportunity to empower the pursuit 
of alternative schemes of thought, knowledge, and self-representation. The 
posthuman condition urges us to think critically and creatively about who 
and what we are actually in the process of becoming (2013, p. 12).  
 
Braidotti means to extract linear, deterministic models from her understanding of life, being, and 
change, reconceived, instead, as ‘forces’ of emergence, or processes of becoming. Where Žižek is 
marooned in impossibility, Braidotti locates possibility. 
 Her vision of the subject as embodied, embedded, and non-unitary develops Deleuze’s 
nomadic theory.3 The non-unitary subject renders the category of the “other” irrelevant, because 
the subject is “a moving horizon of exchanges and becoming, towards which the non-unitary 
subjects of postmodernity move, and by which they are moved in return” (2011, p. 246). 
“Nomadic theory’s main contribution to this debate rests on the concepts of radical immanence 
and nondeterministic vitalism, which unfold onto an affirmative ethics of bioegalitarianism” 
(2012, p. 331). Here Braidotti ascribes to and derives from a non-centric, non-hierarchical view of 
biological life an ethics that practices engagement, rather than confrontation. Vitalism, as ‘life-




non-linear temporalities, memories, and flows of desires and imaginings. I show in Chapter five 
that feminist thinkers, perhaps precisely because of their long-if-quiet objections to the social 
structures of their exclusions and oppressions, have gained a better purchase from which to break 
free of the deterministic confines of Western thought than is available, for example, to a Žižek. 
Setting Braidotti as lichen and Žižek as dinosaur side-by-side, Braidotti attributes Žižek’s 
negativity to his having given up on intellectual theory as socially productive, instead opting for 
“violent antagonism if necessary” (2013, p. 5). Both theorists do, however, remain stalwart, if 
reluctant, in desiring activism; if Žižek is the theorist of lost-causes, Braidotti pins her hopes for 
economic and environmental change on feminist theories of desire and materiality. The tone 
pervading each registers impatience, frustration, and urgency. Žižek, mourning a past 
“desperately attached to the conditions of [his] own impotence” (2013, p. 189) responds with 
intellectual defeatism; Braidotti responds with an insistence on the affirmative as a catalytic 
strategy to mobilize change. In doing so, Braidotti foregrounds subjectivity.  
 The lesson to be reminded in reading Žižek in this way, though, is that, to some degree, 
he is us too, us being any progressively thinking, radically inclined Western subject. By 
happenstance of our 20th century births, you my reader, Žižek, Rosi, and myself are enmeshed in 
a web of relations necessarily defined in large part by the hegemonic ideologies of growth and 
profit that drive unfettered Western capitalist aspirations. We are similarly situated. We steep in 
the same historicity of a dominant narration of the world in which we live. Keeping that in mind, 
we more personally attend to how Žižek’s affect models the ‘melancholia’ ascribed by J.K. 
Gibson-Graham (2006, p. 4) and by Rosi Braidotti (2012) to the ruling ideology of a dominant 
capitalism. We see Žižek’s emphatic but defeatist political philosophy modeled in Braidotti’s 
characterization of advanced capitalism as ‘schizophrenic’. Here she echoes Deleuze’s User’s 




conditioning psychiatric dysfunction, which within the context of a sociopathic society gets made 
legitimate – even inevitable.  
 Žižek acknowledges that he is at a loss, painted into his own despondent corner. Though 
he would like to make a break with the confines of his own subjectivity, he can’t because he is it, 
an out-of-reach a priori of loss and melancholy. What Žižek embodies is indeed on the brink of 
collapse, disintegration or extinction. Rosi is not Žižek, a lichen is not a dinosaur. Misery is not a 
necessary a priori condition. There are choices, ways of becoming un-knowing. Lichens are 





 1 The structure of Žižek’s work, Less Than Nothing, begins with a section entitled The 
Drink Before, and ends with a section entitled The Cigarette After. These serve as bookends on 
two sections entitled The Thing Itself. 
 
 2  In the ancient Greek, Thanatos is the personification of death. 
 
 3  Nomadic subjectivity is a "pursuit of practices of hope, rooted in the micro-practices of 
everyday life, as a simple strategy to hold, sustain and map out sustainable transformations" 











WHAT IS EARTH? 
 
	
Figure 9. Surface of the Earth during the Hadean eon.  
An artist’s illustration of the Earth of 4.5-4 billion years ago (Trappman, 1994) 
	
	
 BIG questions must be asked over and over. What is Life? What is Earth? What is Mind? 
The conventions of modern Western thought have scribed these as discrete ontological categories. 
However, prior to the establishment of those conventions, things were not so clear-cut. Ironically, 
at the cusp of the 21st century, hard science itself reclaims –and points forward to –blurry post-




categorical space. Reductionism itself now mandates a holistic approach to the big “What Is” 
questions. So to ask in the early twenty-first century, “What is Earth?” also necessarily asks 
“What is Earth-Life-Mind” as a scientific object?.  In doing this, I take as my premise Vladimir 
Vernadsky and Lynn Margulis’s argument that the geosphere, life, and the noösphere (the sphere 
of the mind) are functionally indistinguishable, even if these categories discursively help to make 
provisional sense of a world fundamentally in transition. 
	
What Is a Scientific Object? 
	
Figure 10. Conceptions of Earth.  
clockwise from top left: flat Earth (http://s158.photobucket.com); the geocentric universe (A.H., 1996); 
ediacaran fauna 600-545mya (http://sciencesoup.tumblr.com/, 2013);  
deep sea hydrothermal vents (livescience.com, 2012);  






 Let me clarify why I approach the question of “Earth” as a “scientific object.” 
At the start of the third millennium, science as an academic discipline, is no longer bound within 
its prior Cartesian / Laplacean comfort zones. As an epistemological social practice, we now 
understand science to be historically and culturally situated–necessarily partial, conjectural, and 
fallible (refs). This concensus of the later twentieth century compounds the early twentieth 
century challenge from quantum field theories of energy and light to the intelligibility of how 
science corresponds to reality. As energy and matter have come to be understood in radically new 
ways, the determinist ‘God’s eye view’ of an ‘objective’ science, as a discipline, gets questioned 
and starts to shift. Twentieth century physicists reveal a nature that is neither causally predictable 
nor necessarily continuous, but discrete. Physicist Niels Bohr argued that science redefines 
‘Reality’, not as “an observation-independent object, but [as] a phenomenon” (Barad, 1998, p. 94) 
in which we are embroiled.1 Classical science—based in material determinism—gives way to a 
science of experience, which sees matter as emergent from processes of uncertainty, probability, 
relationality, and self-organization. What remains unresolved in the practice of science, according 
to Science and Technology Studies scholar Steven Goldman, are the different conceptions of the 
criteria for the intelligibility of experience. In effect, these challenges to the intelligibility of 
science claims amounts to an attack not only on traditional science, but on Western rationality 
itself, and thus, as several critical feminist science scholars have established, on the master 
epistemologies of ontological certainty.  
     Against this backdrop, a ‘scientific object’, such as the Sun, or atoms, or black holes, ceases to 
be a fixed entity but, rather, exists as an object of knowledge whose terms change with each 
iterative narration. In the 1400s, for example, the Earth was known to be the center of the 
universe; in the 19th century the Earth was known to be between 20 and 400 million years old, in 




century theory J. Marvin Herndon hypothesizes a nuclear fission georeactor at Earth’s core, a 
theory that meets ridicule in the geosciences establishment. So it is in this shifting of the light that 
I ask:  What story of Earth is 21st century science telling? Of course, there is more than one. 
 British literary/cultural theorist Timothy Clark in his paper What on World is Earth?: The 
Anthropocene and Fictions of the World (2013) challenges and questions the intelligibility of 
planet Earth as a ‘whole’. The 1968 Apollo photographs of Earth– that lone blue dot floating 
without mooring in that vast darkness of a cold universe– functions for humanists as the ‘one 
world’ emblem of the Anthropocene. The image, according to Clark, challenges the capacity of 
both human knowing and the human imaginary. Each, he writes, is necessarily inescapably 
constrained to anthropocentric terrestriality, which sets the scalar limit of ‘conceptual 
articulation’ (p. 11) to inside the geographic ‘finitude of the biosphere’ that we “cannot genuinely 
perceive from elsewhere” (p. 15). His perspective on Western knowing, then, situates an 
essentialist context that cannot be either transgressed, transcended, or transformed; it pegs how 
humans experience the ‘world’, in a conflation with ‘planet Earth’ to the narrow temporal frame 
of one modern human’s life expectancy. That these limits are part and parcel of what Derrida 
calls the necessary ‘fiction of the world’ – “the condition of meaningful life and 
communication…arising from ‘the irremediable solitude without salvation of the living being” 
(as cited in Clark, p. 19)– prompts what Clark astutely identifies as the anti-Copernican stance of 
the humanist tradition. This newly revealed Earth, in philosophy scholar David Wood’s 
description tends “towards certain forms of self-organization and boundary formation over aeons 
of evolutionary time, a complex causality unlike that of caricaturing naturalism (linear, fully 
determinate, and with certain automatism)” (as cited in Clark, p. 10). The Anthropocene, then, 
performs the humanist’s taboo in exposing Earth, the taken-for-granted planet that suddenly 
intellectually astonishes and frightens, as contingent. It also exposes humanism’s fictions, and in 




 The obvious question arising here is who does Clark think is being astonished and why 
does he read this as the ‘anti-Copernican’ surprise to Western normativity? Certainly not the 
subject of, say, Donna Haraway’s late twentieth century vision, who seeks new and 
‘blasphemous’ narratives that dismantle the binaries and totalizations that maintain systemic 
practices of domination (1991). Clark dismisses meaning-giving micro-political ‘localisms’ as the 
superficial construction of human possibility that is delusory, even a form of denial (2013, p. 12). 
Clark’s response to the Apollo-inspired ‘whole Earth’ that prompts his demarcation of what lies 
beyond the outer limits of the human imaginary and, thus, beyond its access, perfectly conforms 
to the structuring default parameters of ‘unity’ that Haraway observes being faithfully maintained 
by the “offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism" (1991, p. 151).  Is it, as Yaakov 
Jerome Garb states “a fantasy that we can somehow contain the Earth within our imagination” (as 
cited in Clark, p. 15)? Is that fantasy, as Clark seems to suggest, part of Derrida’s fiction of the 
world? I ask, rather, do we even need or want to imagine a contained, whole Earth in order to 
change how we live in/on/with it? As a trope, the Apollo images, as Clark explains, represent the 
humanist ‘un-prethinkables’; he tries to push back against them, but in my opinion does so 
unsuccessfully because he relies on Derrida’s equally barren charge, that the ‘unity’ of a shared 
world between organisms is never “given in nature … sentient life is in effect the temporarily 
self-sustaining artifice in an economy of the non-living” (as cited in Clark, p. 19), a neutral non-
event. Derrida describes life, “the ‘material logic of boundaries’ according to Clark, as constituted 
in the finite movement of temporalisation, of the would-be self-presence of living intentionality 
as an emergent effect of the difference engine of a metabolism, the economy of the non-living”(p. 
11). Leaving aside that ‘intentionality’ and ‘emergence’ are contradictory, in reading this 
statement out of context, it is not clear exactly what Derrida means, of note, however, is the way 
Clark presents it. He does not grapple with notions of the materiality of boundaries, emergence, 




materialists, posthumanists, and notably, scientists like Lynn Margulis and Francisco Varela.3 
Instead Clark’s presentation emphasizes the life’s function as secondary to and operating in the 
service of inert matter. Observed ‘intentionalities’ belong not to life but to the ‘economy of the 
non-living’. Clark claims this admittedly dark ground conditions a fresh questioning by humans 
on ethics. Though essentially estranged from meaning and recognition, except through fictive 
constructions, humans share with other organisms the same planetary climate-change threats to 
life. Apparently for Derrrida, as Clark presents his stance, the shared threat of non-existence– 
even if existence is necessarily a fiction of the imaginary– grounds an otherwise inaccessible –if 
also fictive– ethics after all. Clark reads this narrative of the foreseeable vanishing of species not 
in literary terms that accede the significance of ‘reality’ to fiction, but merely, as ‘uncanny’ – as a  
 
peculiar affective event that is not one’s “own” and also not with others’, nor with the world (p. 
21), merely an unremarkable event that happens (like rain or air) but can’t get told. Like Žižek, 
Clark, too, abandons and is abandoned, and he, too, companions his own abandonment with 
others-in-general. 
Figure 11. Organism as a system in balance with 
chaos. The organism is an organizational closure of 
interacting subsystems. Depending on the dynamics of 
its mutually embedded systems, the identity of a 
system is always “operating at the edge of chaos. 
Identity is intrinsically precarious and intrinsically 





 A feminist reading responds quite differently than Clark or Derrida (as Clark reads him) 
to the provocations to the imaginary by the Anthropocene that the blue-dot-whole-Earth image 
represents. Rather than reading it as subverting the epistemologies of terrestrial scale and 
boundary, and I include Francisco Varela and the putatively feminism-recalcitrant Lynn Margulis 
in my alternative reading, recent feminisms imagine the Earth as uncontained, contingent, not-
whole (at least in Clark’s sense), not-all, discontinuous, and undecidable in its difference. In the 
science of Margulis and Varela and in the feminisms of Haraway, Barad, Gibson-Graham, and 
Braidotti, the imaginary, knowing, and ethical subjectivity are untroubled, even inspired, by 
disjunctions and porosities in boundaries and scale. This I move to in greater detail in later 
chapters. For now, to demonstrate by contrast that Clark’s ‘whole Earth’ narrative illustrates how 
thinking in the confines delineated by a legacy of rationalist science conjoined with intellectual 
humanism brings forth a despondent and passive affect, I turn to Francisco Varela’s work.  
 Varela was a Chilean biologist and neuroscientist interested in cognition and subjectivity; 
though schooled (not only) in the Western canon, his work extends well beyond its conventions, 
to quite different and more lively result. Varela’s iconoclastic notion of a ‘whole’ living system 
understands the living system as autopoietic, that is, its defined ‘unity’ as a ‘system’ is ‘brought 
forth’ autopoietically. Its apparent ‘wholeness’ is the illusion presented an observer outside the 
system; ‘wholeness’ is the resulting (or emergent) stability of a co-dependency of parts in 
ongoing particular processes that transform matter to self-produce its own organization of 
operation. “Thus, it is more than a question of specific chemical components (carbon, hydrates, 
protein, lipids, nucleic acids, etc.), but is fundamentally one of the relations which the 
components must satisfy in order to constitute a living system” (1979). ‘Wholeness’, as in Clark’s 
constrained imaginary of the Earth, though pedagogically informative, is scientifically 
misleading, for it describes the interpretation of an observer outside the system and overlooks the 




add, cannot inform either ethical or political praxes concerning it. What to Varela is critical in 
envisioning a living system is that it be understand from the perspective of its operation, which 
always unfolds in the present (1979), as enactions of immanence. Varela calls this ‘radical 
embodiment’, which by definition negates any purpose, function, or intentionality. “The whole is 
not the sum of parts; it is the operational closure of its parts” (Varela and Goguen, 1979, p. 35). 
For Varela, organizational closure, such as of the Earth, a cell, the brain, or of the nervous system 
is not incompatible with openness. Closure highlights the power of endogenous spontaneity and 
self-organization between multiple ‘mutually embedded systems’ (Thompson & Varela, 2001). In 
understanding living systems, dualisms of inside and outside, endogenous and exogenous fade 
into nonsense, as do for Varela any material grounds for dividing objectivity from subjective 
experience, or reductionism from holism, or cognition and consciousness from embodiment. “The 
mind,” he would say, “is not in the head” (Rosch, Thompson, & Varela, 1992, p. 299). The mind 
is a non-substantial, coherent whole that is “nowhere to be found. Because of its radical 
embodiment, the mind neither exists nor does it not exist … it is and it isn’t there” (1992, p. 
28)(1996b).4 Enactive cognition is the distributed autopoietic operation of mind and environment, 
which is a structural, dynamic coupling of radical embodiment and its immanent way of being in 
the world that continuously brings forth mind and world into consciousness, and to the subject’s 
experience.  This will become clear later in this chapter. 
	
Thinking Noösphere, Sensing Consciousness  
 Brilliant iconoclast of his day, geologist Vladimir Vernadsky introduced his concept of 
the noösphere in 1938 to account for the transformation of the lithosphere, atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, and biosphere by human thought, inclusive of technologies. To the two elemental 




thought, which he synonymously refers to as consciousness, or reason. Not being energy, 
Vernadsky asks, how then can thought change material processes? 
 Vernadsky’s response is that of a determinist, he champions that “Human reason, the 
directed and controlled will of social man,” (2014a, p. 69) [is] “inextricably linked with the 
totality of all biogeochemical energy of living matter” (p. 13) and has become a large-scale 
geological force. He thus triumphantly celebrates the human introduction to the biosphere of new, 
unknown chemical compounds and forms of animals and plants, seeing this as an early stage in 
the evolutionary trajectory of humans from heterotrophs to autotrophs. He writes, “Through 
agriculture, man was liberated – in his nutrition – from the natural living environment. … Relying 
on this great conquest, man has annihilated ‘virgin nature’” (2014b, p. 76). Although his use here 
of violent sexual imagery as an engagement of the virgin-cure myth in his utopic teleology 
suggests Vernadsky’s blindness to gender oppression, he was a political activist on other fronts. 
He actively critiqued resource depletion, racism, hunger, the unequal distribution of wealth, and 
the barbarism of war. These he understood as global ethical failings that express how history, 
philosophy, ethics, and biosphere intersect in one conceptual order of scientific practice. 
 More recently, another brilliant iconoclast, microbiologist Lynn Margulis, has also asked, 
“How does living matter relate to evolving mind?” (2011, p. xv). Where Vernadsky saw utopian 
possibilities in man’s exceptional mind (gender intended), Margulis’s perspective is staunchly 
anti-anthropocentric. Human thought need not be privileged with a separate, independent 
category, as Vernadsky does. She sees no hierarchy among species and admonishes human 
arrogance, even suggesting that humans are of little significance to life on Earth. For Margulis, 
who also thinks from a systems perspective,5 consciousness is always already an inherent 
component of Earth’s biosphere, because life by definition is sentient. By ‘consciousness’, 
Margulis means fundamental biotic sentience, which has evolved from bacterial sentience (for 




all life in the biosphere, consciousness is hardly exclusive to, but includes, humans. Endemic to 
life, consciousness constitutes the most basic of life’s biospheric processes that produce and 
sustain biospheric conditions necessary for life. In a refinement of Vernadsky’s noösphere and of 
his theory of the co-evolution of life and Earth, Margulis incorporates into James Lovelock’s 
Gaia theory her premise that biological life is an autopoietic geologic, lithospheric, and 
atmospheric force. Her distinctive contribution to Gaia theory is the emphasis on 3.5 billion years 
of micriobial interaction between life and environment. In other words, Gaia theory– that the 
Earth’s biosphere is a dynamic, emergent ecosystem of complex feedback loops between 
subsystems of living and inert matter (e.g. climate, oceans, atmosphere, etc.) such to produce and 
sustain environmental conditions necessary to life– hinges on biotic consciousness. In the 
language of autopoiesis, the theory by which Margulis’ frames her empirical work on Gaia and 
symbiogenesis, Earth and consciousness are ‘structurally coupled’.6 To further explain Margulis’ 
response to the question, “How does living matter relate to evolving mind?” requires first a 
review of autopoietic sentience.  
	
Autopoiesis and Some Other Science 
Varela explains autopoiesis as the process by which the ‘unity’ of a living ‘system’ is ‘brought 
forth’ by virtue of: 
the organization of the network of processes of production (transformation 
and  destruction) of components that produces the components that: 1) 
through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and 
realize the network of processes (relations) that produce them; and 2) 
constitute [the living system] as a concrete unity in the space which they 
exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a 






Figure 12: The autopoietic machine. (Rudrauf et al., 2003) 
 
Autopoiesis is a creative, responsive, self- making, self-maintaining recursive process that 
continually self-produces and maintains its ‘self’ as ‘itself’ (more on that later). Autopoietic  
sentience, then, drives motility, for example toward or away from sugars or magnetic poles, in an 
open interaction with its environment to regulate flows of matter and energy. It is also the  
	
Figure 13. The operational closure of the embodied system. (Rudrauf et al., p. 10) 
 
 Aliveness invents a mode of being which is inseparable from movement, going 
 towards, seeking in movement (Varela and Depraz, 2000). 
 






means by which living matter organizes its own networks within its closed system. What 
biologist Humberto Maturana and neuroscientist Francisco Varela named “autopoeitic sentience” 
explains life’s capacity to perceive and to act. This capacity of the autopoietic sentient ‘self’ 
assimilates and is assimilated by others through symbiosis, endosymbiosis, and  
 
symbiogenesis. Margulis writes, “The world as we know it, and sometimes love it, joins forces, 
goals, and genes. …We merge chromosomes and chemistries within species, bodies and minds” 
(2011, p. 4).  Life, then, is conscious and chimeric. Far from the monadic, pure self of the 
Cartesian individual, the sentient ‘self’ is, in scientific terms, a community, defined by Margulis 
as, “a unit in nature composed of populations of organisms of different species living in the same 
place at the same time” (Margulis, Matthews, & Haselton, p. 310).  Understanding that 
community constitutes the embodied and embedded ‘self’ illuminates, likewise, that  
Figure 14. Geosiphon periforme. (Schuessler, A.,2005) 
A fungus (a eukaryote with intracellular motility) latches 





Figure 15. Visual definition of community. A millipede gut community includes bacteria, arthropods, fungi, 
nematodes, mastigotes and ciliates (Leidy in Margulis et al., 2000) 
	
consciousness is collectively sentient and symbiotic. Thus, Margulis’s consciousness, like 
Vernadsky’s noösphere, is a significant force of evolution, though having emerged ubiquitously 
over vast stretches of time in over thirty million types of organisms distributed through myriad, 
complex networks, hers is without teleologic agency or determinism.  
 Margulis’ death in 2012 cut short her work-in-progress in the area of consciousness. She 
had just begun exploring Whiteheadian philosophy and her antecedent edited volume, published 
in 2011, Chimeras and Consciousness, extended beyond her usual comfort zones, even into 




imbricated consciousness, organisms, and environment resonates with some pre-modern 
philosophies  and posthuman critical theory notions of the subject. Also unbeknownst to her, but 
not surprising –for they were personally acquainted– is how Varela’s theories of enactive 
cognition and neurophenomenological subjectivity amplify the direction she was heading. His 
work remains largely unexplored, except superficially, in the critical feminist science literature. 
 Over the course of his career, Varela developed autopoiesis into a robust theory of human 
cognition and consciousness altogether different from Vernadsky’s ‘noösphere’, though it 
responds to the same question, “How does living matter relate to evolving mind?” Following in 
Margulis’ example, and prefiguring both feminist biologist Donna Haraway (“beings do no pre-
exist their relatings (2003, p. 6)– and feminist physicist Karen Barad (given that ‘agential intra-
actions’ bring forth, or ‘enact’ iterative changes to particular practices that may or may not 
involve humans, inherent characteristics of an object cannot precede its intra-action (2003), 
Varela states,  
The world is not something that is given to us, but something we engage by 
moving touching, breathing, and eating. This is what I call cognition as 
enaction, since enaction connotes this bringing forth” (1999, p. 8). Cognitive 
intelligence resides only in its embodiment (pp. 59-60).  
 
One of the sentient behaviors he associates with cognition and scientifically explores is 
“responding to the needs of others” (1999, p. 23). Perception and enaction, being inseparable, 
demonstrate great flexibility and no central supervision in generating neural narratives in ways 
largely dependent on contingency and improvisation. As such, Margulis and Varela both contend 
that ‘consciousness’ cannot be scientifically explored by “a science that emphasizes only 
‘objective reality’, ‘incontrovertible evidence’ and ‘absolute truths’” (Margulis, 2011, p. 13).  
 Vernadsky, Margulis, and Varela refute Cartesian knowledge as adequate to describe and 
explain current Earth.  Margulis opens science to a view of evolutionary novelty as a process of 




symbiont-symbiosis-community driven scientific perspective on the charade of individualism and 
autonomous consciousness serendipitously hails the process philosophies of Bergson, Deleuze 
and Guattari that undergirds the feminist new materialisms hailed by Rosi Braidotti’s nomadic 
and Karen Barad’s diffractive thinking practices. Ideologically, these iconoclastic scientists and 
feminisms are all of a set.  
 Embedded in these particular scientific configurations that narrate Earth– inclusive of 
inert and all forms of conscious living matter– as an autopoietic Gaian object, very human politics 
of global and local economies and environment critically play out. Vernadsky and Varela, 
Haraway, and Barad model how to question scientifically the inter-/intra- enaction of 
consciousness and Earth leads to reflections of human ethics and subjectivity. Given the current 
state of global affairs, what’s at stake in matters of biospheric transformation are political matters 
of life as currently familiar, and unfamiliar, to human observation–its persistence, distribution, 
vanishings, and extinctions. These are the ethical contests the Apollo photographs of blue-dot 






Figure 16. Re-narrating sentience and entities.  
Sentience is indeterminate; entities are transcorporeal communities. 
(upper L to R: Margulis et al.,2000; Page, 1998; Freeman, 1978. 
 lower L to R: Malik, 2014; clean ambiente.com, 2016.) 
 
 In light of post-human, post-natural, post-modern contexts of 21st century science, Earth 
as an object of knowledge, demands to be re-narrated. Margulis, Vernadsky, and Varela establish 
that conventional science is not up to the task. However, the convergence of stories told by these 
and other scientists with those told by certain feminist science scholars suggests that the search is 
under way for adequate new knowledge practices, and thus new stories of the Earth that as, 




how the consonant understandings derived by Margulis from evolution and microbiology, by 
Varela from neuroscience, and by Barad from physics dovetail, for example, with Donna 
Haraway’s notion that “beings do not pre-exist their relatings” (2003, p. 6). It is illuminating to 
consider how Vernadsky’s post-natural noösphere eerily presages the post-human of Stacy 
Alaimo’s transcorporeality and Haraway’s cyborg. It is illuminating to note that process 
philosophy undergirds the thought of hard scientists like Margulis and Varela, and, for example, 
the nomadic thinking practices of Deleuze, Guattari, and Rosi Braidotti as well. It is illuminating 
to note how Varela’s embodied inseparability of ethics, perception, and action stands him on 
common ground with new material feminisms of Haraway, Barad, and Braidotti.  In light of such 
currents of thought, I propose that “what the Earth is” as a scientific object is this: it is an 
emergent and dynamic phenomenon of contingent relationships, collectively enacted according to 
the diverse and mutually embedded practices of biotic and abiotic matter.  While the criteria by 
which scientific experience becomes intelligible are themselves fluid, (Goldman, 2008), Karen 
Barad notes that because science makes the world intelligible through certain practices and not 
others, humans are in part responsible for the existence of Earth. How Earth exists for humans is 
largely a product of human consciousness, which also suggests that to a millipede, or to a marine 
microbe, the Earth might exist quite differently. Indeed, we are in desperate need of new 
narratives—to help transform and guide how we look at and live in the world, fully aware that 






 1 Note the correlation to the significant influence of phenomenology on Francisco 
Varela’s work. 
 
 2 They (mostly male) populate sundry university departments and they are none too 
pleased, responding accordingly by professionally dismissing upstart academic initiatives, such as 
feminism, feminist science, and new philosophies and critical theories such as new materialism, 
object oriented ontologies, etc. But this goes beyond the focus of this chapter. 
 
 3 Others include geneticist Steven Shapiro, physiologist Denis Noble, Antonio Lazcano. 
 
 4 The reader might note here that this sounds not unlike superposition in physics, or even 
Clark’s literary ‘uncanny’, except that rather than being experienced as bleak, is kind of exciting.  
 
 5 In contrast to reductionism, systems-thinking looks at interactions between components 
of dynamically complex systems with multiple internal or external feedback loops, over time, and 
in relation to other systems. 
 
 6 Humberto Maturana’s and Francisco Varela’s concept of ‘structurally coupling’ 








MEMORY I. THE MONSTER IN OUR MIDST: SCIENCE NARRATES SUBJECTIVITY 
To address the past, to speak with ghosts, is not merely to entertain or 
 reconstruct some narrative with the way it was, but to respond, 
 to be responsible, to take responsibility for that which we inherit,  




 Both feminist theorist Clare Hemmings and particle physicist Karen Barad, when 
speaking of temporality, speak of hauntings, ghosts, and imaginings. Hemmings does so in the 
context of an analysis of feminist academic literature, Barad does so in a material context of 
quantum field theory and entanglement (hint: there is no erasure, no time outside of spacematter). 
Hemmings and Barad intervene in standard, accepted constructs of the past to refuse a politics of 
foreclosure, of immobilization and im-possibility. Both engage different narratives of past, 
present, and future to re-vision ‘political grammars’ that ‘unmoor the here-now and there-then’ 
and the when-then of billiard-ball causality. Material discontinuities, in rupturing the before-after, 
do not undo heredity but undo identity. “The past is always-already open to change” (Barad, 
2014). 
 The term hauntings, as engaged by Hemmings, refers to that which is precluded by 
dominant citational practices– ‘absent presences’, ‘affective investments’, the ‘half-forgotten’–; 
‘imagining’ is her technique to open these hauntings to analyses of their ‘otherwise’ occluded 
textures and affective states, to ‘otherwise’ excluded yet significant citations. Hauntings and 
imaginings matter to the re-membering of patterns in historical claims and political possibilities 
in telling those stories differently. She attaches such “attention to memory” as “central to feminist 
practice and radical politics.” Qualitative methods crack open academic structures of critique and 




of what we think we already know (and feel) about one another” (2011, p. 26). Haunted 
imaginings engage memory to put bodies of work back together again differently, to tell the old 
stories in new ways with new meanings. 
 Barad, too, engages imaginings, and while her definition is strictly material– electrons 
passing through synapses in the nonlinear enfolding and dis-continuities of different 
temporalities– she, too, arrives at the significance of imaginings in reconfiguring bodies and 
politics. The ‘hauntological past’ (“simply not there to begin with”) marks bodies, is memory, is 
the material reality of the world we inherit. For Barad, memory and imagining entangle and 
temporal im-possibilities may rework materially.  
Only by facing the ghosts [those that are not yet born or who are already 
dead] in their materiality and acknowledging injustice without the empty 
promise of complete repair, of making amends, finally, can we begin to 
move towards justice (Barad, 2014). 
 
 And so it is in this hopeful light of ghostly imaginings, the material iterative dynamic 
rupture and reconfigurations that might move toward justice, that I make this inquiry into the 
collective Western memory to find cracks and tangles in the familiar. Whether that be 
monotheism, enlightenment philosophy and science, or the surfaces of current advanced 
capitalism, a smooth topological trace connects each one to the other. Specifically, I identify 
some tell-tale qualities indicative of a monster in our midst, an assemblage of traits that constitute 
teleological thinking, the implication being that these properties qualitatively measure the 
monster’s powers; the move towards justice hinges on denaturalizing these monstrous powers.  
 In this chapter, after locating the ‘genetic imaginary of advanced capitalism’ within the 
Western legacy of telos, I put two of its still influential voices, Kant and Darwin, in conversation 
on the subject, a conversation that encapsulates the philosophical problems that have long 
attracted the focus of philosophers/ scientists belonging to the canon of Western, educated, 




between Kant’s and Darwin’s thought reveal complexities that undermine the very teleologies by 
which the WEIRD world naturalized its own right to authority. These tensions also suggest 
nascent cracks in the dominant that mark inherited spaces of possibility, hauntings for recently-
burgeoning narratives, memory’s ghosts of imagined futures that may yet unfold a different 








Figure17. Other worlds. Grassland #127 (Underdown, 2005)  
 
 Other worlds, that before they become into the new, wait in the interstices, stealthy 
growth within the cracks of what will render as bizarre the outdated normal of before. Soaking up 
and soaking in whatever nourishments fall into these recesses, here hope sustains hope; the 








Advanced Capitalism and the Genetic Social Imaginary 
 
 In her use of the descriptor genetic to explain the social imaginary of advanced 
capitalism and its late twentieth century subjects, feminist anthropologist Sarah Franklin 
summons not only the cultural flights of fancy inspired by the biotechnological capacity to make 
‘life-itself’ in the laboratory, and the neo-Darwinian neo-preformation concept of inherited 
recombinant biological traits that, coded in DNA, function to absolutely pre-determine the future 
individual, but also, and less acknowledged by her, the whole of the long narrative of telos in 
Western natural philosophy and science. Franklin emphasizes only the top layer of this 
palimpsest, biotechnology’s commodification of life-itself, e.g the capacity to ‘modify’ the 
genetic blueprint for desired effects, such as synthetic insulin production or weed and bug 
resistant crops, Dolly the sheep, transgenic animals, patented genomes, gmo crops, animal 
husbandry/breeding in the industrial food production, human reproductive technologies, the list 
goes on. Building on Arjun Appadurai’s concept of the imagination as social practice, which he 
means not in a way related to any psychoanalytic sense, but the imaginary as “central to all forms 
of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order” (as cited in 
Franklin, 2000, p. 223), Franklin argues that the new genetics of ‘life-itself’ reimagine borders of 
reality, and that this represents a redefining of the natural, the global, and the future in the 
collective social imaginary of Western subjects:  
…the borders of the undead and the unborn recede into an indeterminate 
horizon of enhanced technoscientific potency, the challenges to the 
imagination beckon irresistibly, uncannily, hopefully, and with enormous 
popular appeal” (2000, p. 198, italics added). 
	
The haunts of novelist Nicholas Royle’s ‘uncanny’ used by Timothy Clark, who engages 




imagination as beckoning (who and/or what?) ‘uncannily’. While Clark applies this descriptive 
property to his narrative of the foreseeable vanishing of species, Franklin applies the term to her 
Vernadskyian evolutionary narrative of the redefinition of nature /life-itself/ the world/ the Earth 
(she is unclear how these terms do and do not conflate categories). As held true for Clark, 
Franklin, too, experiences an affective peculiarity that is not one’s “own” and also not with 
others’, nor with the world, merely an inevitable event that in its happening can’t get told, and 
which prompts great social anxiety. This ambiguity only compounds the anxiety with which 
advanced capitalism already infects its subjects (Braidotti, 2011).   
 I argue the importance of attending to an archaeological history of the ‘genetic’ character 
of the social imaginary; in important ways, the biotechnological story of life-itself at the turn of 
the millennium, which Franklin narrates as new, is not, but fulfills the trajectory of ‘business as 
usual’ of, in the least, the last two hundred years. It is in this linear, determinant sense of causality 
that the genetic social imaginary indelibly marks its progeny, advanced capitalism and its 
subjects, with what Franklin describes as the “Baconian ur-text of the masculine philosophy” 
(2000, p. 220). The traits and properties, and tensions, embedded in and stemming from this 
Western intellectual history of telos, characterize what Franklin (mis)interprets as a reimagined 
world reality. I claim that Franklin’s new world realities actually express the familiar telos of an 
unchanged imaginary. 
 The term genetic that Franklin engages to modify a millenial social condition gained 
clout as a scientific discipline in the postwar, mid-twentieth century, when telos, as a 
philosophical concept found its penultimate material expression in neo-Darwinism, in the genetic 
theory of evolution based on processes of recombinant cellular DNA as the blueprint or 
mechanism of inherited traits and randomly accumulated mutations; this theory provided the 
mechanism by which to explain Darwin’s evolutionary descent by adaptation, acted upon by 




mid-twentieth century extended into social sciences, economics, political communities, and 
remains ascendant in the popular concept of – in an also a misnomered, oxymoronic 
colloquialism– scientific truth.  
 An interesting analysis of millenial Western subjectivity emerges from the exercise that 
reads the phrase genetic social imaginary in terms of the properties and traits ascribed to the gene 
in neo-Darwinist theories of evolution.1 This translation essentializes the subject imaginary of 
advanced capitalism as inevitable, pre-determined and pre-determining; it functions and 
reproduces virginally, that is in isolation and unaffected by conditions beyond the borders of its 
cell wall. To describe subjects of advanced capitalism in the language of the neo-Darwinist 
metaphor, the bearer of the Homo sapien genome holds the most superior of hierarchical 
positions in the kingdom of animals (and, it goes without saying, life). Richard Dawkins 
accomplished with the gene what Vernadsky performed with technology, the atheistic invocation 
of the virgin-cure myth, but Dawkins’ narrative of the gene explicitly and, equally dogmatically, 
models the Christian-narrative, by the power of the selfish gene vested in Richard Dawkins, it 
holds within and bears “immortality” (2006, 2012).  The purity and absolute control of Franklin’s 
laboratory petri-dish gestations perfectly mirrors the purity and absolute control of the neo-
Darwinist gene, and the invisible hand of a Christian God. The neo-Darwinist gene resurrected 
the body of the past, and the life of the world-to-come. Like the gene in its passivity to a 
utilitarian, mechanistic nature, advanced capitalism becomes the WEIRDly fashioned expression 
of a triumphant reductionist science. Dawkins’ universalization of an anthropocentric ethological 
bias, reflects the logos of capitalism, which, in turn, mirrors genetic material determinism in an 
eternal return of, for example but not limited to, limitless growth and profit passed down through 
the determining genetics of the immortal individual, understood as extending to its current legal 
sense, inclusive of the corporation/ institution). These genetic logics for the survival and 




opposition to the initial aspirations for the wedding of science to society–to foreclose possibility 
of social change, especially and particularly at the level of the subject’s imaginary. J.K. Gibson-
Graham observed that capitalism totalizes the late 20th century’s monocultural economic 
imaginary, to the effect of a foreclosure of economic possibility, diverse community alternatives, 
and subjectivities other than those produced by capitalism (Gibson-Graham, 1996). These 
underlying homogenizing compulsions that drive Franklin’s biotechnological imaginary, and that 
Gibson-Graham’s economic imaginary resists, connect in a Fleckian thought style of 19th century 
‘god-trick’ science that sees everything from nowhere (Haraway, 1988), and naturalizes the 
worldview of a mechanistic, linearly causal, controllable Earth that sustains advanced capitalism. 
These foundational narratives of the WEIRD-world discipline subjects to a telos that silences, 
banishes, manipulates, and controls imaginaries of diversity and change.  
 It is not surprising then, given the co-(m)motion between science, subjects, and society, 
that public education and popular media would be deaf and blind to alternative narrations that 
work against the logics on which are founded the ever-ascendant capitalist marketplace. Its most 
significant product, the colonized imaginaries of the progress-aspiring sub-altern citizen, sustains 
its ongoing operations in a Fanon/Foucaultian paradox. The subaltern enact their own 
marginality, reinforcing the very systems and practices that structure their own subordination. To 
rebel would be a monstrous act of violence and self-annihilation, crazy. Normative scientific 
methodologies and research funding procedures produce normative scientists with normative 
skills and observations. Science-making produces both its subject and its object. Subject-
scientists and their institutions display an addiction to the profits that commercial applications of 
advanced technologies and biotechnology offer	 (Goldman, 2007). Many of these are based on 
advancements in quantum physics and cellular biology, which, ironically, perpetuate the 
mandated machinations and clockwork movements of a Newtonian-capitalist culture. While the 




for ‘progress’ has since been eclipsed, the nineteenth century worldviews that generate the 
structures and relations of the current social order have not. Neoliberal teleologies unseat 
advancing scientific research as the limiting factor of social authority (e.g. the urgencies of 
climate change do not, and it seems cannot, incite political action adequate to its impending, 
gruesome realities). The lesson here is that any 21st century political/ social/ economic/ 
environmental movement for fundamental change must confront what it is up against, namely, the 
push and pull of a long history of the West’s attachment to telos.    
 It becomes crucial to dig into the archaeological layers of meaning embedded in the term 
‘genetic’. Its prior meanings, infused with the traits of their contemporaneous temporal and 
cultural situations, have their own genealogies that mark subsequent narratives (like Franklin’s) 
that move through the collective imaginary. The noösphere that situated the nineteenth century 
imaginary, as I will show, and the Appadurai/Franklin millennial genetic social imaginary are 
replete with tensions between forces of memory and forces of desire, between ‘business-as-usual’ 
and radical change. Situated connotations, associations, signifiers, meanings, and genealogies do 




Telos as Memory 
 
And though she take a hundred lying forms, let her  
not escape you, but hold her close, whatever she may  
be, until she take again the form she had at first.  






 To dig down to the philosophical roots of telos, “an ultimate end” ((Merriam-
webster.com/dictionary) eposes the push and pull of concepts that as an ensemble display a 
restlessness, an inquietude, a shape-shifting, monster-wrestling of traits; when one settles another 
rouses. For thousands of years, but to this project’s interest, for the approximately three hundred 
years of the Enlightenment from the 17th century through the 19th century, the forces of tension 
between reason and experience and the imaginary, between the creative and the mechanistic, 
between living and inert matter, between theology and science duke it out, twisting and writhing 
into one big tangled knot that defies the tidy nomenclature of its categorical threads. To pull on 
one or two is to push on all the others, their constellations shift according to the particular mix of 
attributes and meanings ascribed by each given thinker of a given time. The driving theme, 
however, remains constant: to what constellation does human life belong, and how can this tale 
be told2 in a way that conveys explanatory sense and motivates social justice?  
 In what follows, I argue that the Enlightenment and Rationalism, as the dominant 
foundations of the modern era and of 19th century science, failed in their project to establish 
intellectual secularity, by which I mean a thought-style that is free of the structures and confines 
that characterize monotheism. There is much literature by those qualified to make this point, 
which I am not, but I remind my reader that I present this argument as a premise and a situating 
of the ensuing chapters. The creation of the secular stretches back to the Royal Society of London 
in the 1660s to 1670s; I argue that the project failed, divine authority was not displaced by 18th -
19th century science, but was merely replicated in British men of means, for they alone could be 
trusted to be objective3  —to be God, the scientist speaks for nature and then modestly disappears 
(adaptation of Law, 2004). Nature, as revealed by a universal and pure deity, became the 
universal and pure nature that men of science revealed. I evidence here, if simplistically, that the 
qualities that mark monotheism also mark the beliefs and attributes of the philosophers and 




materiality, singularity, immortality, humanism and morality, monism, reason, and human 
exceptionalism converge in the rituals and social practices that sustain(ed) the hierarchical and 
patriarchal powers of theological institutions. While there is no need here to analyse ecclesiastical 
doctrine, as pieces of a larger puzzle, these elements comprise a larger ideology of deistic telos, 
end-directedness. Though the scientific worldview of the 19th century extracted deism from telos, 
science, to which philosophy also belonged, held to the same ideology of telos, comprised of the 
same theistic elements, reformulated in shifting relations and balances. The adhering 
monotheistic thinking that a vestigial Western determinism propagates failed to dissolve. 
Interestingly –or not– , as modern science took hold as the go-to discipline of authoritative 
knowledge, its players assumed the patriarchal mantle of hierarchical power. I suggest that this is 
no mere coincidence, but a direct effect of a link between monotheism and capitalism, arbitrated 
by the ‘objective, reductionist’ science that neatly channels telos into its methods and taxonomic 
thinking.5 The same descriptors and dynamics that characterized church hegemonies –naturalized, 
lawed, the one truth, certain, necessary, sufficient, benevolent, ‘for the good of’, hierarchical, 
singular, essential–have also been discursively engaged by the WEIRD to herald the social and 
political products of material determinism, such as the global proliferation of colonialism; 
exploitation of natural resources and labor; discriminatory racial and gender policies; 
neoliberalism, regulation of poverty; i.e. the ‘coherence of effects’ in Edward Said’s terminology 
which produces the unitary stable category. The subject imaginary of advanced capitalism could 
hardly help but be trapped within the disciplining domains of a very long history of patriarchal 













Slouching from Bethlehem 
 
Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Feuerbach, Strauss –  
all stink of theologians and church fathers.  
Nietzche  
 
 This tension between processes of convention and processes of innovation bears out in 
the Enlightenment and Rationalist thinkers who resisted church domination of social and 
scientific thought, such as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, David Hume, Isaac Newton, Immanuel 
Kant, Baruch Spinoza, Charles Darwin, the list goes on. In short, the names that anchor current 
hegemonies were the heretics of the social orders in their day. Here I explore these tensions and 
dynamics in the making of the Western worldview through an emblematic focus on Kant (1724-
1804) and Darwin (1809-1882) on the topic of telos, to show how in the end, despite their 
inclinations, the irresistible charismatic of monotheism trumped Kant’s intellectual secularity, and 
haunted Darwin’s.  
 The spectre of telos since Aristotle (see chart if I get to it) informed what both Kant and 
Darwin confronted in the course of developing their concepts, respectively, the ‘purpose of 
nature’ and the theory of evolution by descent from a common ancestor by modification and 
natural selection. Kant and Darwin demonstrate, like Žižek, the depth of difficulty that faces 
subjects, particularly men, of breaking free from the patriarchal, deterministic thinking 
conventions to which they were trained and of their lived experience. Both Kant and Darwin 
introduced contingency, that which eludes determinism, to the biological literature, though Kant’s 
telos also contradicted his tentative dabbling with contingency.6 Both Kant and Darwin do away 
with the divine maker, Kant, however, keeps the divine as the unknowable authority, while 
Darwin wrestled to deal with intersections of the theological and social for decades before 




 The 18th century world understood telos as the hierarchical systematicity of a cause; “the 
end, that for the sake of which a thing is done” was universally for the good, as ‘nature does 
nothing in vain’.  The end purpose preceded and explained the formation of the organism. In 
Kant’s time, the ultimate end of nature was mankind. To this commitment, Kant appended his 
own and, according to John Zammito (2014), Locke’s and Hume’s, heretical concept of an a 
priori limitation to human knowledge of the world. 
Humans cannot determine either efficient or final causes, or how even a 
mere blade of grass is produced. Human beings cannot have the insight into 
mechanical principles of nature of how organized beings are even possible 
(Kant & Pluhar, 1987, p. 409).  
 
Organized beings are the only beings in nature that, even when considered 
by themselves and apart from any relation to other things, must still be 
thought of as possible only as purposes of nature. It is these beings, 
therefore, which first give objective reality to the concept of a purpose that is 
a purpose of nature rather than a practical purpose and which therefore gives 
natural science the basis for a teleology. (Kant & Pluhar, 1987, pp. 375-6). 
 
 Introducing an interesting twist on ecclesiastical telos, as represented by Thomas 
Aquinas, the teleological principle, for Kant, laid both within a Newtonian paradigm and beyond 
the capacity of the human to distinguish between necessity and contingency; it was a heuristic 
construct that aided making whole sense of experience: telos and ‘the emergent sciences’ 
(biology), were not scientific knowledge (philosophy and physics).7  Uncertainty belonged to the 
human while certainty marked the sacrosanct domains of religion and science. In this move, Kant 
displaced the pre-categorical universality of Aristotelian teleology with a ‘regulative’ (pure, 
abstract, theory based) systems-thinking of objective reality which unfolds according to an 
unknowable, yet purposive telos. Kant differentiated between the ‘regulative’ and the 
‘constitutive’ (subjective, empirical, experience based) role of the discerning naturalist, in what I 
see as a gesture to the Platonic conception of matter as residing in an idealized exemplar form 




representation. Scientific claims stemmed from the naturalist’s observation of commonalities 
between this ideal form (the ‘regulative’) and the merely ‘constitutive’.  
 Kant navigated the Scylla and Charybdis of telos as contemporaneously theorized, 
steering a course between mechanistic materialism and animistic vitalism (Zammito, 2014), 
which was the dominant theory of his day to explain development in living matter. The problem 
with vitalism for Kant was that it could not explain hybridity and that it competed with what he 
supported, Harvey’s theory of epigenesis, a developmental model of the organism. Kant steered a 
middle ground, he complemented the pre-existent germs and predispositions of the whole natural 
organism with a concept of interactions and environmental contingency which constituted the 
‘potential state’, and which preformed the individual (Grene & Depew, pp. 96-7). In Kant’s 
‘generic preformationist’ view, the individual organism’s form arose gradually in a process of 
complex interactions between the constants of the germ and the variables of its inner and 
environmental ‘dispositions’. Generic preformationism aligned with ‘purposiveness’: everything 
the organism contained was determined a priori, development in organisms was both goal-
oriented and part-whole ‘fittingness’.  
 The Kantian system was definitively taxonomic, reason was classified in opposition to 
the imagination (Morris, 2011). In reaching beyond its own organismal limits, reason “finds a 
system like itself that organizes itself in face of something beyond it, through a passive/active 
relation to place that echoes the imagination as receptive/spontaneous.” Kant, according to 
Morris, explained his categories as arising from a “system of the epigenesis of pure reason” (p. 
187). In an odd, perhaps accelerated, yet interesting phenomenological reading, philosophy 
scholar David Morris interpreted this to mean that in Kant’s categorical logic, systems (reason 
and organisms) are inherently and dialectically open to something beyond their limit in a way that 




out of a place beyond itself, beyond reason. Imagination and the epigenesis of reason co-
constitute in the a priori of Kant’s natural purpose. 
 In another navigation between Scylla and Charybdis, Kant’s natural purpose preserved 
the all-important divinely-constituted purity of ‘species’, and with it the hierarchical 
exceptionalism and moral destiny of man. This allowed Kant to evade the concept of organism as 
artifact, to evade the charge of atheism, and to evade what was immoral, heretical, and outrageous 
– the dreaded charge of materialism. As a self-identified transcendental idealist, Kant objected to 
romantic observation and experience, traits aligned with materialists. Natural purpose, though, 
introduced a concept of the contingent interactions of living matter, implicating surreptitiously 
another taboo, cyclicity, in an ever-so-soft whisper towards a radical systems- and process-
thinking.  
 Between a rock and a hard place to preserve the certainty and universality of the 
theological domain while simultaneously extracting the theological from science (philosophy), 
Kant squirmed into an ambivalent reconciliation. He stated that the investigation of biological 
matter comes about by means of an idea; natural purpose is the object of a concept that situated 
human reflection within a context of the divine ephemeral of the living, ontologically divided 
from the rest of the living. Though he distanced ‘the emergent sciences’ from Newtonian laws of 
physics, he maintained the obligatory divine gulf between the human and other life; his generic 
preformationism conforms to the linear (when-then) mechanisms of a universal telos to nature’s 
purposes. Kant does away with the divine maker but keeps the divine – embedded in the 
unknowable, determinant, purposive force that equates human morality with nature’s destiny. The 
strictures of monotheism (the divine universal and certain, the natural purpose of man, the 
transference of hierarchical thinking to taxonomic thinking pervaded Kant’s work. Like Žižek, he 
leaned into the jump, but ultimately stepped back from the edge and couldn’t make the leap. The 




teleologic living-matter with a universal and deterministic ‘purposive nature’ resounded with the 
chords of monotheistic dogma.  
In summary, the configuration of ontological and methodological  
commitments that constitute the standards of ‘objectivity’ for early modern 
physical sciences explicitly relies on religious beliefs (Lloyd, 2008, p. 180). 
 
Alfred North Whitehead, an ordained minister who had wandered away from Christian dogma 
into the philosophy of science, had also expressed this sentiment in 1925. He suggested that the 
concept of a personified, rational, and universal God laid the foundation for the “scientific” 
conviction of unifying principles of nature that were universal and discoverable through reason 
and empirical method (Tauber, 1997). 
 Kant’s thought also prefigured the obscure ideas of recursivity of subject-object relations, 
the excess of boundary delineations, contingency, and the free-play of the imagination that later 
came to the fore in feminist continental critical theory, but the Kantian naturalization of the 
disembodied exceptionalism of patriarchal reason eliminated any chance of supporting citations 
of his philosophies by feminists.  
 This did not inhibit Francisco Varela from citing his legacy in connection with 
autopoiesis, nor Stuart Kauffman’s engagement of ‘Kantian wholes’ in support of his philosophy 
of biology.8 Curiously, the Kantian legacy can be leveraged in support of conflicting arguments, 
e.g. the universal, lawed imperative of transcendant moral duty and self-organization, a dynamic 
metaphysics and the fixity of scientific taxonomies, the abstract purity of regulative reason and 
constitutive contingency. A taxonomy of binaries allows for cherry-picking; Kant takes his swim 
and does not get wet. John Zammito, whose explicit project is the rescue of empiricism and 
scientific practice from the ‘fashionable discipline of postmodern science studies’ (2004) asks 
“What was Kant’s philosophy of science?” (2014, p. 39). 
 Surely Kant was cognizant of having to tread a thin line strategically, as Darwin also did, 




Still, Kant’s philosophy of science expressed his subjectivity; embedded in and by the conditions 
of his 18th century, Kantian thought genuflects to the monotheistic divine, even as it meekly 
gestures in new and errant directions. Ultimately a Kantian teleology that ascribed rigid 
taxonomies to nature strains under the pressures of explanation coming from advancing biology, 
chemistry, and mathematics. Even within its own terms, Kant’s telos equivocated, even collapsed, 
as it pushed beyond its own limits. Nonetheless, Kantian thought lays the groundwork for the full 
transplant of the properties of the divine to men-of-science that took hold in the 19th century 
conception of objective reality, which became, as Elisabeth Lloyd notes the standard for 
knowledge itself (Science, Politics and Evolution, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2008).  
 Though Kant’s categories don’t hold up, the tenacity of taxonomic thinking he modeled 
explained, according to philosopher of biology David Hull, the concept of teleological progress 
(as cited in Grene & Depew, p. 289) which, though flatly refuted by Darwin (1887, p. 315), 
persist into the current twenty-first century. Kantian precepts neatly illustrate what John Law 
summarized as five Euro-American assumptions of ontological reality (2004): 
1. There is a reality out-there beyond ourselves; 
2. This external reality is usually (except as our actions affect parts of external reality) 
independent of our actions and especially of our perceptions. 
3. Anteriority: external reality precedes us. 
4. Definiteness: external reality is composed of a set of definite forms or relations. “The 
world is more or less specific, clear, definable, and decided” (p. 25). 
5. Singularity: the world is shared, common, the same everywhere. 
 
Law concurred with scholars in the discipline of science studies, Latour and Woolgar, that this 
“something beyond” of the anteriority and independence of reality crucially deleted subjectivity 




monotheism, and described what the scientific method produced, “a reality that is independent, 
anterior, definite, and singular” (p. 37). 
 The Kantian noösphere situated the historical/social context that Charles Darwin entered 
and eventually, ruptured.10 It also fostered the Hegelian world that Žižek inhabits, along with his 










 Figure 19. Coal depositions exist in order to benefit the human race.  





Darwin’s Subjectivity  
 
Cousin to the amoeba, how can we know for certain? 
Donald T. Campbell 
 
 Darwin’s narrative style, if not his thinking, straddled the conventions of his day and his 
compulsion to have his radical concepts taken seriously. He explicitly acknowledged tension 
between reason and imagination; understanding that his theory of descent and natural selection 
would strike his times as unreasonable and beyond the imagination, and citing the complex organ 
of the eye as an example of natural selection “insuperable by our imagination” (Darwin, 1859, p. 
187). He cautioned against a dismissal of the unimaginable that may turn out to be reasonable, 
“reason ought to conquer imagination” (1859, p. 373). ‘Ought’ suggests any of a tension, a 
Kantian duty, a criticism, a conditional probability. This verb may also have pointed at Darwin’s 
own struggle with his own Victorian subjectivity, initially to remain loyal to the dictates of his 
wife’s devout Christianity and the beliefs common to his class, without alienating either, while 
publishing his findings to the contrary that the evidence of his own research presented. Perhaps 
this helps to explain why, though Darwin felt he had accumulated sufficient material evidence to 
support his theories twenty years prior, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection was 
not published until 1859, after his colleague and competitor Alfred Russell Wallace published 
“On the law which has regulated the introduction of new species” in 1855. In the first edition of 
Origin, Darwin was consistently cautious and deprecatory, repeatedly engaging such phrases as 
“for the good of” and “goodly nature,” phrases that would have reassured believers in an 
Aquinas’ exceptionalism of the individual Man and in the parsimony of a causal Aristotelian 
nature “that does nothing in vain,” or perhaps to buffer the sacrilegious rupture he struck to the 
divine divide between Man and animal species. Indeed, it seemed that at the time of this volume’s 
first publishing, Darwin was unsure himself how he fit into these considerations. Acknowledging 




hybridity wrought from his own natural science practice mixed with the mores and philosophical 
inheritances of his English education and class, clearly present in the definition of natural 
selection: 
Whatever the cause may be of each slight difference in the offspring from 
their parents – and a cause for each must exist (Aquinas/Kant)– it is the 
steady accumulation (Lyell’s uniformatarianism), through natural selection, 
of such differences, when beneficial to the individual (Aristotle/Adam 
Smith), that gives rise to all the more important modifications of structure, by 
which the innumerable beings on the face of this earth are enabled to 
struggle with each other, and the best adapted to survive (Malthus).  
  Darwin 1859, p. 10 (parentheticals and italics added). 
 
 At first Darwin integrated the ideologies of his class; by the mid-nineteenth century, the 
classical economic theory of John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, and Malthus pervaded English 
intellectual thought, showing up in Darwin’s initial theory of natural selection and later in 
Richard Dawkins’ selfish gene {AND WHERE ELSE O WELL] as nature described as 
parsimonious and competitive. Darwin mentions in an 1838 notebook entry the “oeconomy of 
Nature” having “a force like “100,000 wedges …forcing gaps by thrusting weaker ones” as a kind 
of “final cause” (Notebook D 135, 1838-9). Economics, religion, and science conjoined such that 
what had been God became material in the WEIRD market; Adam Smith’s invisible hand bore 
little difference from Aquinas’ divine archer who created the human hand, birds’ wings, and the 
seal’s flippers as modifications of a single plan and from the Creator’s invisible hand of Cuvier’s 
conditions of existence (“pour le role que l’animal doit jouer dans la nature”). In November of 
1859 when The Origin of Species was first published, Great Britain prepared for a joint Anglo-
French expedition that would lead to the occupation of Beijing and the burning of the 
Yuanmingyuan summer palace. In 1862 Karl Marx remarked in a letter to Engels on the parable 
of capitalist modernity of Darwin’s publication: 
It is remarkable how Darwin has discerned anew among beasts and plants his 




markets, “inventions,” and the Malthusian “struggle for existence.” It is 
Hobbes’ bellum Omnia contra omnes, and it reminds me of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, wherein bourgeois society figures as a “spiritual animal 
kingdom,” while in Darwin the animal kingdom figures as bourgeois society. 
    (Marx, as cited in Jones, 2011, p. 6) 
 
Scientific, economic, and religious doctrine heavily influenced Darwin, and though he ultimately 
broke away, it was not without ambivalence. Well after the publication of Origin, in a personal 
exchange on the matter of God the intelligent First Cause and Kant’s ‘natural purpose’, the Duke 
of Argyll reported the following, 
… in the course of that conversation I said to Mr. Darwin, with reference to 
some of his own remarkable works on the 'Fertilisation of Orchids,' and upon 
'The Earthworms,' and various other observations he made of the wonderful 
contrivances for certain purposes in nature—I said it was impossible to look 
at these without seeing that they were the effect and the expression of mind. I 
shall never forget Mr. Darwin's answer. He looked at me very hard and said, 
'Well, that often comes over me with overwhelming force; but at other 
times," and he shook his head vaguely, adding, "it seems to go away” (1885, 
p. 244). 
 
 The Kantian conscience weighed on Darwin, and found voice in a direct challenge to 
Kantian principles, “Have we any right to assume that the Creator works by intellectual powers 
like those of man?” (Darwin, 1861, p. 208). In a letter to Asa Gray dated May 22, 1860 on how 
the role of chance in his theory of evolution directly contradicted the dominant and accepted 
notion of deterministic natural law, he admitted “not that this notion [of chance] at all satisfies 
me! I feel most deeply that the whole subject is too profound for the human intellect” (1888, p. 
312). In this might be heard shades of Kant, applied not as Kant did as a way to preserve a 
universal God, but in a way to explain Darwin’s ongoing personal conflict between his research 
findings and the noösphere of his own political and social world.  
 Darwin remained ever the deferential Victorian English gentleman. He intended to soften 




ancestries and of the relation of the ‘barbarous savage’ to ‘civilized man’ with the ‘god-like 
intellect’.  
The heroic little monkey, who braved his dreaded enemy in order to save the 
life of his keeper, … man with all his noble qualities, with sympathy which 
feels for the most debase, with benevolence which extends not only to other 
men but to the humblest living creature, … man still bears in his frame the 
indelible stamp of his lowly origin.  
(1871, pp. 404-5). 
 
With one hand Darwin removed the boundaries between humans and animal species, and with the 
other hand he quickly reassured his reader of human exceptionality.  
That disinterested love for all living creatures, the most noble attribute of 
man, was quite beyond [the fellow-apes] comprehension. … 
Senses and intuitions, the various emotions and faculties, such as love, 
memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts, 
may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed 
condition, in the lower animals (1871, p. 105).  
 
The subtext is unclear to me as to whether Darwin really believed in human exceptionality, or 
whether these allusions to hierarchy were rhetorical devices of double-entendre, or expressions of 
Darwin’s own ambivalence. Darwin attributed the development of morality in the human species, 
specifically, to the evolution of language, by which the ‘general good,’ for humans, was 
expressed in the golden rule and by natural duty, a logic that Darwin completes in an affirmation 
of a Kantian instinctive moral sense in humans, and quoting Kant, Darwin writes, “I will not in 
my own person violate the dignity of humanity” (1871, Chapter III, 86), or was he facetiously 
playing it safe? Writing to himself in 1838, Darwin ridiculed such natural hierarchy, “It is absurd 
to talk of one animal being higher than another” (Darwin, March 1838, as cited in Grene & 
Depew, 2004, n.33, p. 183). His egregiously polite rebuttal to Dr. Abbott’s case for the enormous 
importance of the ‘greatest of men’ represents Darwin’s reluctant, gentle resistance to the mores 
of his England. “I have been accustomed to think second, third, and fourth rate men of very high 




civilization than you seem inclined to admit” (1871, p. 316). Darwin gently ridicules Abbott’s 
equivalence of ‘civilized’ with Caucasian races with the modest approbrium of the inserted 
modifier, so-called, to describe ‘civilized’. Other frustrations with the dominant thinkers of 
Darwin’s Cartesian education (Locke, Hume, John Stuart Mill, Lyell, Kant) surfaced. In his 1838 
notes he wrote, “the mind of man is no more perfect than instincts of animals to all and changing 
contingencies, or bodies of either,— Our descent, then, is the origin of our evil passions!! — 
The Devil under form of Baboon is our grandfather!(1838, n.. 289). … “He who understands 
baboon would do more for metaphysics than Locke” (1838, n. 84). 
 Whether explained by the inclinations of the Victorian English gentleman or by the self- 
discipline and curiosity of the natural scientist, or both, or ambivalence, Darwin, never quite fully 
or easily accepted even his own findings as certainties. Darwin acknowledged that at the time he 
wrote The Origin of Species, he could rightly have been called a theist. In a letter to Dr. Abbott 
(Nov. 16, 1871) Darwin wrote “I gradually came to disbelieve in Christianity… but I was very 
unwilling to give up my belief” (1887, n.309). Ultimately asked to explain his agnosticism, 
Darwin demurred on atheism, opting for the more respectable agnosticism, and reverting to the 
classed language of the elite versus the masses, stated that there was no evidence to support the 
existence of a God. "Is anything gained by trying to force these new ideas upon the mass of 
mankind? It is all very well for educated, cultured, thoughtful people; but are the masses yet ripe 
for it?” (as cited in Aveling, 1883, p. 5).  
 Later in his life, Darwin became less conciliatory to political-correctness. Admitting that 
he’d placed too much emphasis on Malthus’ survival-of-the-fittest in his first publication of 
Origin, in his 1871 publication The Descent of Man Darwin applied his natural science lens to 
The Comparison of Mental Powers of Man and the Lower Animals (Chapter 3). Here Darwin 
cites evidence found in multiple species for altruism and the ‘social instinct’ that benefits the 




The term, general good, may be defined as the means by which the greatest 
possible number of individuals can be reared in full vigour and health, with 
all their faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are exposed. As 
the social instincts both of man and the lower animals have no doubt been 
developed by the same steps, it would be advisable, if found practicable, to 
use the same definition in both cases, and to take as the test of morality, the 
general good or welfare of the community, rather than the general 
happiness… (1871, 98). 
 
In a footnote reference Darwin directly refuted John Stuart Mill’s school of utilitarianism that 
attributed morality to a form of selfishness, euphemistically called the Greatest Happiness 
Principle. In the fifth edition of Origin published in 1871, Darwin acknowledged additional 
driving forces of evolution such as group selection, altruism, sexual selection, adaptive changes 
of structure, and the sudden appearance of vestigial organs (Geison, 1969); he questioned but did 
not dismiss Lamarckianism, and he discredited the notion of ‘species’ as anything other than 
terms to conveniently classify variation (Darwin 1859, p. 52). These were fighting words. In 
Victorian England species were immutable and immune from extinction, the Creator’s separate 
creations of instantaneous perfect adaptation. Most importantly, there was deep fear of materialist 
metaphysics and theories of transmutation, such as Lamarck’s, which reduced the distance 
between man and animal, this distance being the foundation of civilized society and the rock of 
moral norms. Regardless, species for Darwin were without fixed “essence” but in constant flux, 
and instead, species were arbitrary conceptual constructs used by naturalists and, therefore, void 
of natural purpose. 
 Having dismissed design and divine sovereignty, as well as the concept of species as 
located in nature, Darwin also ejected the Aristotelian good of ‘final cause’ from his earlier 
theory of natural selection. 
I probably attributed too much to natural selection or the survival of the 
fittest. I have altered the fifth edition of the Origin so as to confine my 
remarks to adaptive changes of structure. I had formerly not sufficiently 




can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious; and this I believe to be one of the 
greatest oversights as yet detected in my work (Darwin, 1871, p. 152).  
 
In sum, by the end of his life Darwin had rejected the properties of monotheism: hierarchy 
(perhaps), anthropocentric exceptionality, linear causality, determinism, naturalized morality. 
Darwin’s theories threatened 18th and 19th century worldviews of science as the political basis for 
social reform, they were incommensurate with deterministic and predictive Newtonian laws. 
They directly threatened the sanctity of mankind, reason, morality, even civilization itself. 
Descent by modification and natural selection “dethroned God” (Mayr, 1988, p. 179), whether he 
be Cartesian, Newtonian, or Christian, and there can be little doubt that Darwin was well-aware 
of the stakes of his project.  
 It is not surprising, then, that such an attack on dominant ideologies provoked a 
responsive wrath that called up a monotheistic God’s methods of reward, sin, and retribution, a 
justified condemnation for committing the unthinkable: threatening telos with uncertainty, 
chance, contingency, process, chaos, and complexity, a condemnation that has hardly paled since. 
“A teleological force in nature was so firmly anchored in the thinking…that this belief had more 
followers in the first eight years after 1859 than die Darwin’s theory of selection” (Mayr, 1988, 
59). It is not surprising, then, that Darwin’s ideas did not hold sway in the scientific community 
until Mendelian genetics provided natural selection with a mechanism, and until statistical 
probability gained favor amongst evolutionary biologists in the mid-twentieth century, until a 
confluence of conditions, euphemistically labeled neo-Darwinism or the Modern Synthesis, 
would extract secular radicalism from Darwin’s work leaving in its place a new dogma of natural 
selection consonant with ingrained monotheistic thinking. Darwin’s support for group selection 
would be eradicated by the determinist genetics of neo-Darwinism.  
 Certainly by close of his career, Darwin had upended the legacy of telos, introducing 




genetic logics would later take them away, and 50 years after that cellular biology and epigenetics 
would restore to scientific canon what Darwin had begun. Presaging findings in evolution science 
and cellular genetics of the late twentieth century, for Darwin, affects impelled conduct, and this 
he saw as central to group survival.  In processes of hauntological evolutionary innovation 
environment, variation, and heredity coincide. Ultimately, as Darwin’s thought became less and 
less an expression of the patrimonies of his station, he seemed to never settle on the subject of 
telos, or else it is the literature that cannot discern whether Darwin emerged from his doubts with 
clarity on the topic. Writing in his journal between 1836-1839 what was never meant for public 
reading, and posthumously published in 1887 by his son, Francis, Darwin rejects religion’s 
appropriation of telos as divine design, “there seems to be no more design in the variability of 
organisms, and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows” (1887, 
p. 309). Yet in an 1874 letter to Asa Gray, commenting on his published statement that Darwin 
had brought biology “back to teleology,” Darwin wrote, “What you say about teleology pleases 
me especially” (1887b, p. 267). It is impossible to know what may have been his ambivalence 
over telos, and there is much evidence in Darwin’s literature to support this. In the context of his 
later and private thought, and I would argue for this, Darwin’s remark might also be interpreted as 
Darwin’s pleasure over a displacement of religion by biology, and thus an implied redefinition of 
telos, as a concept, along the lines of natural selection as process philosophy. That said, Darwin 
struggled to explain and differentiate his notion of natural selection within the languages of 
causality, beginnings and endings, within the conventions of telos. 
 
Putting Kant and Darwin in Perspective 
 
The science of evolution [is] a child of the nineteenth century …  
this theory has now become the sure foundation of our whole world-system. 
 –Ernst Haeckel, Die Weltrathsel (1900)  




 The disruption of telos subverts determinism, but Darwin struggled to find language that 
explained natural selection without the use of teleological or mechanistic vocabulary. This 
struggle with existing language to explain radical thinking continues to face philosophers and 
critical theorists who attempt a radical non-gendered process philosophy of emergence. Words 
like ‘create’, ‘produce’, ‘higher’, ‘lower’, ‘function’ MORE show up in the work of Deleuze, 
Elizabeth Grosz, William Connolly, Jane Bennett, and many more. Darwin’s theories routinely 
get misunderstood and misinterpreted, even by these scholars. The English language itself 
structures hierarchical, teleological thinking, challenging any project to release the concept of 
‘progress’ from evolutionary thinking.  
 Monist interpretations of Darwinian evolution, such as Herbert Spencer’s social 
evolution, Ernst Haeckel’s ‘cellular state’, and T.H. Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics, subsumed the 
notion that the law of evolution singularly explained all phenomena, human and otherwise. As an 
ideology, evolution remained entwined with economic progress and capitalist growth.  
…Simplified into developmental thinking, [it] became a privileged way of 
knowing and narrating the world and its history, … [as] unfolding according 
to a set of universally applicable laws. … Colonization [and the] 
extermination of native is understood as the playing out of the logic of nature 
itself, and justified by way of examples from the animal and botanical 
worlds. …Primitive life-forms are likened to “primitive tribes” and the 
complex global division of labor characterizing nineteenth-century 
capitalism is naturalized as the inevitable product of biological development. 
…Evolutionary timescales and laws of heredity render our historical agency 
moot. (Jones, 2011p. 20). 
 
The ‘objective’ science of pre-Darwinian thought conveniently co-opted a misreading of Darwin 
to fit imperial progress narratives. Following on its heels, ultra-reductionism triumphed in the 
neo-Darwinian gene, seeing it as the causal agent of change driven by statistical molecular 
biology. Teleological narrations of scientific determinism stand at a remove from bodies, from 




twentieth centuries ostracized ecologists and natural historians, and delivered on Darwin’s 
gruesome prediction, “Looking to the world at no very distant date, what an endless number of 
the lower races will have been eliminated by the higher civilized races throughout the world. But 
I will write no more…” (1871, p. 316). 
 Neither Kant nor Darwin resolve an a priori dichotomy between reason and the 
imaginary. Reason as mechanistic telos was held in highest value, while attributes of the 
subjugated described the imaginary –irrational, crazy, feminine. The Kant-Darwin tension is 
emblematic of the absence of conceptual concensus about telos throughout western history: is 
telos purposive, end-directed, linear cause, cyclical cause, final cause, social construction, 
emergent, a variable of physics? While the philosophical relevance of the telos question to 
biology came to the fore as part of the 17th century Enlightenment reaction against the immutable 
knowledge authority of the Church, by the late nineteenth and twentieth century this initially 
minoritarian science movement enjoyed hegemonic authority. At the turn of the twenty-first 
century, tension over telos remains unresolved, categories have gotten messy, lost their 
antiseptically drawn boundaries. The metaphysics of telos has become a material issue of 
temporality, of life and well-being that is fundamentally consequential to a planet in trouble, 
despite how Western science narrates the denial and othering of subjectivity, and to do so sustains 
the ontological bifurcation of the imaginary and reason.  
 Marking that this hauntological past, represented by Kant and Darwin as ‘half-forgotten 
absent presences’, brings into focus one of the meanings of the contemporary genetic social 
imaginary, the organism as technological object emerges as an unsurprising telos of its own 
history encapsulated in Kant’s commitment to objective reality, i.e. nature’s purposive ‘organized 
beings’ which, in his view, gave science the basis for a teleology (Grene & Depew, 2004, pp. 
104-5) and framed his systems-thinking of natural purposes. This served his larger discursive 




and nature’s ultimate end. Kant vehemently opposed atheism and defended monotheism, 
accordingly his natural purpose preserved hierarchical law. Taxonomic thinking, monotheistic 
thinking, and teleological thinking wove together in a Kantian whole, the monster in our midst, 
typical of ‘objective’ reductionist and economic narrations by dominant figureheads of Western 
noösphere, of which Kant was one.  
 These stories slam into their own negative effects and subsequent contradictory 
advancements in science; logics of ecology, care, interdependence, the posthuman, global climate 
change, diverse and local economies, classed distributions of health and wealth, community well-
being lay either outside or subservient within the purposive Kantian whole of man’s ‘objective 
reality’ and the systemic nihilism of othered subjects. Science narrated subjectivity, and its 
erasure. 
 Neo-Darwinism successfully resurrected within molecular and evolutionary biology a 
nineteenth century atomistic, ‘objective’ worldview that conjoined economic theory (capitalism) 
and ‘hard’ science as an agent, or engine, of social change in the name of ‘progress’ (civilizing 
the uncivilized, imperialism, industry, commodification, more research, applied technoscience, 
profit). Twentieth century society responded to this nineteenth century promise, as science 
historian Steven Goldman explains (1989), by proliferating vast networks of educational, 
governmental, military, and business institutions to translate scientific ideas (distinct from the 
former practical know-how, apprenticeships, fieldwork, and craftsmanship). Funded by 
government and private investments, the age of techno-science took off with centralized 
electricity, the textile industry, meat-packing, cheap penicillin, and– lest we forget– the military. 
Having begun modestly (the first engineering schools with a core curriculum in the ‘hard’ 
theoretical sciences were few until their post-WWII explosion), the cross-fertilizations of 
universities, business, government, and hard science rapidly opened the door to the profit 




continues to play out an addiction of economic profit to scientific innovation (Goldman, 2007, 
lecture 27).  
 The grip of telos on biological thinking from Aquinas through Dawkins demonstrates the 
tenacity and ferocity of what I see as an irresistible charisma of monotheism by which claims to 
knowledge about life and nature, in filling discrete, absolute, and autonomous categories serve 
political and social ends to assert power ‘over’. In a WEIRD conflation of ethics, applied science, 
and economic power politics, the negation of secular thinking (free of monotheistic traits) deletes 
and others subjectivity, a trait that describes and fosters neoliberalism. Even as stakes get higher 
globally, this conflation sustains the status quo of power relations.  
  Kant’s living matter, understood as operating according to lawed, if unknowable, 
purposive causality contradicts Darwin’s process theory of descent by emergent modification and 
natural selection. The scientific method, by which claims to objectivity are legitimized by 
concensus within the scientific community, presumes a priori that its object of study– the research 
question– exists in the Kantian world of an external nature governed by autonomous, causally-
functioning laws. Grounded in an Enlightenment conception of the workings of natural law, do 
the standards of the scientific method inherently conflict with Darwin’s extraction of telos and 
singularity from natural law, does the scientific method conflict with a theory of variations due to 
differences in conditions and environments, contingency, and unpredictability. Darwin’s science 
more closely resembles the properties of quantum uncertainty than of Newtonian physics. In a 
thought experiment that privileges the scientific method, natural selection, then, is either not 
natural or not scientific. On the other hand, however, accepting Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection to be scientifically accurate prompts doubt on whether the scientific method imposes 
standards incommensurate with natural processes, and, consequently, are possible knowledges 




 Other philosophers and communities of ostracized scientists recognized the tyranny of 
systematics and the limits of reductionism, and I briefly review some of these in the next chapter. 
In many ways, the elder Darwin was one of these. Darwin self-identified as a materialist, though 
only privately in his Notebooks, so heretical were the Romantics to the science of his time and 
class. As Darwin observed in a letter to Charles Lyell in 1860, well in advance of Thomas Kuhn, 
“Without the making of theories I am convinced there would be no observation” (1887, p. 315). 
Observations must be tested against a theory, model, or hypothesis.  
The In-between  
 
 





 The practices may be to pave over, and to cut, and ‘yet it still moves’. Earth swallows up 
and transforms the crust that will have had been the visible, and what had been is no longer 
hidden. The outside becomes the inside. The particularities of how this turnover happens to take 








 What gets overlooked in tugs-of-war over ideology are the tenuous ephemeral dark 
matter of the in-between– of the actor and the network nodes, of the conditions that mark the 
cusp, of what’s gestating inside the gaps, of the teeter between legacy, lived experience, and 
desires, of spaces that cannot be reified or quarantined, measured or predicted– the spaces of the 
imaginary. Given the imaginary’s capacity to weave new narratives of reality, and given the 
potential of recent scientific practices and biological innovations to effect fundamental social 
change, the narratives at work in the imaginary best be scrutinized, and their affective potencies 
tended. Capitalism and patriarchy, the progeny of long histories of militarism and theology, 
colonized the space of the imaginary.  
 As attached to Appadurai’s concept, the genetic social imaginary, that Franklin described, 
defined a local/global practice of science that reimagined, and, then, (re)made a reproductive 
reality. Put another way, Franklin’s exploration of the social imaginary as genetic argues that the 
collective social imaginary directly enacts a reproductive telos of a previously nonexistent and 
not yet narrated world. But does her ‘reimagining re-define’ and bring-forth an unfamiliar world 
or, as I argue, continue the world as it had already been declared as a man-directed engine of 
teleologies? The meta-interpretation of her cultural analysis accurately frames one premise of my 
project: science and the social coalesce in the imaginary of the noösphere-embodying millennial 
Western subject.11 The imaginary, then, locates where and how subjectivity becomes constituted 
and conditioned; it locates the field (meant in the quantum sense) of narrative flows; spatially, the 
imaginary is a heterotopia; it is the imaginary where reserve holds of potentialities, possibility, 
and bringing-forth consolidate; both stasis and transformation require a mobilization of the 
imaginary; as such, the imaginary sites political battle and ethical struggle, inspiring fear in the 




 The challenge to contemporary science is to explain this space, acknowledging its 
political and temporal materialities, a challenge taken on by Karen Barad and other marginalized 
voices in science; theirs, too, briefly reviewed in the following chapter, follows from a legacy of 
former narrations that haunted and queered the dominant of this chapter’s review.12 
 
Figure 21. Paradigm shift. Grassland #394 (Underdown, 2005) 
 
 How long does it take for the drawn out effects of a paradigm shift to show? There won’t 
be crisp edges to mark the end of one and the start of another, but we can take note that it is in 
the process of ensuing, this mark of time and movement, is becoming altogether different than 





 1  While the topologies of the social imaginary that emerges from my brief, simplistic 
exercise here might appear sophomoric, well-researched and scholarly-presented affiliations with 
my description are found in recent critiques of advanced capitalism as tied to subjectivity in the 
work of, for example, Margulis, Gibson-Graham, Haraway, Barad, Alaimo, Braidotti, and more.  
 
 2  …by whom and to whom become the obvious secondary questions that follow. 
 
 3  Women can’t be trusted because they are dependent on men, the judgment of men who 
needed to work for a living also make unreliable witnesses (Shapin and Schaffer on Boyle’s air-
pump, as cited by Law, 2004, p. 120). 
 
 4  This is not a new idea, Richard Rorty critiques rationalism as “a secularized version of 
the Western monotheistic tradition” (as cited by Braidotti, 2013, p. 175). There would be more 
references for the same idea were I to do that research. 
 
 5  Philosopher of biology, David Hull, lays responsibility for the wars in ‘directional’ 
evolution between cladistics, phenetics, and evolutionary statistics in the 1960s and 1970s to 
taxonomic thinking (1988, pp. 32-33); these computational methods are not Darwinian, they are 
neo-Darwinian.  
 
 6   Richard Rorty: Nietzsche's charge that the philosophical tradition which stems from 
Plato is an attempt to avoid facing up to contingency, to escape from time and chance. Nietzsche 
thought that the test of human character was the ability to live with the thought that there was no 
convergence. 
 
 7  “Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by 
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is directed by the archer. 
Therefore, some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and 
this being we call God” (Aquinas, 1485 Article 3, Question 2). 
 
 8  In a co-authored, posthumously published paper Life After Kant: Natural purposes and 
the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality (2002), Francisco Varela acknowledges 
that parallel directions in scientific ideas around autopoiesis and the philosophy of biology around 
complexity converge in Kant’s introduction of the term ‘self-organizing’. Both Varela and 
Kauffman (1995) acknowledge Kant in the genealogy of the idea of immanent teleology as a 
biological feature of the living process. The notion of a Kantian ‘whole’ is difficult to pin down. 
On one hand, “Kant’s precept that the organizing principle of a complex whole could not be 
derived from analysis of the functional interactions among its parts” (Newman, 1995, p. 213) 
confirms Kant’s limit to human understanding. Kant’s language suggests an intrinsic linear 
hierarchy, “parts are possible only through their relation to the whole,” and parts are “there for the 







Kauffman’s citation of the Kantian whole as an organism whose cyclic functioning is without 
hierarchical privilege: “the parts exist for and by means of the whole; the whole exists for and by 
means of the parts” (2010, p. 58). Regardless, Kant is clear on the point that the qualities of this 
latter formulation he saw as properties of ‘constitutive reason’, which he negatively identified 
with materialism. In my opinion, expressed with a nod to Clare Hemmings’ language, the 
narrative strand that serves as an invocation of authority– the inherently ambiguous Kantian 
presumptions– reproduces a gendered monotheistic habit that does no favor to the scientific and 
philosophical story innovations that Varela and Kauffman secure. 
 
 9  Ironically, Latour and Woolgar’s explanation of their claim sounds a lot like Kant’s 
description of the concept/object order of living matter, but that observation falls tangentially to 
my point here. 
 
 10  Ernst Mayr states that Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution does not find concensus 
in the scientific community until the 1940s (1988). 
 
 11  Having already established this paper’s acceptance of the Varela/Margulis erasure of 
the differentiation between entity and context, between self and community, and of the Gibson-
Graham notion of the dispersed ubiquity of subjects as, collectively, the local/global social, the 
imaginary, then, as I use it, refers at once to that of both the subject and the social.  
 
 12  Another challenge that confronts the capacity of independently-thinking subjects to 
break free of their own socially- and culturally-situating intellectual milieu, and to remain 
uninfected by the blinding normativity that the noösphere to which daily life tunes, may to some 









MEMORY II. VICO’S QUEER CHAOS: SUBJECTIVITY NARRATES SCIENCE 
If we would have new knowledge, we must  
get us a whole world of new questions. 
 Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (1941) 
 
 
 The structure of language structures thinking. To think differently, to think away from a 
presenting paradigm, radical theorization requires leveraging existing vocabulary to explain and 
move towards something new, it’s always awkward. To revise thinking itself, to undo ideological 
norms and subjectivities ensconced in culturally dominant habits requires a new language, or new 
uses of language suitable to innovation on a fundamental level. Only ideas that can be 
‘languaged’ in some form of text, whether verbal, imagery, movement, etc., can be thought. For 
Susanne Langer “language is intrinsic to thinking, imagining, even our ways of perceiving” 
(1974, p. 318). Absent a language corresponding to new imaginaries, existing language can at 
best only approximate, unsatisfactorily, new thought, or only gesture towards ineffable meanings, 
and in this way “we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past” 
(Fitzgerald, 1925, last page) that “was simply not there to begin with, and the future is not simply 
what will unfold” (Barad, 2014). In Giordano Bruno’s language, the past and future are a 
coincidence of contraries, “iteratively reworked and enfolded through the iterative practices of 
spacetimemattering…All are one phenomenon” (Barad, 2014, 53:40). Bruno, burned at the stake 
in 1600 for his anti-Catholic beliefs, objected to the Aristotelian tradition of Final Cause and 
monotheism. He was a pantheist, his coincidence-of-opposites1 was less a unity of binaries than a 
dissolution of the borders of duality, since each property coincides with, is equal to, its contrary 




the rational and the irrational, and it prefigured what physics located materially four hundred 
years later in quantum tunneling, entanglement, non-locality, and dis-continuity. It may be no 
coincidence that Bruno’s thinking was influenced by 15th century Nicholas Cusa, whom 20th 
century quantum physicist David Bohm cites, and whom, in turn, Karen Barad cites in her 
quantum field theory of matter, history, and temporality. In Bruno’s materiality opposites are not 
binaries, but co-constituting properties, “all things are everywhere in change and motion…” (as 
cited in Singer, 1950, p. 109). 
Our philosophy ... maketh contraries to coincide so that there is one primal 
foundation both of origin and of end. From this coincidence of contraries, we 
deduce that … contraries are within contraries; wherefore it is not difficult to 
compass the knowledge that each thing is within every other -- which 
Aristotle and the other Sophists could not comprehend.  
(Bruno, as cited in Singer, 1950, Chapter 3) 
	
Bruno’s coincidence of contraries influenced Vico’s Scienza Nuova published in 1726, in which 
he rebelled against the dominant trajectories of Cartesian rationalism and Lockean empiricism, 
and against the strictures on science imposed by Enlightenment methods. Vico objected to the 
linear ‘progress’ narratives presented by evolutionary theories. Scienza Nuova is a cyclic science 
of history; his vision was political– the eradication of rank and privilege.  
 The history of dominance (and its undoing) embeds shadow-stories of nascent 
movements of resistances to power. The Enlightenment, that began as a heretical movement 
engaging science to defraud the church of its doctrinal belief systems and social power, produced 
its own radical elements. Analogously, current nascent social movements, having roots, might 
possibly flourish. Indeterminate, unpredictable, but possible. Present meanings get carved from 
genealogy, the past imprints its future in forms of memory that, like proteins, unfold and refold, 
in the “materiality of imagining” (Barad, 2014). Political hopes for transformations ground on 




 An anti-Cartesian thread stretches from the Milesian monists to the recent new materialist 
feminisms. Leading voices of minoritarian memory have been largely overlooked or dismissed by 
an over-confident mainstream that ‘doth protest too much. Due to the negative effects, 
conspicuously pronounced economically and ecologically in advanced capitalism, produced by 
Cartesian/ rationalist/ reductionist subject positions, those who boldly queered their social order, 
still largely overlooked, garner renewed attention. Heraclitus, Giordano Bruno, Giambattista 
Vico, Jean Baptiste-Lamarck, Charles Darwin, Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead,2 William 
James, Merleau-Ponty, Michael Polanyi, and Susanne Langer, are some of those whose 
philosophical thinking now finds support in recent advancements in the sciences (evolution, 
cellular genetics, integrative biology, quantum physics).3 It makes for uncanny, out-of-linear-time 
affiliations between academic disciplines and scholars. What distinguishes this group as an 
assemblage is a notion of science and experience as indivisible, impacting and impacted by 
notions of ethics, politics, and justice. In this lineage,4 affect figures centrally in knowledge 
production, to scientific claims, to life-ing and nature. Concepts of materiality organize around 
not telos but process, and by so doing the bifurcation of reason and the imaginary dissolves. My 
entry point into this curious continuum of renegades is Giambattista Vico, one voice whose 
echoes, temporal diffractions, resonate as overtones to voices that challenged objectivity and 
transform concepts of subjectivity and materiality in science, science studies, philosophy, and 
critical feminist theory. Their common denominator is a process systems-thinking, as opposed to 
reductionism. Vico’s concept of Chaos, particularly, provides a thread by which to make tracings 





Ricorso: Vico’s Chaos 
 
One of the results is the downgrading of poetry itself.  
The idea of the poet as seer or prophet now seems a distant memory. 
Harry Eyres, 3/15/2014, 
referring to the “objectivist, scientific view of the  
world that still holds power almost everywhere.” 
	
	
 Influenced more by Egyptian than Western thought, Vico put forth a 
societyhistoryscience5 theory of human civilization as a recursive pattern (ricorso) of three 
consecutive stages, which historian Isaiah Berlin called a ‘science of mind’, each stage 
corresponding to a political structure and to a linguistic trope by which that stage comprehends 
phenomena.  
	
Figure 22. Vico’s stage theory of the cycle of human history. (Sand, C, 2015) 
 
 
Each phase of the cycle returns historical life to begin the “seim anew” (Joyce, 1939, p. 215, l. 
23), and retains in memory the previous cycle. The return to the Theocratic stage from the Human 




liberty, reminiscent of the Middle Ages, as contrasted to cosmos, to which he associated order 
and rules as envisaged in the medieval Christian tradition.  
	
	
Figure 23. Menelaus capturing Proteus. (https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com) 
	
Vico described Chaos as a shape-shifting Protean pattern of forms: 
1. its earliest “confusion of human seeds in the period of the abominable sharing of 
women,” to  
2. the misshapen monster that devoured all things and swallowing men into its void, to  
3. the physicists’ prime matter of natural things, to  




5. the philosophers’ symbol of the formed universe, to  
6. the poets’ matter in the sense of Proteus, the mythic form-shifting monster wrestled by 
Menelaus.  
 Chaos ultimately collapses irony and the rational into poetic wisdom and metaphor. 
Poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile [non-Biblical] world, must 
have begun with a metaphysic not rational and abstract like that of learned 
men now, but felt and imagined, as that of the first men must have been, 
who, without power of ratiocination, were all robust sense and vigorous 
imagination…This metaphysic was their poetry, a faculty born with them 
(for they were furnished by nature with these senses and imaginations); born 
of their ignorance of causes, for ignorance, the mother of wonder, made 
everything wonderful to me who were ignorant of everything…; they, in 
their robust ignorance, did it by virtue of a wholly corporeal imagination. 
(Vico, Book II, Chapter I, para. 375-376 in Bergin & Fisch, 1948). 
	
For Vico, the imaginary is memory, expressed in wordless thinking (‘mute language’), poetry, 
and language. “Imagination is nothing but the springing up again of reminiscences, and ingenuity 
or invention is nothing but the working over of what is remembered” (as cited in Rickard, 1999, 
p. 264). Nothing is divinely ordained. Men make (there is no poeisis without technê [craft/art]) 
their own histories and their own categories by which they apprehend the world according to the 
poetic wisdom and poetic physics of their historical stage. Myth and memory and language merge 
in an embodied imaginary6 of the subject and in the code of history’s ricorso, without telos. In this 
ricorso of language —not dissimilar from Haraway’s and Barad’s– men bring forth ‘nature’ and 
‘gods’. What they can know is only what they have made.  
The nature of things is nothing but their coming into being (nascimento) at 
certain times and in certain fashions. Whenever the time and fashion is thus 
and so, such and not otherwise are the things that come into being. (Vico, 
XIV, para. 147, as cited in Bergin & Fisch, 1948) 
 
Amplifying Herodotus and Heraclitus, and as a harbinger to Bergson, Whitehead, Deleuze, 




historical stage and its memory. Vico sets a standard for an indivisibility of cyclic temporality, 
materiality, and the imaginary languaged in an historical ricorso of becoming of the subject and 
event.   
	
Echoes: Ricorso in Chaos 
chaosmos presided over blankdeblank, god of all machineries  
(James Joyce, 1939, p. 253, l. 33) 
	
 The recovery of history as a methodology to de-stabilize the linear and the dominant, 
which Nietzche and Foucault and post-structuralists perform, traces back to Vico’s Scienza 
Nuova and the entangling of myth, language, narrative, science, society, and history. Vico’s 
Chaos, emergent from / between / to / before and after order, takes on iterative multiple meanings 
across historical stages of artsciencephilosophy that diffract across post-modern and post-
structuralist thought, as well as in the modern science of chaos (turned complexity) theory. Post-
colonialist Edward Said appropriated Vico’s heuristics, as did Derrida (another favorite reference 
of Karen Barad’s). Vico’s influence on James Joyce yielded the novelist’s origination of the term 
‘chaosmos’ in Finnegan’s Wake, subsequently taken up by Gilles Deleuze.  
Because, Soferim Bebel, if it goes to that, (and dormerwindow gossip will 
cry it from the housetops no surelier than the writing on the wall will hue it 
to the mod of men that mote in the main street) every person, place and thing 
in the chaosmos of Alle any way connected with the gobblydumped turkery 
was moving and changing every part of the time …the continually more and 
less intermisunderstanding minds of the anticollaborators, the as time went 
on as it will variously inflected, differently pronounced, otherwise spelled, 
changeably meaning vocable scriptsigns.  (Joyce, 1939,  p. 118, l. 18-28). 
	
While a deep discussion of chaosmos lies beyond the focus of this project, one observation 
(consistent with the linguistic trope that Vico attaches to the democratic ‘human’ phase of 




Joyce) was Vico, not Spinoza (Vico’s contemporary rival and the oft-praised textual authority of 
Deleuzian liberatory monism), informs one of my central critiques of new material feminisms that 
I trace in the next chapter. Vichian diffractions spread to hard science (e.g. the chemistry and 
complexity theory of Isabelle Stengers and Ilya Prigogine) and from hard science (ecology of 
Gregory Bateson) to philosophy (e.g. Merleau-Ponty, William James), and, by way of those 
influenced by Deleuze, to the new materialisms and feminist critical theory of Rosi Braidotti 
covered in the following chapter. These examples illustrate the breadth of Vico’s diffractive, if 
little acknowledged, significance to efforts to defeat the Euclidean-Newtonian-Cartesian-
Enlightenment-neoDarwinian tradition.7  Taken together as a time-traveling assemblage, this 
amounts to a counter-hegemonic movement in science, philosophy, and feminist critical theory,  
to describe an altogether different model of world-view-making-becoming, one that I summarize, 
for the convenience of a shorthand, as an embodied becoming without beginning or end in 
constantly changing conditions. We are not in Kansas anymore.  






 Paul Klee's 1920 painting Angelus Novus, which Walter Benjamin compared to "the 
angel of history" in the ninth thesis of his essay Theses on the Philosophy of History presents a 
Klee painting named Angelus Novus. “The painting shows an angel looking as though he is about  
 
Figure 25. Angelus Novus. Paul Klee, 1920, the angel of history.  
 
to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is 
open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned 
toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps 
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of its feet. The angel would like to stay, 
awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; 
it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The 
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which its back is turned, while the pile of debris 





Echoes: Ricorso in Language 
For the last three hundred years the progress of science has increasingly 
 controlled the outlook of man on the universe, and how  [CHECK] profoundly 
 modified (for better or for worse) the accepted meaning of human existence. 
 Its theoretic and philosophic influence was pervasive. 
(Michael Polanyi, 1969, p. 64) 
	
 “The springs of European thought,” Susanne Langer wrote, “have run dry—those deep 
springs of imagination that furnish the basic concepts for a whole intellectual order” (1942, p. 
293). The conceptual forms that will emerge to replace them are still “in the mythical phase, the 
‘implicit’ stage of symbolic formulation”, a particularly Vichian echo. For Langer, philosophy “is 
mythical in origin and scientific in destination” (p. 178) –Vico interpreted language as signals, 
poetics, and science– a description that her friend and former teacher, Alfred North Whitehead, 
subsequently shared— that philosophy, like mysticism, affords “direct insight into depths 
unspoken (1938, p. 174). “All men enjoy flashes of insight beyond meanings already stabilized” 
in language. It is the role of philosophy—along with literature and the sciences—to find 
“linguistic expressions for meanings as yet unexpressed” (1933, 291).  
 Langer believed what was required was “a new conceptual vocabulary—not a 
metaphysical use of old vocabulary—to make a new frame” (1967, p. 316) for thinking about 
“the problems of life and mind in nature” (1967, p. xvii). Navigating between actualities and 
possibility, the philosophical and biological cannot be separated:  
Whenever an act is induced by a change in the vital situation, such as the life 
process itself constantly engenders (thereby motivating an endless stream of 
acts), it is likely that not only the impulse of that act, but also one or more 
conflicting impulses or alternative potential acts are formed, which are 
doomed to speedy abrogation. This play of impulses forms the dynamic 
matrix of life, a plexus even more involuted and compounded than the 
metabolizing, differentiating, ever-changing structure that is the material 
organism, because the latter consists only of actualized events,8 but the life 




(1967, p. 304) 
 
Though known primarily for her contributions to theories of art and language, Langer also gave 
extensive, if overlooked, attention to the philosophy of science and biology, directly connecting 
the relevance of language to temporal concepts of materiality. Anticipating the late twentieth 
century science wars over objectivity, Langer acknowledged the challenge of putting into words a 
revisioning of biological systems, “the subjective aspect of experience, the direct feeling of it,” is 
an “aspect of the intricate web of life [that] defies discursive formulation, and therefore verbal 
expression” (1957b, Problems of Art, p. 22). In Laboratory Life: the Social Construction of 
Scientific Facts, Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar (1979, 1986) argue that logistical procedures in 
conducting experiments dealing with equipment and data require multiple subjective decisions, to 
such an extent that scientific facts are, in large part, culturally constructed. They observe that 
inscription devices in scientific research have empirical results of their own. Analogously, Steven 
Goldman states mathematical theories, such as those pertaining to structures of molecular 
relationships, function like languages. The meanings of their terms are a contingent function of 
the relationships internal to the theory. Latour’s and Woolgar’s and Goldman’s observations 
appropriately impute the language as an inscription device that produces its own empirical results. 
Daniel Lehrman shows this to be true in his comparison of the effect on opposing scientific 
claims in animal behavior, pathology, evolutionary biology, genetics, and evolution of various 
and imprecise meanings of words as innate, acquired, inherited, learning, normal, abnormal, 
experience (1970).	One of the results of this semantic and conceptual disarray are battles between 
scientists over matters of teleology and preformationism, largely organized according to whether 
the scientific discipline’s point of view privileges mechanisms that move toward functional form 
or an ontogeny from a preceding stage. Despite a conceptual transformation of biological life and 




reproduce a linear model of Cartesian thinking, even though this has been proven inadequate to 
deliver descriptions of phenomena, and often delivers ‘knowledge’ that is flat wrong.  
 
Echoes: Ricorso in Poetry 
 
If they could be surprised on the higher side of the said, 
 would they not reveal another meaning?  
(Levinas, 1991, p. 35) 
 
I shall reconsider human knowledge by starting from the 
 fact that we can know more than we can tell.  
(Michael Polanyi, 1967, p. 12) 
 
 According to Bruno, Western science began with the emergence of the definite article in 
the grammar of early Greek language. The placement of the definite article with an adjective or 
verb, (the cold), (the good), (the act of thinking), transformed a property to a substance, and 
afforded abstraction. Heraclitus spoke of the universal and the logos, which served as stable 
objects of thinking. The horse, the thought, and the just afforded concepts of the generic and 
permanent. The abstract noun, Snell says, “references the non-physical – alive, animate, 
intellectual, dynamic.” Swaying between Platonism and a Heraclitus’ view, with a dash of 
exceptionalism thrown in, he states “Both the metaphor and the personification necessarily put an 
anthropomorphic of physiognomic interpretation on the non-physical, i.e. they present it as a 
product, or an embodiment, of animate reality” (p. 231). The definite article defines the abstract 
and connects a particular to the universal, generating an object of thought about which we make 
knowledge claims. The new product for the early Greeks was the rational, i.e. the logical 
expression of thought. New modes of using prepositions (through, because), not only to connect 
parts of speech as designations of time and space, as causality gave way to the “abstract 
conception of the human mind or spirit as it was brought to fruition by Heraclitus” (Snell, 1960, 




concept of ‘becoming’, was dismissed by historians of a science defined by LaPlacean parameters 
of objectivity), Snell credits the early Greeks with the linguistic ancestries to Cartesian-
Newtonian humanism, the mind/body split, and the grammar of scientific thought.  
 Might grammatical structures of the English language serve to embed linear causality and 
substance metaphysics in Western thinking, structuring bias and inequality into scholarship and 
leadership, to real and disastrous effects for the daily living of world and planet? Might we need a 
function of language precluded by correct scholarly structure to express a process worldview? 
Snell’s grammatical trope that explains the rational mind is the definite article and the use of 
causal prepositions; for Vico metaphor, synecdoche, and irony constitute tropes for apprehending 
phenomena in a becoming world. Have we come stutteringly full circle, from the early Greek that 
seeded substance metaphysics to the awkward phrasings of process sciences of immanence and 
emergence found in the recessed corners of discourse at the start of the twenty-first century? To 
step aside from the bifurcations, binaries, dichotomies, teleologies, and dialectics of the 
intervening two thousand four hundred years, do we have a language to not-think categories and 
telos, instead to think co-becomings and co(m)-motions? According to the dictum of Italian 
linguist Giuliano Bonfante who followed Vico’s influence, “all language is poetry” (Larissa 
Bonfante, personal communication, 2012); language is always-already ever-not-quite becoming. 
Theoretical physicist of non-locality and quantum potential, David Bohm, writes in 1980:  
Thus the ‘atomistic’ attitude to words has been dropped and instead our point 
of view is rather similar to that of field theory in physics, in which particles 
are only convenient abstractions from the whole movement. Similarly, we 
may say that language is an undivided field of movement, containing sound, 
meaning, attention-calling, emotional and muscular reflexes, etc. … The 
word ceases to be taken as an ‘indivisible atom of meaning’ and instead it is 
seen as no more than a convenient marker in the whole movement of 
language … (This means that giving attention in this way to the components 
of words is not primarily an attitude of analysis but, rather, an approach that 
allows for the unrestricted flow of meaning).  





By reading scientific terms and philosophical concepts as a form of poetry, might “the strange 
fact that language means something” (Polanyi, 1967, p. 192) foster a more capacious stance 
towards knowledge- and meaning-making in science, one that relaxes the border controls of 
acceptable ‘academic writing’ and makes space for thinking improper ideas that bolt from 
academic corrals?  
 Alfred North Whitehead’s process metaphysics responded to his criticisms of Cartesian 
foundations of scientific materialisms as inadequate to account for the nature of things given 
advancing scientific realities. “Time, space, matter, material, ether, electricity, mechanism, 
organism, configuration, structure, pattern, function, all require reinterpretation” (1925, p. 16). 
Compelled in part by the development of quantum theory, Whitehead stated in 1925 that the 
scientific ‘situation’, having become too narrow, especially in biology and psychology, needed 
“to revise all our notions of the ultimate character of material existence” (1925, p. 35). This had 
been happening within physics since the late 19th century when discoveries of electromagnetic 
fields, the aether field, and field theories of gravity undermined the discipline’s own own 
LaPlacean worldview.  
 Contrary to substance metaphysics, the intangible became material, and the initiation of 
modern process metaphysics ushered in a fundamental challenge to material determinism 
(Goldman, 2007). A cascade of ‘immaterial realities’ was discovered – radio waves, cosmic rays, 
x-rays, gamma rays, neutrinos, dark matter, dark energy.  I mention here only a very few of the 
many milestones that contributed to a repositioning of the discipline of science from that which 
reveals external and passive laws of natural truth, to the discipline by which a particular sort of 
inquiry leads to a particular sort of explanation, or failing that, depiction of phenomena. With the 
discovery of intangible forces and fields, science described an experience of nature, but how 




 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries with the discovery that spatial arrangements of 
atoms within molecules determined molecular physical and chemical properties, relationships 
became physically real. Molecular biology decoded DNA; in network theory and information 
theory the properties of relationships, independent of the terms they related, caused their own 
effects. Relativity and quantum mechanics redefined causality. In mathematics symbolic logic 
broke from Euclidean-Newtonian confines, making possible Claude Shannon’s founding of 
digital computer design theory. Differential geometry and topology, the study of freeform spatial 
relationships, became important to quantum theory, cosmology, and biology.  
In mid-century algorithmic information theory reduced physical objects to information 
representations. Genetic research discovered that the sequence of bases differentiated one life 
form from another. Information as sequence took on ‘insubstantial’ material reality. The idea that 
information structures constitute black holes and the entire universe took shape, for example, in 
the holographic principle. The quintessential science of process, evolution, established time as a 
fundamental feature of reality. Regardless of Darwin’s articulation that causative processes of 
individual variation were ‘spontaneous’ (as opposed to random), his physicist contemporaries and 
evolutionary biology descendents interpreted ‘spontaneity’ to mean ‘random chance’. Ironically 
to the exclusion of spontaneity, chance and statistical probability became inculcated into the list 
of rational attributes of nature.  
 Reality had ceased to mean material ‘thinghood’, instead it referred to structures and 
relationships, and information, identified according to intra- and interactive properties and 
processes. This revision to scientific reality opened up to new applications of systems-thinking to 
such phenomena as weather, climate, atmosphere, Earth. These complex systems interact, 
modify, and adapt, in a quasi-Darwinian sense of fitness, in interaction with other systems 
(examples: hurricane, living entities, cells, genomes) and were found to be exquisitely sensitive to 




stable non-linear systems that, far from equilibrium, bore none of the prior identifying traits of 
19th century reality: autonomous, passive, deterministic, and predictable. Matter itself emerged as 
complex, dynamic, and self-organizing.  
 The discipline of explanation was forced, again, to re-articulate its function. Scientific 
knowledge became a particular sort of depiction of phenomena, in the sense of Vichian poetics 
and phenomena. “Poetry always has to have both content and memory, without describing it too 
explicitly” (Libbrecht, 2007). Vico’s poetics argued that science/history could not be dissociated 
from the subjects or from the culture of its historical setting in which science and subjects are 
embedded, a concept with energies for long temporal diffractions.  
	
Echoes: Ricorso in the Social 
 While the early history of Western science was one of the subversion of authority, an 
aspect of the scientific revolution supported by Vico (if not its Cartesian and Rationalist terms), 
by the early twentieth century the whole outlook of man on the universe was conditioned by an 
implicit recognition of the authority of scientific opinion (Polanyi, 1969, 57). The project, then, as 
one might imagine Vico’s analysis of modernity, would be the subversion of Cartesian/LaPlacean 
science, specifically, as wielding political authority, and, if seen in terms of his theory of 
historical ricorso, inevitable. Interestingly and ironically, that destabilization initiated from within 
the conventions of authoritarian science. This pattern emerged from the many disruptions to 
material determinism, and contributed to the rejection of pure objectivity in scientific research as 
either viable or rational. 
 The effect of quantum theory and relativity on shifting the language of science from its 
prior status as revealing nature’s truths to, ultimately, the depiction of phenomena– definitionally 




to scrutiny as a social practice of sentience and experience. With that began the unseaming of the 
politically conjoined Newtonian twins of modernity, authority and objectivity.  
 Inspired by the quantum revolution in physics, Ludwik Fleck published a series of papers 
in the 1930s based on medical ‘ways of thinking’ that claimed scientific ‘facts’ get constructed by 
collectives that exchange ideas within a frame that conforms to a shared and particular thought 
style, and this epistemological social process constitutes ‘objective reality’. The publication of 
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962 cemented the notion that scientific 
‘truths’ reify social processes of consensus within the scientific community. All ‘objective 
conclusions’, he states, are ultimately founded on subjectivity and worldview. Lynn Hankinson 
Nelson, too, affirmed that social beliefs and values inform theory, but she argued her point 
politically, from a feminist perspective on knowledge as produced by dominant community 
processes (1993).  Sandra Harding, also sounding much like Vico, observed that the content of 
scientific thought is shaped (but not determined) by its historical location, and that throughout the 
modernist history of science, the scientific worldview is in fact a view of dominant groups’ 
modern western society, and that (1993). These voices echoed with new meanings, not only 
Vico’s insinuation, but also Darwin’s assertion that without theory, there would be no 
observation, a premise supported by historians of science such as Thomas Kuhn (1962), Israel 
Scheffler (1967), Michael Polanyi (1969), and Lynn Margulis (classroom refrain), with an 
important distinction. This clarified understanding of theory, that the values and subjectivities of 
a time inflect the theories of that time, and that theories are value-laden, exposed the political 
underbelly of scientific knowledge, a facet especially explored in feminist scholarship, and posed 
a risk to science that undermined its authority. Polanyi observed that one danger of a value-laden 
authority was that it caused science to argue against theoretical possibilities that would not appear 




amounted to an attack on the very trait that legitimized the authorization of power to institutions 
and structures of Western society. 
 To be a member of the scientific authority meant to submit to its values. Evelyn Fox 
Keller (1985), Donna Haraway (1988), Nancy Tuana (1989), Ruth Hubbard (1990), Sandra 
Harding (1991) demonstrated that claims to scientific knowledge reflect the values and biases of 
those who ‘make’ science happen. Feminist scholarship revealed an androcentrism as the 
‘normal’ default status of scientific claims. Exposure of gender bias and a masculinist orientation 
inherent to the historiography of science and to standard research methodologies further 
challenged scientific ‘objectivity’ [Audre Lorde (1982), Evelyn Fox Keller (1978, 1985), Nancy 
Hartsock (1983), Longino and Doell (1983), Harding (1986), Sandra Harding (1995), Elisabeth 
Lloyd 1996, Tuana (1996)]. Carol Gilligan (1982) made visible the persistent ascription of 
amorality to ‘feminine forms of reasoning.’ Evelyn Fox Keller critiqued the “force of the concept 
of predetermined centralized control as a ‘natural’ model of ‘relationship’ among components of 
living systems or populations” (1985, pp. 150-157). By virtue of work by minoritarian scientists, 
social scientists, and feminist scientists, any claim by a scientist-subject or discipline to freedom 
from values, biases, commitments and ideologies became implausible, but cultural practices fade 
slowly. Despite the indisputable role of subjectivity in the formation of ‘objective’ knowledge 
claims, and despite the fundamental revision to the scientific conception of reality, familiar habits 
of thinking in terms of causal relations get attributed to systems that seem to be complexly 
interactive, “imposing on nature the very stories we like to hear” (Keller, 1985, p. 187), or, to 
modify that quote, the very mythologies a former scientific thinking likes to perpetuate.  
	 With the threatened erasure of ‘pure’ objectivity, charges of relativism hovered over its 
challengers. Israel Scheffler defended ‘objectivity’ in science by redefining the term so as to be 
unrelated to its Newtonian sense of fixity of observation and meaning. He situated objectivity 




gets absorbed by different political and cultural frameworks, and meaning constancy (1982, viii). 
Scheffler rejected the inevitability of each. Neither did feminist science and science studies 
scholars reject ‘scientific objectivity’ wholesale either, nor did they promote the caricatured 
position of scientific facts as mere constructions of social processes and political interests. Quite 
to the contrary, but one of the outcomes of feminist insight into science was a demand for paying 
attention to the embodied, situated ‘ever not quite’9 processes by which shifts in language and 
science intra-act, a practice of critical reflexivity sensitive to nuance and complexity. To 
acknowledge the social and the subjective as inherent elements of ‘objectivity’ advanced not only 
feminism, but scientific knowledge-making, as well.  
 
Echoes: Ricorso in Science and Philosophy 
 As Whitehead predicted, the replacement of the Cartesian foundation of scientific 
materialism by more adequate modes of abstraction “[did] not fail to have important 
consequences in every field of thought” (1925, p. 36). With the pearly gates of objectivity rent 
asunder, the dragons of epistemology rushed in. Themes of inquiry in the ‘hard-sciences’ 
included consciousness, cognition, mind, neuroscience, and experience. Systems science looked 
at bodymind interactions between organism and environment, self-organization and emergence, 
immanence, dynamical systems, and complexity. The scientific study of these newly focused 
realms required hybridization with humanities and social science scholarship and philosophy 
schools of phenomenology and pragmatism. In a cyclic ricorso, these disciplines fell back on the 
sciences, such as biology, evolution, cognition, and neuroscience. These disciplinary shifts also 
mapped to changes in the concept of materiality itself. The resulting discursive re-conceptions of 
matter, experience, and reality laid bare a long unresolved dilemma: how to articulate the co-




these chapters is a gross simplification in order to satisfy brevity, given a generous reading, I 
think, and hope, my summations are not generally inaccurate.  
	
Echoes: Ricorso in Prehensions 
 
If there is no before and after by which to order cause and effect,  
has causality been arrested in its tracks?  
The open-ended becoming of the world resists 
 acausality as much as determinism.  
 Karen Barad 
	
A prehension, in Whitehead’s terminology, is a coming together of different parts of reality that 
develops from the present and reaches into the future “like tentacles” (Klose, 2007, p. 9). Modern 
process philosophy, which conceptually integrated scientific re-imaginings of reality, may be 
seen as a prehension of subsequent scientific theorizations of systems and materiality, elements of 
Whitehead’s and Susanne Langer’s serve as prescient preludes to late twentieth century theories 
of Gaia, autopoiesis and cognition, complexity, feminist new materialisms, and quantum 
consciousness.  In Langer’s philosophy ‘Acts’ are “articulated elements,” distinguishable “within 
a dynamic whole (i.e., a whole held together only by activity),” which are “indivisible in 
themselves, and inalienable from the whole, if they are not to give up their identity” (1967, pp. 
272-273). Her language prefigures the paradoxical and dynamic autopoietic notion of apparent 
permanence of a living entity’s identity, minus an articulation of the exchange of matter and 
energy with the entity’s context (immediate environment).   
[The persistence of a form] “made and maintained by complicated 
disposition of mutual influences among the physical units (atoms, molecules, 
then cells, then organs), whereby changes always tend to occur in certain 
permanent ways” [is] “always, at every moment, an achievement, because it 
depends entirely on the activity of ‘living’ [which] “is itself a process of 






 Autopoiesis provided the theoretical frame Lynn Margulis adopted to frame her empirical 
work represented in her 1967 paper On the Origin of Mitosing Cell, her 1981work Symbiosis in 
Cell Evolution, Acquiring Genomes (2002), and for her work on Gaia theory (1974).  Writing in 
the 1940s-1960s, Langer’s antecedent philosophy of biology captured more of the nuance, 
emergence, and complexity embedded in these theories and in Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection than most critical engagements of these concepts grasp. Langer concluded that the 
principles governing both evolution and development… 
“spring from the nature of acts, [for the patterns of developmental and 
evolutionary processes are] inherent in acts, and in all the complexes they 
form: lives, populations, stocks, and finally the whole history of life on earth 
that we usually mean by ‘evolution’ (1967, p. 371).  “The causes of 
evolution lie in the dynamic properties of acts and act-engendered entities. 
… [Hence, evolution is primarily] “a pattern of acts rather than of the 
anatomical changes that form the record of acts” (1967, p. 396). 
 
Like Margulis, contemplation of evolutionary processes led Langer to contemplations of the 
Earth as a complex system. For Langer, the advancing course of life emerges from  
the pressure of billions of impulses, ever pushing to actualization in every 
single organism, entering or failing to enter the moving stream of acts that 
constitutes the life of the agent, and beyond the agent, the stock, and 
enfolding the stock, the whole teeming life process on earth (1967, p. 377).  
At every level, a living system is seen as “a fabric of burgeoning acts, in 
literally billions of pressive relations which automatically adjust the elements 
of that incredibly complex dynamism to each other” (1967, p. 370 in 
Dryden). 
 
Here Langer is drawing on Whitehead’s depiction of becoming as impulse, there is… 
“a rhythm to process whereby creation produces natural pulsation, each 
pulsation forming a natural unit of historic fact. The data for any one 
pulsation of actuality consist of the full content of the antecedent universe as 
it exists in relevance to that pulsation (1938, p. 88-89). …The universe is 





In Whitehead’s becoming as impulse, creative and prehensive affinities with the quantum come 
together in later applications of Whiteheadian thought to speculative models of reality, as seen 
put forth by quantum physicists Tomonaga and Schwinger’s investigations of the observer and 
the observed (Klose, 2008),10 which build on Von Neumann’s quantum demonstration showing 
that an observed event in the external world is directly linked to the brain of the observer of that 
event. In Whitehead’s philosophy, 
the perceiving subject does not exist before the perceived events and is not 
their contemporary. This would mean a new formulation of a concept of 
substance, of a basis bearing the phenomena. Vice versa, the perceived 
events are temporal before the objectifying actual entity. (Klose, 2008, p. 9) 
 
 In von Neumann’s model, the observer signified experience, while the observed was treated as a 
quantum system. The event (in Whitehead’s sense of the term) of observation brought physical 
aspects and consciousness together as two aspects of a rationally coherent, natural whole. The 
Tomonaga-Schwinger-Surface made quantum adjustments to von Neumann’s principle to 
accommodate, like Whiteheads’ becoming, a sequence of instantaneous “nows”. The observer 
(consciousness) chose what question (or attention) to direct in the future to (quantum) nature, 
which in turn influenced the brain in ways controlled in principle by quantum laws. 
 “This connection can be found via the quantum Zeno effect, which shows 
how the choice and timing of questions can influence the course of events in 
the probed system… Since the question to be posed is supposed to be an 
experience [consciousness], it would appear that it really ought to be part of 
the mental [immaterial], rather than physical [material], side of the mind-
brain dynamics. Quantum theory has a lacuna that can very naturally be 
filled in such a way as to allow our thoughts to exercise real, though not 
absolute, control over the mechanical aspects of mind-brain dynamics.”  
(Klose,2008, 14-15). 
 
 Joachim Klose argues multiple points of correlation to suggest a synchronicity between 
process philosophy and what he calls ‘quantum ontology’ by which reality and matter are “mind-




“These elements of ‘freedom of choice’, on the part of the human participant and nature herself, 
lead to a picture of reality that gradually unfolds in response to choices that are not necessarily 
fixed by the prior physical part of reality alone.” Klose then asks, “Is it now justified to argue that 
quantum events could be counted as sentient? This assertion would equip elementary quantum 
events with a degree of creativity” (2008, p. 16-17). This is precisely the question that Stuart 
Kauffman (2014, 2015) and Karen Barad (2007, 2013) speculatively pursue scientifically; Barad 
describes the capacity of electrons to inscript, via quantum tunneling, a temporal future that is 
antecedent to an objectifying actual entity. Lynn Margulis integrated Ian McHarg’s 
thermodynamic theory of creativity (2006) into her foray into chimeras and consciousness as 
sentience. Coming out of his work in neurobiology and Buddhism, Francisco Varela developed 
an ethical philosophy of sentience. Some feminist new materialists pursue questions of sentience 
by engaging ‘hard’ science in order to theorize embodied meanings and implications (Hird, 
Haraway, Alaimo). Susanne Langer figures again as a prehension to this early twenty-first 
century trend in feminist thinking. Writing in 1957 on embodiment and agency, she takes 
seriously the materiality of process,  
 Embodied life is an intricately textured dynamic form, that is, a form whose 
permanence is really a pattern of changes, [whose] elements are not 
independent parts, but interrelated, interdependent centers of activity (1957, 
p. 52) held together by multiply coordinated rhythmic interactions. An agent 
is a product and producer of acts; a living being. (1971, p. 317) 
 
 Over time (such as it might be), concepts and ways of thinking, like proteins, fold 
together, unfold and refold in Vichian ricorso. Becoming and the complex uncertainty of ‘acts’ 
and ‘events’ displaced deterministic and preformationist telos. Illustrative of Vichian Chaos, an 
altogether different worldview started to take shape, greatly changed from, yet ironically 
synchronous with, the mythic worldviews of antiquity, prior the advent of Platonism, 




Langer’s process philosophies of science, and from twentieth century advancements in scientific 
concepts of reality and materiality, a rejection of anthropomorphism and human exceptionalism. 
In a materiality of life that becomes, as a creative and emergent property of systemic processes of 
complexity and Chaos, the uncertainty and dynamic conditions that contextualize and embed 
emergence and evolutionary innovation have been shown to be responsive to sentient and 
‘conscious’ quantum processes that exchange matter and energy. The explanation of how, to 
repeat what Vico said, “whenever the time and fashion is thus and so, such and not otherwise are 
the things that come into being” (Vico, XIV, para. 147, as cited in Bergin & Fisch, 1948) amounts 
to a politics by which out of many possibilities, an actuality results. Inadvertently, twentieth 




Ricorso: Scienza Nuova and Subjectivity 
The event illuminates its own past, 
 but it can never be deduced from it. 
(Hannah Arendt, 1953, p.323) 11 
 
 Former ontologies of life, materiality, nature, reason, and experience came up for grabs. 
Conventional Western academic philosophy and science lost the charade of their former political 
and social detachments, agnosticism, and authority over ‘normativity’, prompting new 
theorizations of scientific knowledge, at least by those who acknowledged the revelations brought 
to light by social and feminist science studies scholars.  
 Stating that “a theory of knowledge … does not require that we purify science of 
references to mind …” (1969, p. 157), Polanyi understood scientific practice to be a craft, an art 
that explored the unpredictable to establish collective meaning, as in art myth, and religion. For 




‘more true’ and ‘more real’ than Euclidean certainties. Truths were that which is made, ‘verum 
factum’. Vico saw the truths of consciousness, or uncertain choice, as different but equivalent to 
the truths of science, each being created by humans through cultural concensus, according to the 
communal processes that ultimately determine what ‘truth’ is. He believed that what motivated 
people to “live in justice and to keep themselves in society” (Vico, para. 2, in Bergin & Fisch, 
eds.,1948) was not rationalism and laws but “emotions, creative imagination, and mythic 
traditions in which the people believe and live” (Vico, as cited in Mali, 2012, p. 44). The question 
of social justice circled, through philosophies of the Other, back to the science of consciousness. 
Hegel’s ethical sin, according to Emmanuel Levinas, was a failure of respect, by recognizing the 
Other according to his own categories, he deprived the Other of their inescapable ‘irreducible 
alterity’ or difference (Yar, Majid, 2002). Levinas asked, “What do I have to do with justice? A 
question of consciousness” (1981, p. 157). Recognition of the Other in Levinas as an ethical 
consciousness held affinities to Francisco Varela’s analysis of ‘ethical know-how’ based on the 
bioneurological reflexivity of sentience and cognition, and to consciousness as an evolutionary 
force as microbiologist Lynn Margulis had begun to advance prior to her death.  
 Not only did materialty itself turn out to embed the political, feminist science scholars, by 
interrogating categories of oppression located in ‘scientific’ practices showed ways that the status 
quo of the disciplinary practices structured power and inequality (e.g. [of many] Ruth Bleier, 
Anne Fausto Sterling, Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Ruth Hubbard, Helen Longino, Londa 
Schiebinger, Nancy Tuana).  Sheila Jasanoff (2005), working in the politics of science, showed 
science to be inadequate in providing objective authority. When summoned in service of national 
policy debates, identical studies yielded multiple interpretations, depending on the various 
political and cultural positions of that nation. Rather than providing objectivity, the ‘interactional 
co-production’ of scientific knowledge served as an economic resource that shaped national 




engine, the proliferation of engineering schools, and the splitting of the atom, that’s hardly news. 
“The sciences are so intimately tied to political authority” (Lloyd, 1996, p. 224).  
 Polanyi recognized that these features present in a society “lead to further fragmentation 
of initiatives and thus increase resistance to any deliberate total renewal of society” (1962, p. 
71).12	This statement underscored Gramschi’s observation that hegemony depends upon consent, 
and hegemonic discourses prop up status quos and certain powers. Perhaps this helps to explain 
the apparently interminable Western discursive ping-pong match over materiality, between 
whether opposites are in continual war, or compose a unity, or are different, equal descriptors of a 
category (the road that goes up goes down). The match extends back to Heraclitus and before, to 
the Milesian monists Anaximenes and Anaximander, and reaches forward, for example, to 
Descartes, Hegel, Marx, Althusser, Žižek, Jane Bennett, and Elizabeth Grosz. Why do Western 
philosophical and scientific conventions of intellectual analysis obsess over binaries, the dialectic, 
singularity, and ontological unity? Despite the transformation of scientific conceptions of matter 
being redefined in terms of forces, complexity, indeterminacy, emergence, and self-organization, 
since the early 1970s the pursuit of the ‘standard model’ of matter is on-going. This unification 
theory of matter states that four fundamental forces, the weak force, the strong force, 
electromagnetic force, and gravity, interact in quarks and leptons to form the basic building 
blocks of matter. This debate represents another manifestation of the contested political question 
over subjectivity and objectivity in that way of knowing particular to meta-narratives of an 
imaginary of science that instructs and restricts. Steven Goldman observed that this perennial 
pursuit of unification, the compulsion to singularity that drove Einstein to fudge inaccurately his 
initial formula for the general theory of relativity, is a holdover from monotheism and Greek 
materialistic monism. (2008, p. 192). Patriarchy resists secularity and equality, forcefully. 
 Hilary Rose articulated the challenge, to create a “practice of feeling, thinking, and 




Feminist inquiry turned to strategies of intervention on the ‘tyranny of ontology,’ to use Levinas’ 
(1989) and Lloyd’s (1995) verbiage. Haraway cautioned against the use of social constructivism 
as a critical tool, because it may maintain rather than deconstruct science. Katherine Hayles re-
oriented scientific knowledge claims as True, Not-true, False, or Less-false (1993). Barad 
promoted “onto-epistemology, the study of knowing in being” (2003, p. 829). Another tactic of 
intervention has been through various approaches to embodiment, of knowers that embody their 
social location (Harding 1997) and by the loosely assembled collective identified by the term new 
materialism.  
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, philosopher of how we experience (phenomenology) wrote: 
Insofar as, when I reflect on the essence of subjectivity, I find it bound up 
with that of the body and that of the world, this is because my existence as 
subjectivity [= consciousness] is merely one with my existence as a body and 
with the existence of the world, and because the subject that I am, when 
taken concretely, is inseparable from this body and this world (1962, p. 408). 
 
In short, consciousness is embodied intra-actively with the world, and equally, embodiment is 
infused with consciousness (in/with the world). Merleau-Ponty disagreed with Levinas’ depiction 
of the Other as a separate alterity, stating instead that the subject spontaneously slips into the 
Other, rather self and Other are bodily imbrications intertwined in world; self is also the potential 
of the Other, and the Other’s potential; seeing someone necessarily involves possibility of being 
seen. Perhaps, as quantum uncertainty and entanglement suggest, the response to this problem is 
not an either/or but both/and/sometimes. Perhaps the wrong questions are being asked; perhaps 
the whole frame has run its course and might better be retired to make space for other frames of 
existential and phenomenal apprehension. Luce Irigaray (1993) critiqued both modes of thought, 
because each engaged dualisms –either as total incorporation (Merleau-Ponty) or as reduction to 
object (Levinas) – that implicate and produce male privilege. Where, she asks, is intersubjectivity 




foreclose the ethical, and that nothing short of transforming foundational views of subjectivity, 
science and religion might alter the situation. This would demand new languages, ones that allow 
release from the tyranny of Cartesian reason. Though its acolytes may recess kicking and 
screaming, subjectivity is in motion again. 
 
 
Figure 26. Obscured transitions. Grassland #027 (Underdown, 2005-9) 
 
 Lacunas, spatial and temporal, pockmark becoming terrains. Multiple paradigmatic  
and fledgling orders overlap and bleed through to each other, edges blur. Lags between  
scientific breakthroughs and socio-cultural responses open simultaneously across multiple  
space-time frames. Temporalities and conditions are complex and dynamic, fast time  
stretches out slowly. The timespan that serves as a backdrop to and frames human  





 1  a simplistic orientation: heat and cold are relative terms, rational and irrational unite. 
 
 2  Whitehead, in an admission of his own iconoclastic inclinations, credited his wife’s 
thinking as fundamental to his own. Though Whitehead’s philosophy remained on the fringes of 
mainstream philosophy of his day, it has recently directly influenced scholars Isabelle Stengers, 
Bruno Latour, Niklas Luhmann, Lynn Margulis, and many more. 
 
 3  Amartya Sen writes on Michael Polanyi; Francisco Varela writes on Merleau-Ponty; 
Lynn Margulis espouses Whitehead and Lamarck; Karen Barad writes on Levinas; Deleuze 
writes on Bergson and Spinoza; Elisabeth Grosz writes on Bergson and Darwin (badly); 
Kauffman writes on Heraclitus; Rosi Braidotti references Margulis, Varela, and Spinoza; Isabelle 
Stengers references Vico, etc. 
 
 4  A partial listing of thinkers includes Heraclitus, Giordano Bruno, Giambattista Vico, 
Henri Bergson, Alfred North Whitehead, Michael Polanyi, Thomas Kuhn, Gilles Deleuze, Bruno 
Latour, Lyotard, Hans Jonas, Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Gregory Bateson, Stuart 
Kauffman, and a cadre of feminist science scholars, such as Elisabeth Lloyd, Sandra Harding, 
Ruth Bleier, Helen Longino, Evelyn Fox Keller, Donna Haraway, Isabelle Stengers, Elisabeth 
Grosz, Karen Barad, Elizabeth Wilson, Vicki Kirby, Myra Hird, Nancy Tuana, and more.  
 
 5  Societyhistoryscience my neologisn, because, for Vico, these were one discipline. 
 
 6  The theme of the embodied imaginary recurs in Kauffman’s ‘hard science’ of wonder 
(2006) as well as in Isabelle Stengers’ cautionary note about eliminativism in science that 
precludes wonder (2011).  
 
 7 Vico’s influence extends to the likes of Henri Bergson, Karl Marx, Samuel Beckett, 
Alfred North Whitehead, C.S. Pierce, Edward Said, Richard Rorty, Marshall McLuhan, Julia 
Kristeva, Derrida (difference within language), Gregory Bateson (difference as relationship). 
Also interesting is that the term ‘quark’ in particle physics was taken from James Joyce’ 
Finnegan’s Wake, too, “Three quarks for Muster Mark.”  
 
 8  Langer is probably referring to Whitehead’s meaning of an ‘event’: the unit of reality, 
or entity, that is a concrescence of all available information at the time, according to certain 
principles, repeating and reinforcing certain patterns, and thereby creating new ones (Seibt, 
2016). 
 
 9  ‘Ever not quite’ is a Whiteheadian motto, which he appropriated from William James, 
to mean the property of becoming and characterized by possibility and novelty.  
 
 10  This is a theme central to Francisco Varela’s autopoeisis and cognition as well, that 
rests on the ‘structural coupling’ of the entity and its context, and the aphorism that “anything 
said is said by an observer” (Maturana & Varela, 1980). 
 
 
 11  Both Whitehead’s and Roy Bhaskar’s meaning of event inflect Arendt’s statement: 
Whitehead’s ‘event’ is the unit of reality, or entity, that is a concrescence of all available 







and thereby creating new ones (Seibt, 2016). Roy Bhaskar’s ‘conjunctions of events’ is the ‘ways 
of acting of things’ that does not ascribe necessary causality, teleology, or laws (1978). 
 
 12  Michael Polanyi’s brother is Karl Polanyi, author of the counter-capitalism socio-






QUEER CO-(M)MOTIONS OF SCIENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY 
 
By historical method I mean every means of examination of conscience,  
of meditation, of contemplation of vocal and mental speech and other  
acts by which a person prepares and disposes the self to rid its coherence  
and integrity of all inordinate attachments to empire, and after their removal, 
 by which he or she creates reciprocity and joins with others  
in a society of equal historical selves (SOEHS). 
  
 
During the narration of history of any kind, be sure to attend  
to the sound of reproach in the voices of all the anonymous dead.  
(Dimock, 2012, p. 29 and p. 85) 
 
 
 In the previous two chapters I pulled on two strands of memory, two different frames of 
thinking, each permeated by very different theoretical orientations towards science and its 
explanations, to very different effects on subjectivity and the social imaginary, productive of 
different narrations of the world. Chapter 3, The Monster In Our Midst, recounted dominant 
social imaginaries contextualized by a Cartesian/ Enlightenment noösphere that views the human 
subject as a function of a natural and scientifically-knowable telos, a linear and deterministic 
story told in a LaPlacean / Baconian / Newtonian mode of thinking. Chapter 4, Vico’s Chaos, 
recounted a minoritarian social imaginary produced by a process-oriented noösphere that inverts 
the former model, and premises scientific theory and practice as expressions by and expressive of 
communities situated by and in their particular timeplace-thinking. Each of these ‘categories’ of 
memory reverberate in current feminist theories of subjectivity; looking at these histories reveals 
strategies, as Clare Hemmings notes, for a politics of the present. “If we can identify the 
techniques through which dominant stories are secured, through which their status as ‘common 




(2011, p. 20). In this chapter I move from memory, the topic of the last two chapters, to desire, 
the impelling and organizing drive behind the politics of feminist new materialism.  
 I argue, through a focus on Rosi Braidotti’s theory of the zoe-nomad subject, that while 
new materialism/posthumanisms extend the work of a long history of process-thinkers, vestigial 
strains of the linear, deistic model still infiltrate the feminist project to its detriment.  In response I 
argue that Braidotti’s cultural critical theory of subjectivity needn’t draw on compromising 
sources for its philosophical grounding, by which I identify Spinozist monism and her over-
identification with Deleuze and Guattari. While feminist new materialisms embrace science 
studies as well as literary and cultural theory, they tend to different tracks, and though these 
tracks do acknowledge the others and share broad aims and orientations, the arguments take 
significantly different approaches of reasoning. In Braidotti’s case, taking her work as 
representative of the larger body of Continential-theory derived new materialist political desires, I 
argue that her theory of the zoe-nomadic subject is better supported by the sciences of desire that 
her theory, in fact, extends; as a strategy, this would offer the advantage of evading dismissal of 
the whole project by the halls of conventional philosophical discourse (Rice University, 
forthcoming) under charges of relativism, solipsism, failed logic, or utopianism) to connect a 
philosophy of materiality to ‘leftist’ ethical subjectivity. An approach grounded in the ‘new’ 
science could establish this important feminist political project free of residual strains of 
paradigmatic thinking that the politics of the project seeks to upend. In turn, Braidotti’s in-depth 
considerations of the subject and processes of subjectivity as a micro-political intervention on the 
processes of advanced techno-capitalism extend the work of, as examples, Varela and Barad in 
important ways. Barad, Varela, and Braidotti, whom I treat as something of a triptych in this 
chapter, orient their urgent calls for transformation of subjectivity to praxes of inter-/intra-
relations, but leave off on what that might look like.1 While Braidotti’s aim for her theory of the 




inspires the reader with effective visions that reorient the imaginary, it fails to offer strategies or 
tactics—what one of her influences, Isabelle Stengers, correctly identifies as the significance of 
materialism, its relations with struggle against “those who believe and those who know” (2011, p. 
369)—for reading and changing the power structures ‘we’ are up against.  
 In this chapter, drawing on late 20th century science and late 20th century feminist 
posthuman and new materialist theory, I present my view of the structuring relations between 
science and subjectivity, not as a narration by a narrator, but as co-(m)motions of innovation, 
dynamic inter- and intra-motions by which each indivisibly ‘brings forth’ the other, the ‘two’ 
become indistinguishable. This approach enables me to explore the extent to which an affective 
theorization of the ethical, becoming subject, such as Braidotti’s, when entangled to a differently 
imagined science, provides a platform for the making of new and genuinely secular myths 
““worthy of the complexity of our times” (2013, p. 186). 
 The stakes and goals are one and the same… new foundations of subject and social 
imaginaries are necessary in order to build and enact political strategies that bring forth economic 
transformation and the ecological restoration of our Holocene epoch planet.2  Rosi Braidotti and 
other feminists3 modify Kant’s question to ask, what may we hope now? I extend the question 
also to ask, what skills are needed in the becoming other than we have been? This chapter is 
primarily about the “propelling force” of feminist desires, which are “a deep yearning for 
transformation or a process of affirmation…the affectivity of the imagination is the motor for 
these encounters and for the conceptual creativity they trigger” (2006, pp.169-170). By virtue of 
their long outsider-status, as outside the margins of dominating frames of power, feminist 
theorists (not necessarily female-gendered4) and non-Western thinkers and scientists,5 are well-
positioned to model processes of alternative, secular thinking and creating.6  Accordingly, the late 
twentieth century feminist literature has brought to bear several challenges and interruptions to 




the previous chapter, with an additional critical element. Feminisms hold knowledge claims and 
epistemologies accountable for their social, cultural, political, and economic effects; posthuman 
and new materialist feminisms (I discuss these terms in more depth below) hold central critiques 
of neoliberalism and its effects. Broadly speaking, these labels, posthumanism and new 
materialism, loosely cluster the work of feminist thinkers7 who enact philosophical disruptions on 
the dominating western dialectics and telos laid forth in Chapter 3. These disruptions may be 
summarized as: 8   
 • a rejection of taxonomic thinking and of the dialectic imaginary, 
 • critiques of reductionism and deduction, 
 • an emphasis on affectivity that challenges the exclusively ‘rational’,  
 • rejection of human exceptionalism,  
 • rejection of universals and essentialisms, 
 • challenges to totalizing notions of a stable one-ness,  
 • exposure of androcentric biases and deterministic tactics of power 
 • exposure of false ‘ontologies’ as oppressions (for example race, sexuality, gender, class, 
and nationality).  
I bring to this group a discussion of scientists whose work supports in some way the aims of these 
feminist theorists, Francisco Varela, Manuel DeLanda, Stuart Kauffman, Lynn Margulis, and 
James Shapiro. The assemblage of these scientists may be simplistically explained by the 
aggregate of what they offer as a group:  
 • a thinking-style built on process philosophies of becoming,  
 • reconceptions of matter, materiality, evolution, and genetics 
 • a re-integration of the body in matters of ‘mind’, and of the mind in matters of ‘body’  




 • direct material relation between processes described through science and the social 
imaginary,  
 • radical anti-individualist theorizations of  the ‘self’ and the ethical subject.  
In short, recent scientific insights represented in this group supports a feminist imaginary that 
fosters possibility for what we, as subjects, may hope now.  
 A feminist imaginary allows a different knowing than that of rational critique.  It is an 
altogether different logic. The logic I present in this chapter as ‘desire’ bears the marks of the 
logic presented in Chapter 3, Memory I, but does not, in its dynamics or mode of thinking, align 
with those logics. The logics of this chapter, Desire, reconfigure those of Memory. These 
reconfigured concepts come of asking different questions in a different time for different reasons; 
that is, its fundamental difference can be largely explained by its accountability to a 
fundamentally different situated-ness. Suspended in the gap space between memory and desire, 
in-between these perforated and leaking boundaries, a feminist imaginary trolls genealogies and 
temporalities and hopes and creative possibilities. While the human imagination can “run amok 
with affectivity and dreams or fictions” (2006, p. 164), a feminist imaginary moves freely outside 
of social normativity, its enactions subvert and complicate the reigning noösphere, such that we, 
as human subjects, might become other than we have been.  
 
Monster-ous Monstrosities 
Proteus, of sea-green hue, traverses the mighty main in his car 
 drawn by fishes and a team of two-footed steeds.  
Virgil, tr. Lewis, 1940  Georgics 4.388 
 
And though she take a hundred lying forms, 
 let her not escape you,  
but hold her close, whatever she may be,  
until she take again the form she had at first.  






 Affectivity and embodiment precondition the posthuman, ethical project and, thus the 
feminist imaginary, as I use it, embeds and is embedded in materiality, and therefore does not 
relate to the ideological imaginaries of a Spinoza, Althusser, or Lacan. It does embrace Varela, 
Barad, and Braidotti, whom I see as forming a particular triad that forms connections between 
science (as enaction and innovation—materiality) and ethical subjectivity, in a way that supports 
a politics of possibility, hope, and life. These “yearning[s] as a radical aspiration to freedom” 
(Braidotti, 2013, p. vii) also only thinly veil a tone of urgency, an exasperation and almost 
desperate pleading that simultaneously acknowledges and mourns inevitable, impending losses. 
But Braidotti does not confront darkness with darkness. Her aim, at its core, is to cultivate 
“affirmation and joy … in order to pull out of the end of millennium stagnation” (2002, p. 211). 
She presents a nomadic theory of subjectivity that is an ethical, impassioned and compassionate 
location of hope in the ‘here and now’ of possible futures, a hope so ardently placed beyond 
(though not in contrast to) panic and mourning (affective politics, too, are complex and nomadic) 
as to suggest a subtle underbelly of disquietude, one which, while understandable, goes 
unacknowledged, save one admission to frustration. Nomadic subjectivity emphasizes the role of 
“passions, empathy and desire as modes of relation” (2012, p. 266) that work against nihilism, 
liberal individualism, and ‘delirious megalomania’. Desire, then, in Rosi’s theoretical frame, 
reconfigures the subject, it is a ubiquitously dispersed9 praxis of political resistance embedded in 
the human body, suitable to memory and to the “monstrous and grotesque imaginary we have 
inherited from the nineteenth century” (2002, p. 267). The posthuman imaginary of feminist new 
materialism takes on those monsters, and gets perceived by some as monstrous for its resistance 
to humanism, and owns its own monsters; monstrosity is in the eye of the beholder. 
 Feminist biologist Donna Haraway’s monster is a schismed thing with a three-fingered 
hand, its cut divides subject from object, and its hand unites the digits of science, economics, and 




monstrosity of advanced techno-capitalism plays the God-trick on ‘nature’, invoking an altruistic 
‘calling’ to command-and-control systems of profit, power, and war that exploit non-human 
resources (1991). Age-old domination finds new expression in control hierarchies such as human 
engineering, sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, corporate management, and labor practices. 
Perversely, oligarchic malthusian gods (omg: affluent white Western men with too much power) 
applied their disembodied, rationalist minds to mitigating the excesses of [neo-Darwinist]10 
competition in their pursuit of a desired, yet out-of-nature, state of harmony. Social harmony, so 
the story went, offered an improvement over God’s ‘natural laws’ left bare. Western colonial and 
economic imperialisms of and since the twentieth century self-anointed such acts as acts of 
altruism in domesticating the ‘wild’, i.e. Other humans, Other life, Other geographies. “The 
search for the illusive subject paradoxically ends regularly in the discovery of the totalitarian 
object—nature, the gene, the word” (1991, p. 78). As wielded by the OMG, scientific knowledge 
operated as an armature of political and social control to wed unnatural, harmonious desires of the 
mastering mind and the natural, material servile wild. 11   
 Rosi Braidotti identifies post-industrial techno-monstrosity in “consumerist liberal 
individualism” that capitalizes on technologies of biopiracy afforded by information and 
genocentric economies of hybridity, and which disintegrate distinctions between self and others 
—the human/animal, life/not-life, the organic/inorganic/technological. She locates a “vampiric” 
monster in an advanced capitalism that consumes the surplus vital matter of ‘others’,  
it is head-less and centre-less, yet hegemonic, mobile and flexible, yet fixed 
and very local; inherently violent and ruthless, thus prone to self-destruction; 
as a system, it is illogical and without an endpoint, aiming only at self-
perpetuation; … it is the great nomad par excellence (2012b, p. 17) that has 
produced the homogenization of commodity culture in terms of consumerist 
practices, coupled with huge disparities and structural inequalities” (2006, p. 
31). “Advanced capitalism acts as the petri dish of a contemporary social 
imaginary that “swings between euphoric techno-transcendentalism and 





Braidotti locates the center of these scientific and political debates as the life-itself that festers 
within the bellies of their material and embodied beasts. 
 Hybridity as monstrosity remains a source of terror and macabre attraction that 
challenges humanism’s notions of the human and nature, and threatens anthropocentric 
patriarchal autonomy.12 Haraway published her theory of the cyborg subject— part animal, part 
human, part technology— at the height of the Cold War. Now, decades later, in times of “blissed-
out, techno-sublime euphoria” she has backed off from the misunderstood and misapplied, 
transhuman interpretations of her earlier cyborg theory in favor of her theory of companion 
species. Microbiologist and evolution scientist Lynn Margulis champions such hybridity that 
expresses the symbiotic processes that characterize all living entities as chimeras; symbiogenesis 
explains the evolutionary resource that has sustained all life, from bacteria to eukaryotic 
organisms, for 3.5 billion years of evolution. Margulis’ lens that looks at ‘life-itself’ in the 
context of geologic time observes that boundaries and membranes have always been dissolving, 
transgressing, and transforming, the identity of an entity is inherently transient, provisional, 
temporary, and in autopoietic process. Paradoxically, constantly renewing metabolic exchanges 
with flows of matter and energy secure the continuity of form and function of an autopoietic 
entity, whether cell or organism.13 Scientifically, the idea that an entity is constitutively 
autonomous, whether living, inert, or conceptual, has always been a myth (i.e. false). The mark of 
the definite article on conceptual objects (the human, the species, the ecosystem, the mind, the 
body), according to Bruno Snell (see Chapter 4), reveals a fallacy of misplaced concreteness 
(Whitehead, see Chapter 4). Static reifications and classifications, and autonomy as isolated 
individuation are but misleading appearances that have no perch in life-itself. Monsters, if they be 
hybrid and protean, are us, and that’s the good news, for it rearranges everything about the now of 




quiescent essences, singularity and certainty, hierarchical and centralized controls without 
accountability to mess or complexity.  
 Braidotti locates another affirmative varietal of the monstrous (as in huge) in the “energy 
of life” that does not respond to our names, but endures through differences and by differing 
(2012a). This vision reflects a more recent iteration of the posthuman turn, which neither has one 
voice or definition, but, may be described by its collective concensus that, in rejecting human 
exceptionalism, sees the hybrid predicament of a world as salaciously and anxiously saturated by 
technoscientific life as capital, to think it, posthuman scholars fumble for a critical and applicable 
theory outside of humanism’s universalizing narratives that fix essences, and that acknowledges 
the crucial play of nonhumans in all processes (e.g. information technologies, in vitro 
fertilization, mammal and embryo cloning, transgenic manipulations, artisanal cheese-making). 
But telling the human body being preyed upon by vampiric systems apart from the human body 
of agential political and ethical transformation, both being modes of ‘becoming other’ flows, is 
not, as Braidotti notes, readily transparent, and so it is the task of cultural and political theory and 
practice to make the differentiations (2007, p. 67).  
 As a critical theorist, Rosi Braidotti sees her task as double-edged, at once to make sense 
of our present and to dream aspirationally. “It is the dream of producing socially relevant 
knowledge that is attuned to basic principles of social justice, the respect for human decency and 
diversity, the rejection of false universalisms; the affirmation of the positivity of difference; the 
principles of academic freedom, antiracism, openness to others and conviviality” (2013, p. xi). 
This tone, deliberately engaged, marks a shift from her earlier work between 2002-2007 that 
focused more on Agamben (2007a, reiterated in 2013 in The Posthuman), and on neo-liberal and 
neo-Kantian thought, to which she countered with Deleuzian ‘becoming machine’ language 
(2002, 2007b). It reveals an oppositional discomfort, a frustration and anxiety that gropes for a 




the inspiration of process-oriented sciences that describe life as a “relentlessly generative force” 
(zoe)14 (2006, p. 37) in the midst of this age of “informatics of domination” (Haraway, 1991, p. 
162), and when new materialist discourse returns the body of the post-anthropocene subject to 
feminism —with sufficient weight to re-balance former marginalization of the ‘enfleshed’ body 
by the discursive— the span of her new materialist/posthuman work comes into better focus. She 
envisions new generations of ‘knowing subjects’ that “enact principles of community bonding 
free from the provincialism of the mind, the sectarianism of ideologies, the dishonesty of 
grandiose posturing and the grip of fear. … That means we need to learn to think differently 
about ourselves” (2013, pp. 11-12). 
 In reframing a politics of the changing nonhuman/living world, the literature takes a 
couple of paths. Barad makes an important distinction, “posthumanism” “marks a refusal to take 
the distinction between “human” and “nonhuman” for granted, and to found analyses on this 
presumably fixed and inherent set of categories” (2007, p. 32). The critical effect of such a refusal 
is to disable dreams of the “human” and “nonhuman” as materially constituted differentially. 
Barad’s ethico-scientific materiality of entities would be the ‘ism’ of the posthuman, while 
Braidotti’s engagement of the ‘perverse’ and ‘paradoxical’ posthuman predicament is less about 
Barad’s materiality and more about moving beyond European history (the ‘post’ of Humanism). 
Braidotti’s aim is to use her brand of posthumanism as a navigational tool to explain the 
‘profound’ transformations under way in our situated historical location (2013) and its affective 
dimensions15 in order to “think critically and creatively about who and what we are actually in the 
process of becoming” (p. 12). Haraway, noting that the imagined human of Humanism is known 
to us only through non-innocent translations, perspicaciously asks, “how can humanity have a 





 New ways of thinking difference and subjectivity need new languages. To me, the term 
‘posthuman’ suffers from its construction on ‘human’, thereby reinforcing the very thing it means 
to decenter (here is one place that begs for a new word). I use the term posthuman simply to refer 
temporally to the late twentieth and early twenty-first century made distinctive by the locking of 
global advanced capitalism to advancing technolife, and also made distinctive by the biological 
sciences that explain life’s becoming as a matter of complex flows, self-organizing relations, and 
material assemblages of diverse organisms that give no privilege to, nor center on the human.16 
Defined these various ways, the term posthuman figures frequently in the discursive language of 
feminist new materialisms, the critical theory that, in response to what was left out by post-
structural privileging of performative language and verbal text, feminist scholarship refocuses on 
the body and materiality. Feminist science studies, having never abandoned the body, informs this 
shift of focus in cultural theory and humanities scholarship, opening new avenues of 
transdisciplinarity that integrate scientific and social considerations in new frameworks of 
natureculture (Haraway), onto-epistemological (Barad), biocultural (Anne Fausto-Sterling) 
analysis and reflection. Being based loosely on the premise that “cells and culture [and 
environment (author’s insert)] construct each other” (2000, p. 242), neuroscientist Elizabeth 
Wilson (2004) argues that ‘gut feminisms’ do the political work of difference that, without the 
sciences, sociocultural constructions cannot accomplish. By reclaiming objects of knowledge that 
have traditionally belonged to reductionist modes of explanation, new materialism provides for 
new thinking around the sciences, nature, biology, the body, and materiality that extends the 
dynamic process philosophies of becoming found in Bergson and Deleuze (each of whom were 
inspired by Alfred North Whitehead) to arrive at a political and ethical commitment to life-itself 
as well-being.  
 In general, new materialism concerns “an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self 




negativity on the other. Rosi expands Deleuzian philosophy to construct her own vision for an 
ethical politics of life and subjectivity “worthy of the complexity of our times” (2013, p. 186). I 
assess Rosi’s vision in terms of what it offers productively to the overall project — the vision and 
affect to become ourselves (collectively) as ourselves, who will have been fundamentally 
different from the selves we are, from what the Western master-narratives tell us we are, and from 
whom we thought we were supposed to have been — and to make note of what her vision lacks 
and risks.  
 
The Sciences of Desire 
 
The Universe is not only queerer than we suppose,  
it is queerer than we can suppose. 
J. B. S. Haldane (1928, p. 286) 
 
 The critical theory of feminist new materialist and posthuman process-thinkers is 
supported by twentieth century developments in science in the fields of physics, biology, and 
evolution, which, as they seem to me to form an assemblage, I collectively refer to as the material 
gap. This is the science that proceeds outside of organizing assumptions of cause and effect, of 
telos, of reductionism, linearity, equilibrium, or certainty and universals. I explain here Stuart 
Kauffman’s concepts of the ‘poised realm’ and, in biology, the ‘adjacent possible’ as cousin to 
the physics concepts of ‘possibility space’ (aka ‘phase space’ or ‘state space’) as presented by 
Manuel DeLanda.  While Kauffman’s discursive style remains loyal to the linear conventions of 
his training, put to use, ironically, to undermine those very foundations, DeLanda sees this 
approach as problematic to changing our way of thinking about the world. He instead presents a 
non-linear history that represents reality as “different ways in which single matter-energy 
expresses itself,” (1997, p. 21). Since then, theories (more metaphors) have been put forth —that 




suggest that the universe is an information structure, and some astrophysicists suggest negative 
mass may be possible under certain conditions to an observer (Grant, 2014). Scientific theories, 
generally, are corrigible metaphors that reflect the participant-observer. Accordingly, I present the 
ideas of an assemblage of late-twentieth century scientists, DeLanda, Kauffman, Margulis, 
Varela, and Shapiro, not in order to critique, but to make the point that a different science, a 
science of material possibility supports the desires expressed in the feminist critical theory of 
political possibility that I also present in this chapter. I present this science as a way to model a 
different thinking, to orient a different imaginary, to anchor a different subjectivity, to narrate a 
transformation to modern Western myths that is underway. These scientists spatially locate a 
creative dynamic in material gaps as characteristic to processes in both physics and biology, and 
which make way for these scientists’ further musings on the materiality of life-itself. They share 
in a rejection of the schizophrenic lineage of the Cartesian mind/body and the Hegelian dialectic 
in formations of the subject. This group understands life to be self-organizing, creatively 
expressed in flows of matter and energy that embed history and take unpredictable form in the 
burgeoning of diverse entities. For most of this group, humans do not rate as exceptional. Such 
scientific positioning lends support to conceptualizations of radical subjectivity that new 
materialist feminist literature does well at extending and interrogating. 
 In the course of laying out their spatial configurations of possibility, both DeLanda and 
Kauffman arrive at redefinitions of causality. DeLanda adopts a complex view by which “causal 
interactions among component parts… exercise their capacities to affect and be affected, 
constituting the mechanism of emergence behind the properties of the whole” (2011, p. 385), and 
in his language can be heard echoes of Latour. Relations between interactive components and 
between the object and the context in which it is embedded change, without the terms of the 
object itself, changing. While DeLanda comes to this through his framings in physics, this is 




its ‘wholeness’, composed by the functions and forces of its components, don’t matter to the 
identification of an object as that object.17 His view of causality draws from a quantitative physics 
that is without linearity, homogeneity, law, or teleology, but richly complex.  
 Possibility space, in DeLanda’s usage, is topological, meaning it is the space of all 
solutions to predictive models of future states of a particular physical process. All tendencies and 
outcomes in the possibility space are real; of these, as if acted upon by natural selection, only 
some become actual. This distinction between the real and the actual that DeLanda emphasizes 
describes two possible states materiality occupies. And like Darwin’s evolution of descent with 
modification, “the current actual state cannot be deduced from the equation alone because it 
depends on the historical path that the process followed” (2011, p. 389). Within possibility space, 
capacities to affect and be affected are infinite, while tendencies to different types of stability 
(steady, periodic, turbulent) in dynamic systems are limited. Capacities and tendencies are real 
(‘virtual’ in the language of Deleuze, to whom DeLanda connects philosophically), even if not 
actual; they precondition emergence while evading classical norms of mechanistic linearity18 and 
ontological commitments to causal ‘law’. “The current actual state cannot be deduced from the 
equation alone because it depends on the historical path that the process followed. … Thus, while 
much of the work on causal mechanisms and mechanism-independent singularities is performed 
by scientists and mathematicians, the elucidation of the modal status of capacities and tendencies 
and the enforcement of immanence must be performed by philosophers (2011, p. 389).  
 Kauffman, however, attempts to do both, to provide through classical deductive, 
linear, ‘lawed’ argument a speculative, scientific proof of ‘possibility space’, what he 
analogously, but not identically, develops into his concept of the ‘poised realm’,19 which 
in concert with quantum mind and the actual, recovers acausality, and with it an 
embodied subjectivity that has been lost for 350 years of Newtonian Cartesianism, and 




actuals, possibles, and mind, by which he also means consciousness and experience— 
there is no discussion of the body in his 2014 paper (although writing in 2008 that, 
“Embodied in us, human mind is a meaning and doing organic system” (p. 177)); body 
and mind are adjacent and real, but still separate; stating that “immaterial mind has 
consequences for matter,” Kauffman accepts the physicists’ language of immaterial to 
mean “not objectively real,” a rock is objectively real (2008, 209); so, by implication, 
Kauffman of 2008 understands matter classically, as that which has substance—jointly 
function21 in a “co-creative becoming” of ‘reality’ (2014, p. 17) that is instantaneous22 
and acausal. If Kauffman’s quantum ‘mind’ were to be understood generously along 
feminist new materialist lines that undo binaries, as Kauffman wants to do, too, then 
perhaps it would be reasonable (!) to conceive of his 2014 triad as inclusive of the body 
as an affective and sentient transect (from the quantum level of the electron on up 
through the subject’s conscious experience) that crosses through each component of his 
triad; this is indeed the implication of his 2014 paper, that mind is not solely human; it 
distributes across all of matter23 and that the poised realm system is both emergent and 
material. Matter, and the body, in Kauffman lack clarity, but it seems his thinking may be 
evolving. 
 Kauffman approaches this rescue mission of acausality and responsible free will with “hope 
and skepticism,” (2014, p. 18); interestingly, the words imagine, experience, desire, metaphor, 
and hope show up forty-nine times totally in his 2014 paper, so while Kauffman never surrenders 
the split between ontology and experience, the objectivist inclinations of his thinking are being 
radicalized by affect and by the quantum world and this brings him smack inside the interface of 




entanglement in quantum physics as grounding a new ethics, Kauffman, too, argues through 
science for his desire for an evolving global ethics. If his argument is ‘true’ (his language is 
formalist), then the classical world leaves a record, just as Barad states, “the past is never over 
and done with” (2014), “we construct the world we think we live in (2014, p. 18). In the poised 
realm, possibility affects the actual and mind, which in turn create and limit new possibles, and so 
on as “we and nature jointly ‘create reality’ “ (2014, p. 17).  
Kauffman’s renewed focus on quantum physics follows his prior work that focused on 
questions of biology, in which he asserts that biology cannot be reduced to physics. Quantitative 
biology cannot describe that always changing space of the ‘poised realm’ of biological emergence 
of order at the edge of chaos. Like DeLanda’s ‘possibility space’, the poised realm does not 
reduce to formal methods that ‘prestate’ possibilities, either of pre-adaptations, expressions of 
pre-adaptation, or phylogenic trajectories. In the unpredictable poised realm of uncertainty, be it 
of the biosphere, the cell, ecological community, or ecosystem, Stuart Kauffman locates 
spontaneously ordering energies of ‘life-itself’ that emerge in a grand dance of “transform or die, 
or both  … each creature evolving as best it can, inevitably creates the conditions of its own 
ultimate elimination…making way for new forms of life and ways to be” (1995, p.130 and p. 
243). Examples of this spontaneous ordering, expressive of the emergence of ‘actual’ matter from 
DeLanda’s ‘real’ matter of the poised realm, include a lipid’s formation of a bilipid membrane 
vesicle, the Fibonaci series of a pinecone’s phyllotaxis, the origin of life as phase transitions 
through collective autocatalytic processes of chemical reaction systems, patterns of ecosystem co-
evolutions, and the evolutionary repurposing of fins as wings and temperature-moderating 
feathers for flight. “It is from these unlimited combinations that truly novel structures are 
generated” (DeLanda 1997, p. 16). DeLanda references, amongst others, Kauffman (1990, pp. 
428-429), who calls these the ‘adjacent possible’ of biological functionalities. I think of these 




between parts may be ‘at-the-ready’ should and when conditions change, as if warehousing an 
indefinite array of creative, unpredictable-possibles of evolutionary and environmental processes 
for a possible future of becoming actual (the lungs of the lung fish become the swim bladder that 
yields neutral buoyancy in the water column for some fish, becomes the habitus of specialized 
endosymbiotic bacteria (Kauffman, 2013, Heraclitus). Unknowable by reason but made sense of 
by metaphor, the ‘emerging novel adjacent possible empty niches’, Kauffman suggests, follows a 
‘quantum logic’ by which meanings cannot be ascribed to either true or false. The radical 
intervention here is Kauffman’s concept of order as a creative, playful, stunningly beautiful, and 
improvised24 property of complex networks. “We seem to have been profoundly wrong. Order, 
vast and generative, arises naturally” (1995, p. 25).25 
Evolution as a process of becoming over time ‘enables’ but does not cause. Like DeLanda, 
Kauffman erases classical notions of causality, and instead engages his concept of ‘enablement’, 
defined as making possible. Kauffman posits an explicit premise, that “no law entails the 
evolution of the biosphere” (2012, p. 1380) and that “the very phase space of evolution changes 
in unprestatable ways” (2012, p. 1386). In other words, nature is not an object obedient to 
limiting laws of prediction; the poised realm, or possibility space, of life’s vast and generative 
trajectory proceeds without limit or constraint, until subjected to the limiting effects of natural 
selection on the becoming of actual and historical matter; there exists (I even claim, materially) 
infinitely more possibilities and configurations than ever become actual. This ecological view of 
‘enablement’ does not accommodate reductionism, instead, relationality in biotic and abiotic 
niches “enable what evolves,” and we do not begin to understand this co-constitution.  
The scientific investigation into the mysteries of this co-constitution have also been modeled 
by Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela in their works on autopoiesis and 
enactive cognition, and by Lynn Margulis’ work in symbiogenesis and endosymbiosis26, by 




quantum field theory. An analogous equivalent to possibility space and the poised realm (which I 
group under my umbrella term, the ‘gap’) appears as a component in all of their works, each 
contribution shores up the work of the others. Intra- and interactions between organisms, between 
cellular organelles and their information communication systems, biological niches, ecosystems, 
and electron spins and charges are “ever changing, intrinsically indeterminate”; we cannot 
anticipate the “niches” that constitute the boundary conditions and ecotones, we cannot anticipate 
what will have emerged. “We can only inhabit a micro-identity when it is already present, and not 
when it is in gestation” (1999, p. 52). For these scientists, despite their different disciplines and 
the particularities of their vernaculars, life —living matter— evolves as a creative and ordering 
emergence (or a bringing forth)27 through processes that are sentient, embedded, and consciously 
‘communicative’ on the interior of their enveloping membranes and with epi-entity / epi-
component /epigenetic conditions. This position, despite the supporting advancements (using 
reductionist methods) already accepted by the larger scientific community, remains marginal and 
heretical to the culture of evolutionary biology, which relies on statistical formalisms to the 
exclusion of observation and physiology. Such intransigence gives testamentary evidence to the 
staying power of the neo-Darwinist genetic techno-imaginary of the selfish, capitalist 
gene/subject as a machined blueprint. I remind my reader of the definition of life by biochemist 
Craig Venter as “DNA software-driven machines” (as cited in Freeman, 2013). These precepts 
hold not only circles of science and industry but also the collective popular Western imagination 
in their narrative grasp of advanced capitalism; they model the content, practices, politics, and 
worldview of what alternative understandings of life-itself and the subject are up against, and 
thereby mark points for destabilizing interventions (Hemmings, 2011) in political strategies for 
change.  
 Views of possibility as material to the ‘responsible’ co-becomings of the world, such as put 




“there is in these new theories a positive, even joyful conception of reality. And while these views 
do indeed invoke the ‘death of man,’ it is only the death of the ‘man’ of the old ‘manifest 
destinies’” (DeLanda, 1997, p. 274). 
The view of the material world that emerges from these considerations is not 
one of matter as inert…[nor] … an obedient matter that follows general laws. 
It is rather an active matter endowed with its own tendencies and capacities, 
engaged in its own divergent, open-ended evolution, animated from within 
by immanent patterns of being and becoming. This other material world can 
certainly inspire awe in us but does not demand from us to be accepted with 
pious resignation. (DeLanda, p. 392).  
 
Echoes of Deleuzian immanence and becoming figure prominently in DeLanda, and in Braidotti, 
as will be shown; these tracings, shown in Chapter 4, hail Vico and company. In the long history 
of inquiry into consciousness that extends far earlier than that of the Cartesian Enlightenment, 
individuality was not attributed to active processes of materiality; this ‘tortured vein’ of thought 
comes back to the surface in intersections of current science studies and philosophy, significantly 
contextualized, again, by the current social and political conditions that inspire and situate the 
inquiry. 
Sounding like the radical and feminist philosophy that Kauffman is not schooled in, he states 
“radical emergent becoming…creates its own future possibilities of becoming” (2012, p. 17).28   
Without selection acting to do so, the biosphere is persistently creating its 
own future possibilities! The biosphere, beyond selection, persistently 
creates what it may become!…[R]eductionism fails for the evolution of life 
and we are beyond Newton and Schrodinger. (2014, p. xiv) 
 
Kauffman raises the same question that DeLanda raises in his statement that “no law entails the 
evolution of the biosphere” (Longo, Montevil, & Kauffman, 2012, 1380). “The question then,” as 
DeLanda puts forth, “is whether the very concept of ‘law’, a concept that, it may be argued, 
constitutes a kind of theological fossil embedded in modern science, is adequate to think about 
these immanent patterns” (2011, 386).  Kauffman affirms that science can no longer be about 




as systems evolving spontaneously in conditions of complexity, “No vital force or extra substance 
is present in the emergent, self-reproducing whole” (1995, p. 24). In contrast to the Victorian 
canon of natural history that connected the political mindset of empire and progress in England to 
its legitimate powers to command and control nature, complexity evidences that “we do not know 
what we are doing…having invented the categories, we carve the world into them and find 
ourselves categorized as well …. global civilization would have to invent its own new sustaining 
myths” (1995, pp. 300-303). Causality, then, as defined by Kauffman and his scientist co-authors, 
is “difference that causes difference” (Longo et al., 2012, p. 1379) and is embedded in and 
embeds the “indefinite, un-orderable” (p. 1389) poised realm, spoken like a true feminist 
epistemologist. The material gap of intra-acting forces lies beyond mathematics and words, and 
may be imagined only as that which exceeds the imaginary, and enables radical collective 
emergence (the creative).  
My discussion here on Kauffman and DeLanda focuses on a realm of meta-scientific inquiry 
that reveals possibility space, the poised realm, and the adjacent possible as active lacunas, the 
very materiality of which demands a transformation of scientific ideologies, if not of worldviews, 
and which, for now, are conceptually populated by the creative co-becomings of subject and 
world, both always-already in constant, dynamic motion, thus my phrase, the creative co-
(m)otions of science and subjectivity (pun intended, the dynamics are definitionally in motion, 
appear chaotic, but in Vichian style, are simply complex). I now move to a parallel discussion of 
embodied creative possibility space on the scientific micro-level, in Varela’s neurocognitive 







“If my internal awareness were glued  
without gap to my fleeting experiences,  
the passage of time would rip my ego to shreds.”  
(Brough 1989, p. 288, as cited in Shear & Varela, 1999, p. 130). 
 
Varela’s work, too, undoes dualist frameworks of inquiry by which “logical antinomies” only 
lead to “conceptual knots,” indicative of wrongly posed questions that in neglecting first-person 
praxes (“the experiential and social dimension in —even the most consecrated forms of natural 
science —is often hidden, but never entirely absent” (Shear & Varela, 1999, 13)) neglect the 
neurodynamics of experience, thereby silencing the empirical evidence of the ecological intra-
embeddedness of self, inter-subjectivities, and world. To study conscious experience29 
scientifically, defined as the lived experience associated with cognitive and mental events in 
which experience (and affect) are explicitly active components of consciousness (p. 1), Varela 
advocates first-person methodologies, linked to third-person accounts. Subjectivity is central to a 
science of the consciousness. 
For Varela, “perception and action are embodied in self-organizing sensorimotor processes” 
(1999, p. 15). Cognition consists of embodied action. Actions/behaviors of immediate coping– 
‘know-how’– walking, reading aloud, dressing and undressing, eating, responding to the needs of 
others—are expert skills unfettered by intention or the application of rules or analysis, having 
taken the longest evolutionary time to develop; by training over time, these actions transformed 
into embodied behavior. It is on this level of cognition-as-expertise that Varela constructs his 
concept of ‘ethical know-how,’ one that can be learned through praxis. “The basic idea is that 
embodied (sensorimotor) structures are the substance of experience, and that experiential 
structures “motivate” conceptual understanding and rational thought” (p. 16), cognition brings 
forth embodied subjectivity. Varela suggests that cognition, as understood scientifically, has 





To explain cognition as distributed processes of emergence by which “signals move back and 
forth, gradually becoming more coherent until a micro-world has been constituted” (1999, pp. 48-
9), Varela cites Walter Freeman’s findings from a study of rabbits’ olfactory system, and I quote 
here at length: 
 Emergent patterns of activity are created out of a background of incoherent 
or chaotic activity by fast oscillations until the cortex settles into a global 
electrical pattern, which lasts until the end of the sniffing behavior and then 
dissolves back into the chaotic background. The oscillations then provide a 
means of selectively binding a set of neurons in a transient aggregate that 
constitutes the substrate for smell perception at that precise instant. Smell 
appears in this light, not as some kind of mapping of external features, but as 
a creative form of enacting significance on the basis of the animal’s 
embodied history. What is most pertinent here is that this enaction happens 
at the hinge between one behavioral moment and the next, via fast 
oscillations between neuronal populations that can give rise to coherent 
patterns. …  
 It seems that between breakdowns these oscillations are the symptoms 
of very rapid reciprocal cooperation and competition between distinct agents 
activated by the current situation, vying with each other for differing modes 
of interpretation for a coherent cognitive framework and readiness- for-
action. This dynamic engages all the sub-networks that give rise to the entire 
readiness-for-action in the next moment.  It involves not just the sensory 
interpretation and motor action but the entire gamut of cognitive expectations 
and emotional tonality central to the shaping of a micro-world. On the basis 
of this dynamic one neuronal ensemble (one cognitive subnetwork) finally 
prevails (i.e. a bifurcation in a chaotic dynamic) to become the behavioral 
mode for the next cognitive moment, a microworld. … In the breakdown 
before the next micro-world shows up, there are a myriad of possibilities 
available until, out of the constraints of the situation and the recurrence of 
history, a single one is selected. The fast dynamic is the neural correlate of 
the autonomous constitution of a cognitive agent at a given present moment 
of its life. … The cognitive self is its own implementation: its history and its 
action are of one piece” (pp. 50-54, italics in original).  
 
 Systems of fast resonance to transiently bind neuronal ensembles pattern life-itself, being 
located, for example, in the visual cortex of mammals, the avian brain, and the ganglia of an 




from computationalism to model the workings of the brain as “simply incorrect,” Varela 
describes the architecture of the brain as supporting the operation of signals to move “back and 
forth,” not in a seamless flow from one state to another, but “in a punctuated succession of 
behavioral patterns that arise and subside” in a “natural temporal parsing” (pp. 48-49). The 
oscillations and breakdowns of neurocognitive processes in Varela bear striking resemblance to 
Kauffman’s proposed “persistently poised quantum coherent-decoherent system”31 of 
mind/consciousness, one difference being that Varela additionally explicitly addresses 
intersections of embodiment and affect as constitutive of the ‘virtual self’ and “at the same time 
contain[ing] a radical openness or unexpectedness with regards to its occurring” (Shear & Varela, 
p. 132). He explores the linkages between affection and the constitution of time as directly 
impacting what he calls ‘coping’, the readiness for action that marks an “expectation as to the 
way the world will show up,” for example habitus and learning a skill. Affect, for Varela, is “a 
dispositional trend proper to a coherent sequence of embodied actions.” Affection and learning 
enact a world by coping in temporal flows that are deeply rooted biologically.  
 In sum, Varela presents a ‘hard-science’ of the role of affect and experience in pre-
conscious neurological processes in a co-(m)motion of becoming self and world, mapped by the 
co-(m)motions of science and subjectivity. He uses non-linear mathematics and dynamical 
systems methods to perform temporal measurements (msecs) of neuronal sensori-motor enactions 
that, in unceasing flow, configure items into ‘meaningful world’ (Shear & Varela, 1999, pp. 116-
125). Lending evidence to cognition as embodied and dynamic, measurements of each of cellular 
rhythms, synaptic integration, central oscillations, memory, and excitability cycles show the 
emergence of self-organizing patterns of “endogenous configurations of [reciprocal cell 
assemblies] of neuronal activity” (p. 116). Taken together, these correspond as well to a view of 
temporality as an embodied, neurocognitive process. ‘Nowness’, present-time consciousness, 




capacities. The integration of moments of ‘nowness’ gives rise to broader temporalities of 
memory and imagination (desire, anticipation) that constitute the flow of consciousness. 
“Inseparable from our history as living beings and minute events in brain physiology, … 
emotional tonality [‘an awareness that is constitutive of the living present’], is, by its very [pre-
conscious] action, a major boundary and initial condition for neuro-dynamics” (p. 132-133). 
 The neurodynamics of time as a dynamical system are based on non-linear coupled 
oscillators, for which the norms of perpetual self-propelled motion are instability and multi-
stability. Accordingly, “any slight change in initial and boundary conditions makes the system 
move to a nearby stable/unstable region” (Shear & Varela, 1999, p. 128), and we are reminded of 
the butterfly effect.32 Here Varela engages complexity theory to discuss consciousness in terms of 
fissures, breakdowns and loss in the fluidity of coping within the ‘phase space landscape and the 
specific trajectories that move in it,’ which condition the embodied coupling of affective-tonality 
and temporality. Varela acknowledges that this dynamic of breakdown and ‘re-membering 
desire’33 is what Kauffman refers to as ‘operating at the edge of chaos’ and ‘self-organized 
criticality’ (1993) in the space that hovers, or oscillates, between chaos and order. I point out to 
my reader that this concept amounts to the quintessential scientific application of Vichian 
dynamics (Chapter 4) to the constitution of material possibility. In making scientific statements 
about ‘life’ as self-coordinating-systems, both Varela and Kauffman emphasize the creative 
function of embodied mind/cognition. The “continual redefinition of what to do is … enormously 
dependent on contingency and improvisation, and is more flexible than any plan can be…in terms 
of the role such running redefinition plays in the coherence of the entire system” (Varela, 1999, p. 
55). Varela’s uses ‘system’ in a specific sense that leads to another aspect of thinking that he 
Kauffman share. The system in its entirety emerges out of the local chaos of interactions, there is 
no one central representation or command system, it is only the observer who imputes central 




 Maturana’s and Varela’s system of autopoiesis, in setting out to define the 
phenomenology of biology, arrives at an epistemological stance by which living systems are 
describable only from the remove of an observer and, for social groups, only in a linguistic 
(social) domain, which for humans is language. I presume that in making this observation, 
Maturana and Varela are also commenting on scientific claims to objective truth of its 
knowledge.  “No description of an absolute reality is possible” (1980, p. 121). Though we are 
embedded in it, ‘nature’ lies at a distance to our intelligibility of it, at best we might indirectly 
infer and debate its nature, which cannot be proven. The particular properties of an entity-in-itself 
cannot be directly apperceived, but autopoiesis generates observers, thus relations between 
entities can be described; hence, cognitive reality is unavoidably relative to the knower’s 
interpretation, mediated by the behavior34 of description. Humans, as autopoietic systems, interact 
with this world through their descriptions … “this demands an entirely new cognitive outlook … 
autopoiesis generates a phenomenological domain, this is cognition” (pp. 122-123), and it is 
cognition that generates time as a dimension of the descriptive domain, it is not a feature of the 
‘ambience’” (p. 133). Language, then, appears in the evolution if hominids as a biological 
phenomena of social groups dependent on communicative interactions for their survival, 
dependent on the biological-cognitive dynamic of love and acceptance of others. Emotions, (fear, 
anger, sadness, etc.) are part of the dynamic that defines an organism’s structural pattern (TofK 
247). 
Language was never intended by anyone only to take in an outside world. 
Therefore, it cannot be used as a tool to reveal the world. Rather, it is by 
languaging that the act of knowing, in the behavioral coordination which is 
language, brings forth a world. We work out our lives in a mutual linguistic 
coupling, not because language permits us to reveal ourselves but because 
we are constituted in language in a continuous becoming that we bring forth 
with others. We find ourselves …not as a pre-existing reference nor in 
reference to an origin, but as an ongoing transformation in the becoming of 





In this way language directly links biology to social and cultural practices, Varela 
contextualizes the scientific phenomena of enactive cognition, not as concerned with objects but 
as self-reflexive ricorsos, by which, like a Klein bottle that has no inside or outside, no start and 
no finish, we bring forth ourselves. This knowledge, states Maturana and Varela,  
“compels us to adopt an attitude of permanent vigilance against the 
temptation of certainty. It compels us to recognize that certainty is not a 
proof of truth. … This is why we cannot evade …an ethics that has its 
reference point in the awareness of the biological and social structure of 
human beings, an ethics that springs from human reflection and puts human 
reflection right at the core as a constitutive social phenomenon” (TofK 245). 
… Every human act has an ethical meaning because it is an act of 
constitution of the human world. This linkage of human to human is, in the 
final analysis, the groundwork of all ethics as a reflection on the legitimacy 
of the presence of others” (1987, p. 247). 
 
In a series of lectures printed in a volume Ethical Know How (1996), Varela presents the 
theoretical science of cognition and consciousness that drives his desires for a compassionate 
ethics and “the re-enchantment of wisdom, understood as non-intentional action” (p. 75).35 He 
describes dense, chaotic, concurrent co-ordinations of multiple interacting cognitive sub-networks 
of the brain, which “ensure that every active neuron will operate as part of a large and distributed 
ensemble,” (p. 48) ultimately producing for the outside observer the illusion of a coherent pattern 
of behavior and representations as aspects of the world. Color, for example, emerges from the 
‘dialogue’ between an organism’s active history and an environment by which a perturbation 
triggers “neural networks to constitute sensorimotor correlations and hence put into action their 
capacity for imagining and presenting” (p. 57), i.e. “we bring forth new worlds” (Barad, 2007, p. 
170), “we construct the world we think we live in” (Kauffman, 2014, p. 18), “we have only the 
world that we bring forth with others” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p. 248).  
Varela brings the body back to a post-Cartesian science of mind driven by complexity, not 
dissimilarly from Kauffman’s science of mind, but with the significant distinction of his focus on 




is a neuroscience of embodied activity rather than a neuroscience of brain activity (Noë, 2004); 
the way neural activity is embedded, not in the brain but in sensorimotor patterns and structures 
of skillful activity (which I point out is a function of motion, or movement and of contingency) 
determines phenomenon. Experience is the enactive neuroscience of embodied activity, “realized 
in the active life of the skillful animal. … Brain, body, and world work together to make 
consciousness happen” (Thompson & Varela, 2001, as cited in Noë, 2004, p. 227). Varela favors 
an ethical philosophy of the subject informed by phenomenology36 and by wisdom traditions of 
the East, especially Buddhist mind-trainings, and he leaves behind rival Kantian and Hegelian 
moral philosophies of the West.  
The effects of this move—used by Varela to connect empirical neurodynamics of temporal 
flow to self-motion (immanence), self, and affect— allow me to use Varela’s enactive cognition 
as a bridge from quantum complexity and neuroscience to feminist new materialist theories of 
ethical subjectivity. The dynamic functions of Varela’s enactive cognition serve to re-interpret 
borders, temporalities, and relationality outside of Western framings, and, instead, understand 
them as ensembles that operate without hierarchy, central control, or telos. By means of his 
autopoietic definition of life as closed operationally, yet systemically open to fluxes of matter and 
energy, Varela injects a conception of life-itself with fundamental paradox, a topological relation 
that also much enamors Braidotti, but before I delve into that realm, there are two more scientific 
threads to follow. One connects Varelan theory to Lynn Margulis’ theories of evolution grounded 
by her work, ecological in approach, in microbiology on symbiogenesis,37 and the other, through 
Margulis, to James Shapiro’s presentation of cellular genetics, which absolutely undoes the 
Franklin / Dawkins ‘genetic imaginary’ presented in Chapter 3 and replaces it with a whole new 
narrative that prompts an altogether different ‘genetic imaginary’, one that is an autopoietic 




 Consciousness, in the embodied enactive sense that Varela explores it, concurs with 
Margulis’ interest in consciousness as the sentient, motile capacity of living entities to learn and 
evolve, the embodiment of all living entities being chimeras. (Omitted: explanation of SET of the 
eukaryotic cell.) The autopoietic characterization of ‘life’ frames Margulis’ empirical work from 
microbiology to Gaia and, though she edited a volume on Chimeras and Consciousness, she was 
less familiar with Varela’s neurological explorations of enactive cognition. Nonetheless, she 
holds to the same basic standard of consciousness as sentience that premises Varela’s (and Alva 
Noë’s) explorations of phenomenal consciousness; what Varela refers to as ‘embodied 
sensorimotor systems’ Margulis refers to as ‘cellular motilities’, each phrase necessarily 
describing phenomena immediate to triggered motion and movement. Margulis and Noë review 
these aspects of the development of life against an evolutionary setting that takes seriously 
sensorimotor skills as constitutive of a kind of knowledge, which extends from the simplest of 
bacterium to complex organisms with “greater degrees of freedom of movement, and so greater 
possible patterns of sensorimotor interaction” (ibid.).  Phototactic (light), magnetotactic 
(electromagnetism), aerotactic (oxygen), thermotactic (temperature), gravitactic (gravity), 
phonotactic (sound), rheotactic (fluid), and chemotactic bacteria each embody particular 
evolutionary paths of environmental sentience and sensorimotor knowledge that stimulates their 






Figure 27. Magnetotactic bacterium. Image shows visible internal magnetite. 
 
 
Figure 28. Magnetic polarity in bacterial motility.  
Double click on image to play video of Magnetotactic bacteria  




These forms of sentience, the awareness of light, or magnetic polarization, or chemical conditions 
of the immediate environment amount to a form of consciousness in that the ‘knowledge’ 
provokes the action of their particular prokaryotic motility mechanisms.  
Communication among millions of life forms (strains, varieties, and species) 
has been rampant nearly since the origins of life itself. Bacteria detect 
Earth’s magnetic field and gravity. Protocticst bodies evolved eyes, tentacles, 
and fishing rods to help catch prey. The biosphere is abuzz with more-than-
human sensation and information flow. Chemical communication among 
tress, whale sonar systems, and, more recently, people who talk, read, and 
write electronically have augmented the nonstop tendency of this life to 
reach out to other life. Communication modes that began in crowded 
bacterial mats and scum have been in place, grown, declined, and changed 
for at least 3,000 million years. (Margulis 2011, p. 9)  
 
 Prokaryotic and eukaryotic cellular motilities differ by type, and within each category are 
scads of (co)-evolutionary innovations, convergences, and variations. The living entity not only 
“moves” in response to its environment, it is “moved” by its environment; in complex forms, 
entities embody a sensitivity to the way its own movements change the way the environment 
stimulates it (Noë, 2004), and has the capacity to change its environment (Margulis everywhere), 
as well. Speculatively, then, ‘life’ and ‘perceptual consciousness’ are integral to each other and to 
the environment and to (oft-neglected) motion/movement; operating in concert, these becoming 
cognitive skills, bring forth a ricorso (Chapter 4) becoming of self, other, and world. 
In another micro-instance of ‘gap’ dynamics that model the bringing forth of life and 
world largely resonant with Varela’s and Margulis’ work, James Shapiro advances a science of 
sentient cellular genetic processes, the cell being the minimal autopoietic unit, that puts to final 
rest the neo-Darwinist-Dawkins concept of the selfish, autonomous, and immortal DNA-focused 
gene and its concomitant blinkered causal determinisms that devastate life and Earth. Shapiro’s 
evolution for the 21st century opens up, instead, to self-organizing genomic systems that leverage 
multiple paths of change to rewrite the non-species self (2011). 




 Accepting that these speculative sciences are adequately accurate (enactive cognition, the 
poised realm, the adjacent possible, and possibility space), and given the leaky processes of 
symbiosis, symbiogenesis, of coherence-decoherence in the quantum field, and of the genetic 
biology of the cell, then the physics and biology of uncertain, nonlinear processes of becoming 
are necessarily contingent, to some degree, on the social, ethical, and affective conditions that 
play an important role in the material constitution of possible realities and actuality. Explorations 
of consciousness and experience as natural phenomena belong not only to philosophy but 
appropriately also belong to problems in biology about the nature and origins of life (Noë, 2004), 
and perhaps, by extension to physics, as well; in both cases they belong as a matter not of the 
brain but of the active becoming of lives in motion. “Experience is what makes possible and 
constrains conceptual understandings” (Varela, 1999, p. 16), and is thus also integral to how 
subject and collective imaginaries function in the becoming of the world. 
 The multiple sciences of becoming inform of a sea-change underway in the sciences that 
speaks to a fundamental shift in their framing imaginaries, and that correlate to utterly different 
modes of thinking that have been subjugated and marginalized for centuries (Chapter 4). The 
qualitative character of the conditions that contextualize a subject’s and group’s experience and 
imaginary, and vice versa, are directly integral to what had traditionally been considered the 
exclusive domains of quantitative empirical research. Subjectivity, it has become evident, is in 
active co-(m)motion with the dynamic processes that are matters of science, they dance together 
inextricably in a structured and structuring improvisation. Perhaps now, as connected to the 
insights marked by these interventions in science, and in acknowledgment of current dire 
planetary conditions, new subjectivities might be hovering in a poised realm, oscillating between 
the possible and the actual, becoming skilled in ways that might enact a hopeful present. As 
Varela states, we are compelled to see that “the world will be different only if we live differently” 




Co-(m)motions: From Memory to Desire 
 
 The sciences of becoming— quantum and complex, evolving and symbiogenic, hybrid 
and cognitive— teach that there is nothing fixed or static about nature or life, evolutionary 
processes open to limitless stories of what might be and what could be; should sundry conditions 
be favorable opens to understandings of life as flows of becoming alterities of matter-energy 
without limit, these constitute the conditions of proliferation on which natural selection acts. To 
clarify, natural selection is not creative, it edits, it cuts and limits. “Life is not what we thought 
and living it is beyond the ken of reason alone, for we cannot reason about that which we cannot 
know”(2012, p. 1)38 nor can we reason about the body in pain, the sight of a loved child, the 
affection of music, or sun-setting light on white cows grazing in a golden field.  
 The sciences of desire move away from normative conventions of disciplinary science, 
and in so doing move subjectivity out of determinist contexts into new frames of thinking, new 
imaginaries, and new possibilities. The re-definition of boundary conditions as porous, sentient, 
and paradoxical, and finding creativity poised in gaps of possibility drive new attention to 
concepts of matter and materiality.  Messy and emergent life as an object of scientific study 
cannot at once be both alive and dissected, the conduct of natural science by taxidermy and 
luxuriously framed dioramas of pinned specimens belongs to memories of imperial conquest and 
hyper-individuality, worlds of telos-structured entitlements. “What needs to be broken is the 
phantasy of unity, totality, and oneness [what I have called in this project the ‘irresistible 
charisma of monotheistic thinking’]. What gets pulled out from under the subject’s psychic 
landscape is the delusion of stability, the phantasy of omnipotence. To recognize this basic ego 
deflating principle is ground zero of subject formation” (Braidotti, 2012a, p. 174). Karen Barad, 
through her feminist work that applies the effects of developments in quantum physics, 




Rosi’s radical collapse of the delusion of classical certainty with quantum substance that shields 
Rosi’s theory from charges of epistemological relativism. Barad provides the scholarship for 
moving from memory to desire, she engages her expertise in matter to interrogate cultural notions 
(whether in the social or science domain) of identity, agency, causality, and peculiar motions of 
temporality. Because I see Rosi Braidotti’s work as building on and extending the sciences of 
desire (in which principles of becoming — of moving from possibility to actuality —entangle 
ethics) to a feminist critical theory of subjectivity, I use her work to observe how the new 
materialism project shifts feminist discourse from its focus on systems of power to discussions of 
matter, ethics, affect, and life. Through Rosi’s work I am able to evaluate desire as a 
transformative strategy in a posthuman / threatened / techno-capitalist world, and as a feminist 
response to her question, what may we hope now?. In observing Rosi’s vision, I also make note 
that she does not offer ideas as to praxes that might enact her vision of an ethical becoming of 
Earth and life. Memory, as narrated through the topics of Chapters 3 and 4, gets writ large on 
present bodies and becomes desires. In becoming-desires, how do hopes for ethical desire get 
enacted now? 
 The feminist voices of new materialism on matter are not univocal, but they share the 
same foundational desires for social transformation that find political and ethical function in 
“materiality” when dissolved of former and falsely imposed dichotomous contexts 
(material/discursive, nature/culture, matter/mind, human/nonhuman). Feminist new materialisms 
hold themselves and others to rigorous standards of scholarship that keep pealing back the layers 
to root out the instigating ways and means of oppression in order to resist them and foster change, 
even as planetary conditions rapidly change. The new materialist approaches claim to build on 
former feminisms, and in bringing the body back to feminism, bring back actionable ethical 




detached from ‘substance’ or world or conditions for thriving. The aim on the grand scale, is a 
new paradigm of thinking.  
 My question, in light of my organizing exploration of new materialism’s effectiveness in 
advancing transformative feminist theories of ethical subjectivity for twenty-first century 
conditions, becomes: given their shared and divergent points of view within radical theoretical 
discourse, what patterns (technê) inform (en)activist strategies and practices to change paradigms 
of thinking? This political interest trumps the enticement to delve into an in-depth academic 
analysis and critique of their positions, which would be warranted, but for present purposes I 
restrain myself to doing so only to the extent that is useful to this larger question. This disclaimer 




“If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life,  
it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat,  
and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence.  
As it is, the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity.” 
George Eliot, Middlemarch 
 
 
 In opposition to a long dominant notion of matter as inert and passive, and all that that 
genealogy confers and its practices configure, feminisms turn to a notion of matter as active, but 
there are different approaches taken, broadly speaking one largely associates a philosophical 
retrieval of  ‘vitalism’ and ‘monism’ (e.g. Braidotti, Bennett, Connolly (?)), another complicates 
that (e.g. Claire Colebrook, Grosz), and another resists cultural, discursive modes by favoring 
feminist science studies of the agential material ‘non-human’ (e.g. Haraway, Barad, Alaimo, 
Wilson, Hird).40  Jane Bennett’s descriptive term for matter is ‘vibrant’, and her (neo)vitalist 




Guattari, Elisabeth Lloyd, Moira Gatens, John Protevi, Patricia Clough, Elizabeth Grosz, and 
Brian Massumi. These scholars back up their positions with a Spinozist monism, resurrected from 
17th and 18th century philosophy for its rejection of mind/body dualism and for its ideas of 
interconnection and affectivity as defining features of the subject (Braidotti, 2006, p. 162), and 
for its concept of matter as one substance. A Spinozist vibrant matter, according to Bennett, 
locates potent ‘aliveness’ shared by all matter, living and otherwise, whether “edibles, 
commodities, storms, [or] metals” (2009, p. viii) by virtue of the agency of things with “non-
personal, ahuman forces, flows, tendencies, and trajectories” (p. 61). All matter is intelligent, self-
organizing, and densely interconnected through networks of relations. Bennett being a political 
theorist, I make sense of her, to me, obtuse concept of ‘vibrant matter’ as little more than a 
treatise on Brownian motion, engaged as a political methodology to redefine the relationship 
between humans and things (she calls her project a ‘political ecology of things’ with ‘thing-
power’), in order to unseat the anthropocentricity of the subject-object binary and capitalist 
commodification. Whether successful or not, her ultimate aim is to enliven social justice; Bennett 
asks, What difference would it make? (p. viii), should all things be seen as interacting actants. 
Vibrant, monist matter is the core concept to Bennett’s ontology of ‘vital materialism’ that 
Spinozist-thinking descendants of Deleuze engage, and Rosi, echoing Deleuze, correlates to a 
political ontology of ‘radical immanence’ (2013, p. 115). This return41 to ‘neovitalism’ (Rosi thus 
distinguishes it from classical vitalism to distance it from the tangential association to fascism and 
to incorporate a philosophy of flows and flux, which “benefits from the philosophical monism 
that is central to a materialist and nonunitary vision of subjectivity” (2011, p. 199). Monism is 
seen as the unity of matter from which self-organizing processes of difference, framed by internal 
and external forces (as opposed to a dialectic scheme), proliferates. Difference, then, 
paradoxically in Rosi’s description, is the effect of monism’s vitalist, non-essentialist principle of 




the necrophilia of an authoritarian dichotomous secular theology (“friend or enemy” / “with us or 
against us’) that structures modernity as necessarily violent, and, instead pursues a political 
reasoning with “the ability to account for the fluid workings of power in advanced capitalism by 
grounding them in immanent relations and hence resist them by the same means” (2011, p. 200). 
This brief synopsis of vitalism demonstrates that to theorize matter as inter- and intra-active 
necessarily bleeds into theorizations of subjectivity. 
  This holds true for each of my forthcoming foci in the triptych of Varela, Barad, and 
Braidotti. Rosi acknowledges an expressed element of “residual [nontheistic] spiritual values” in 
a neovitalist notion of immanence (2011, p. 200) that she defends against Žižek’s charges of 
neomysticism as a generative theory of desires (2011).43  The point of critical theory for Braidotti 
is to  “upset common opinion (doxa), not to confirm it” (2013, p. 87), and to pursue and create 
new ways of thinking and new frameworks “that help us think about change, transformation, and 
living transitions” (2011, p. 64).44 Distinctively, Barad cannot be seen as subscribing to ‘vital 
materialism’, and though she, too, sees matter not as fixed substance but as active across organic-
inert ‘boundaries’, she makes no claim to some mysterious vital ‘force’ (2007, p. 151). In terms 
of theoretical function, though, a similar relationship exists between Bennett’s vibrant matter and 
vital materialism as between Barad’s intra-action and agential realism, and to similar effect. The 
core concept (vibrant matter / intra-action) constitutes and enables the enactions of its larger 
theory (vital materialism / agential realism)— each being frames of thinking based on concepts of 
dynamically becoming matter that open to ethical accountabilities that the former construct of 
thinking, which characterizes Newtonian-Cartesian-Enlightenment attachments, silences.  
matter is substance in its intra-active becoming—not a thing but a doing, a 
congealing of agency. … ‘[M]atter’ refers to phenomena in their ongoing 
materialization (p. 151, ital. in original). Matter is a dynamic 
expression/articulation of the world in its intra-active becoming. … The very 
nature of materiality is an entanglement. Matter itself is always already open 
to, or rather entangled with, the “Other”. The intra-actively emergent “parts” 




permeated through and through with their entangled kin; the other is not just 
in one’s skin, but in one’s bones, in one’s belly, in one’s heart, in one’s 
nucleus, in one’s past and future. This is true for electrons, as it is for 
brittlestars as it is for the differentially constituted human. (2007, pp. 392-3).  
 
Intra-active matter forms the bedrock of Barad’s “posthumanist performative theory of the nature 
of matter and discursive practices [which] provides a means for taking account of the productive 
nature of natural as well as cultural forces in the differential materialization of nonhuman as well 
as human bodies,” (2007, p. 34) which she names ‘agential realism’, drawing on her particular 
meanings of both agency and realism.  
Crucially, agency is a matter of intra-acting; it is an enactment, not 
something that someone or something has…It is the enactment of iterative 
changes to particular practices—iterative reconfigurings of topological 
manifolds of spacetime-matter relations—through the dynamics of intra-
activity. Agency is about changing possibilities of change entailed in 
reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production, 
including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are marked by those 
practices in the enactment of a causal structure” (2007, p. 178, ital. in 
original). 
 
 Former modes of Newtonian determinist reasoning make no sense in this world that 
Barad builds. Her language is full of circular neologisms required to present new ideas based on 
new science using the preceding status quo of values-freighted lexicon. ‘Realism’ refers to a non-
representationalist notion of “experimenting and theorizing dynamic practices that play a 
constitutive role in the production of objects and subjects and matter and meaning” (p. 56). 
Realism rejects the extreme oppositions between objectivism and relativism, each which deny the 
embodiment of knowledge claims.45 Agential realism, then, is intra-active becoming of matter, 
movements and co-(m)motions in processes that navigate and negotiate possibilities within 
conditions for which dichotomous reasoning and binary divisions bear no relevance, even 
existence, beyond nonsense or syntactical convenience. The phenomena of agential realism, then, 




Barad makes explicit that her use of the term ‘phenomena’ has nothing to do with philosophical 
associations either to phenomenology, the way things-in-themselves appear, or to Kant’s notion. 
Rather she bases her use on Bohr’s notion to refer to “that which is observed, what we take to be 
real” (2007, n.30, p. 412), and, as interpreted within the intra-actions of ‘agential realism’, 
phenomena are richly complex, and materially enactive. Agential realism understands “matter as 
a dynamic and shifting entanglement of relations, rather than a property of things” (p. 35).46 
Matter, Barad notes, is not classical, “it does not reside in space and move through time. Space 
and time are phenomenal, they do not exist outside of matter, rather they are matter’s agential 
performances” (2014). While I find her use of the term ‘performance’ misleading, by either 
conventional or post-structural terms, what begins to accrete, as Barad sees and shares it, is a 
multi-constituting world of dynamic relations and complex improvisations and becoming 
enactments that bear no resemblance to the world we thought we knew, but in fact had only 
wrongly imagined, this planet inhabited, perhaps infested, by neoliberalism.  
 Though Barad’s theory of intra-active matter derives from her familiarity with quantum 
physics, her concept of matter conforms, as well, to James Shapiro’s presentation of the many 
mechanisms active in cellular biology that process genetic information in response to both 
‘internal’ and environmental and cultural factors, as well as to what Varela and Margulis refer to 
as the autopoietic functions of the cell that respond, signal, and inform how cells and matter 
‘learn’.   
 Agential realism reflects Barad’s interest in scientific practices as “entangled material 
practices of knowing and becoming” (2007, p. 56), laying the foundation for her move from 
scientifically-framed discourse to matters of power, ethics, and subjectivity (“entanglements are 
relations of responsibility…not through the realization of some existing possibility, but through 
the iterative reworking of impossibility, an ongoing rupture, a cross-cutting of topological 




ethics gets debated, and I return to this question later, but what is opened here is the direct 
relevance of discussions of the nature of matter and life to the feminist politics of new 
materialism and ethical subjectivity. Once the categories of exclusion have been dissolved by the 
science itself, the materiality of political and ethical respons-abilities removes all innocence from 
systems that think and do in the purported purity of isolation.  
 Intra-action, spacetimematter, and agential realism are terms Barad introduced that have 
become integral to feminist new materialist literature, and which signify the inevitable awkward 
semantic wrangling that comes of thinking and communicating natural and social worlds together 
using the limiting lexicon of the status quo. Such neologisms continue the ‘tradition’ in science 
studies literature of ‘chimerical word forms’, Haraway’s ‘natureculture’ and ‘technoscience’, 
condensed without hyphen in a ‘kind of visual onomatopoeia’, exceed their composite 
distinctions (Haraway 1997, pp. 3-4, n. 21, as cited in Barad, 2007, p. 407) and “avoid cementing 
the nature-culture dichotomy into its foundations” (Barad, 2007, p. 32). Barad calls her 
framework an ‘ethico-ontoepistemology’ “to mark the inseparability of ontology, epistemology, 
and ethics” (p. 409, n.10). Such fusions evidence a thinking that utterly departs from the 
genealogical histories of Western philosophy that root the component parts of these neologisms in 
entirely separate disciplinary fields.  
 Barad shares this challenge of languaging a new framework of thinking with Francisco 
Varela. Interestingly, both concur, generally, that, using Barad’s words, “the world is intra-
activity in its differential mattering…the universe is agential intra-activity in its becoming” (p. 
141), though Varela (Margulis would concur, as well) references biology and calls the related 
explanation, autopoiesis (Kauffman, too, refers to a related ‘phenomenon’ as auto-catalytic 
processes). Where Varela explicitly tracks his empirical studies of cognition and theoretical 
explorations of consciousness and experience to Eastern meditative practices and to philosophical 




“access to the world is mediated, whether by consciousness, experience, language, or any other 
alleged medium” (2007, p. 409, n.9). Most interesting, though, is that both Barad and Varela 
arrive at a core notion of enaction as the motile, dynamic (autopoietic / intra-active / Gaian) mode 
that is the paradoxical co-becoming of the world, and I would argue that Barad and Varela’s 
notions of enaction are synonymous, indicated as well by the fact that both theorists spill into 
considerations of ethics and subjectivity as an attention that, given their science, cannot be 
ignored. Their thought is not so very far apart. Varela’s notion of ‘consciousness’ and cognition is 
not what Barad gestures at in her rejection of a mediated access to the world. In contrast to 
Barad’s position that language functions as a ‘medium’, Varela considers language to be a 
material expression of autopoiesis, akin to what Barad encompasses within intra-active agential 
realism. This comparison and contrast could become a much more complex and nuanced study, 
but my interest and point here is that the gist of their thinking styles signals their shared 
subjectivity in terms of what belongs within science and how, as a practice, science and meaning-
making relate. Perhaps another point of agreement gives evidence to this, that each warn against 
the export of their scientific theorizations to analogical models of politics or psychology in the 
macro-world. Ultimately, Barad and Varela are more concerned with the ethical and 
philosophical implications of their scientific explorations for natureculturesciencesociety (to 






Matter, Life, and Subjectivity 
 
“We are all linked by a fabric of unseen connections.  
The fabric is constantly changing and evolving.  
This field is directly structured and influenced  
by our behavior and by our understanding.” 
-David Bohm 
 
 Barad’s erasure of delineation between subjects and objects is consistent with Margulis’ 
rejection of the notion of biological individuality. Where Barad’s work (2007) organizes around 
theories of matter, Margulis’ work (1995) focuses on characterizing life in terms of matter. “Life 
is matter gone wild… life is moving, thinking matter…it is awareness and responsiveness; it is 
consciousness and even self-consciousness … life is the transmigrator of matter… life is a 
network of cross-kingdom alliances…life is the transmutation of energy and matter… life is 
memory—memory in action ... we carry our past with us … life is not vitalistic” (Margulis, 1995, 
pp. 214-217). Margulis and Sagan agree with Samuel Butler that “life is matter that 
chooses…living matter can ‘memorize’, in support of which she, like Barad, references Niels 
Bohr. “Life, sensitive from the onset, is capable of thinking…thought, like life, is matter and 
energy in flux; the body is its ‘other side,’” (pp. 226-233), “Life is existence’s celebration.” 
Millions of years of endosymbiotic47 intra-actions of living entities and cosmic elements have 
produced communities that co-enact— at every scale of systems, from cellular to Gaia, 
boundaries impute no isolation. Microbial symbionts, for example, are pervasive and essential 
contributors to animal metabolism, genetic variation, and the immune system.  Epigenetics, 
noncoding RNA, and a myriad of complex functions within genomic processes evidence that 
autopoietic enactive cognition indeed becomes encoded in DNA (Shapiro, Evelyn Fox Keller). 
Biochemist, cell biologist and philosopher Alfred Tauber states, “Such an ecological 




and thus breaks the self/non-self, subject-object dichotomy of Western language and thought” 
(Gilbert, Sapp, and Tauber, 2012, p. 326). Once deconstructed scientifically, the ‘individual’ of 
Margulis’ biological ‘subject’ is neither unitary nor autonomous. Functionally, and even 
anatomically, there is simply no such living thing as ‘self’ or individual. Informed by Varela’s 
autopoietic neurocognition, ‘a’ Margulisian subject is in fact a self-organizing, self-maintaining 
assemblage of conscious communities with permeable, shifting, and transitory membranes and 
borders.  
 It helps to hold Margulis’ argument against notions of individuated selves (which draws 
on Varela) in mind along the way to understanding Varela’s notion of the virtual ‘self’, but to get 
there first requires another explanatory tangent. Varela’s work precedes recent feminist debates 
on the ‘nature’ of ‘matter’, but, perhaps, because he and Barad explore questions of the becoming 
of the world from a shared positionality towards science and ethics (or is it just uncanny?), 
Varela’s autopoietic enactive cognition bears much resemblance to Barad’s intra-action. While 
Varela restricts his work to the study of living entities, Barad, acknowledges a “vitality to the 
liveliness of intra-activity” which she clarifies as unrelated to ‘vitalism’, but is meant in terms of 
the aliveness that makes possible the distinction between the animate from the inanimate (2007, 
p. 17 and p. 437, n. 81); this is the structuring principal behind autopoiesis. The two theorists put 
forth their respective concepts, enactive cognition and intra-action, as re-workings of the 
traditional notion of causality “in an ongoing reconfiguring of the real and the possible” (p. 177). 
We are back to ‘possibility space’, the ‘poised realm’ and the chaotic oscillations of Varela’s 
sniffing rabbit that, in context of a given environment, gives rise to coherent patterns of behavior 




     
Figure 29. Peter Rabbit. (Beatrix Potter) 
 
 In another example of their convergences, the bioneurologist and physicist situate 
language (different discursive practices) as part and parcel to the dynamics of materiality that 
configure the world. Neither supports the idea that language serves a mediating function between 
dichotomous inner and outer realities so as to ascertain correspondence, which then constitutes 
‘knowledge’. Rather, communication is an autopoietic function, materially immediate to the co-
becomings of an indeterminate ‘self’ and world. “Matter is always already material-discursive, 
and discursivity is not to be understood as a human-based practice” (Barad, 1997, p. 445, n. 43). 
Thus, for both Barad and Varela, what matters, and what doesn’t, is directly bound up with issues 
of accountability and responsibility. Barad could be speaking for both of them when she writes, 
“matter emerges out of, and includes as part of its being, the ongoing reconfiguring of boundaries, 
just as discursive practices are always already material (i.e. they are ongoing material 
[re]configurings of the world). … the material and the discursive are mutually implicated in the 




original). With this context in place, it becomes possible to follow with explanations of Varela’s 
notion of the ‘virtual (selfless) self’ and Barad’s notion of the subject. 
 While they use very different styles of language and syntax, and reference very different 
domains, I suggest they share a similar conception of the subject without localized center; the 
apparent whole of complex, inter (intra-)acting functioning behaves in patterns as though 
coordinated. With no ‘agential’ center or ‘self’ to be found, Varela calls this the selfless (virtual) 
self. The reader is reminded that from the point of view of the Margulisian ‘self’ as a dynamic 
community of autopoietic communities, it could hardly be otherwise. But what Varela introduces 
here is the connection of the so-called-self to complexity, by which distributed network systems 
exhibit emergent, and in this case of living entities, cognitive properties. The selfless self, 
metaphorically, is emptiness,48 a gap space that enables relationality with the environment, a gap 
that bridges the corporeal, neural body and emergent social properties.  
Having referred to a ‘gap space’ throughout this chapter, I have now presented enough layers 
of meaning to clarify my concept, propped up by Barad’s discussion of space in cultural 
geography (2007, pp. 223-4 and pp. 447-8, n. 2). Gap space in no way models a literal or static 
‘container’ or ‘locality’ for intra-active, autopoietic dynamics of matter and energy in motion. 
Conceptually, then, gap space is what it exactly isn’t, or isn’t what it exactly is. It bears no 
relation to a ‘Euclidean geometric imaginary’ to use Barad’s term. This would be impossible in 
the way that I apply it to Varela’s absence of center, to the a priori that isn’t of the non-locality of 
the subject. This conceptualization is non-Western to its core, gap space is the very inverse of a 
Western physical view of mappable space that sets the standard for so much of its noösphere of 
“objectivity, inevitability, and reification” (Soja, 1989, p. 79 as cited in Barad, 2007, p. 224), and 
that Haraway points out contributes to the fetishization of the neo-Darwinain gene (1997). Nor is 
the gap space, as I mean it, an “agent of change” as described by Henri Lefebvre and David 




argued by Neil Smith and Cyndi Katz would position the gap space within capitalist patriarchy 
and racist imperialism (1993). My notion of the gap space can only be understood within a 
Baradian frame of spacetimemattering, within Varela’s autopoietic enactive cognition of the 
virtual ‘self’, within the contingencies and motile improvisations of how and what complexity 
brings forth. The gap space conforms to but is a more narrow focus of DeLanda’s ‘possibility 
space’, and of Kauffman’s ‘poised realm’. Narrowing to this focus makes the concept useful for 
describing and applying what Varela does in tying the science to the subject, which in its sweep 
gathers in the ethical, and to what Barad does and the feminist new materialist project aims to do, 
namely also to gather within that sweep the political and issues of power, thereby affording new 
analytical approaches and enactive, embodied praxes of feminist intervention and transformation. 
These frames make sense of the direct connections between scientific materiality and the effects 
of power on the production of bodies and subjectivities.  The gap space may be thought of as “the 
pause that precedes each breath before a moment comes into being and the world is remade again, 
because the becoming of the world is a deeply ethical matter” (Barad, 2007, p. 185). Like the 
quantum that exists neither in space nor time, which oscillates between continuity and 
discontinuity, and as the epitome of leaky spacetimemattering, gap space torks and changes 
change. What the gap space makes clear that much of the posthuman and new materialist 
literature does not, is that the transformation envisioned requires training and praxis; the politics 
of the gap space requires embodied, strategic approaches that address imaginaries, understood as 
a constitutive, doing dynamic of spacetimemattering, of enactive cognition and ethical know-
how, all of which bring forth a Gaian, autopoietic world. 
Varela’s selfless, as-if-self (or virtual self, like a virtual interface) relates to the environment 
“in relation to the perspective established by the constantly emerging properties of the [system’s 
continually contingent and improvisational redefinition of what to do] and in terms of the role 




Varela, is how ‘coupling events’ give rise to [embodied] intentions (desires) unique to living 
cognition; neural networks “put into action their capacity for imagining and presenting” (p. 57), 
and this precedes the bringing forth, or the enactment, of a compelling world.  
Segueing from Varela’s ‘coupling events’ to Barad’s description of what intra-action 
iteratively performs, that these two concepts are analogous becomes apparent in terms of both 
enaction and their difference-configuring effects on boundaries, properties, bodies, and meanings. 
Barad notes,  
Intra-actions reconfigure the possibilities for change. In fact, intra-actions 
not only reconfigure spacetimematter but reconfigure what is possible. 
Ethicality is part of the fabric of the world; the call to response and be 
responsible is part of what is. There is no spatial-temporal domain that is 
excluded from the ethicality of what matters. Questions of responsibility and 
accountability present themselves with every possibility; each moment is 
alive with different possibilities for the world’s becoming and different 
reconfigurings of what may yet be possible. (2007, p. 182).  
 
Through Vicki Kirby, Barad, too, uses the language of non-locality to explicate the 
posthuman condition, to dispel Nature and human identity as containers or causal forces, 
and to dispel any whiffs of essentialism (184). As posthuman subjects, we are part of the 
world in its ongoing intra-active becoming, in which (sounding like Lyn Margulis and 
Varela) practices of knowing and learning afford humans no privilege. The subject in 
Barad’s thinking, by virtue of its entanglement with “Others” (living and not), is an 
embodiment that always already entails “an exposure to the Other; memory and re-
member-ing are not mind-based capacities but marked historialities ingrained in the 
body’s becoming” (p. 393). Subjects (by now it should be clear that subjects are not only 
humans) are responsible to others through the entanglement that materiality entails, there 
is no such thing as individuation. “Ethics is therefore not about right response to a 
radically exterior/ized other, but about responsibility and accountability [to our part of the 




are a part” (p. 393). Spacetimemattering entangles questions of justice (p. 236). 
In summary, for Margulis, Varela, and Barad, the personal, self-constituted “I” is illusory, 
construed by virtue of ongoing, fragile micro-narratives. Exploration of the selfless self, the non-
dual manifestation of subject and object, then, is “a matter of learning and sustained 
transformation (a praxis of “ethical know-how’) that resists deeply entrenched drives for identity 
construction (Varela,1999, p. 63), instead to experience the groundlessness of becoming. 
Groundlessness, in this sense, is not a negative, but affectively positive. As emptiness and 
uncertainty, groundlessness paradoxically embodies the creative potentialities of the gap space. 
Groundless becoming is a mode of an embodiment of emptiness within the lived world (Varela, 
Rosch, & Thompson, 1992, p. 234). It is a stance of un-knowing, of possibility, of a becoming-in-
community without category. It rests on a perspective on the evolution of Life and Earth as 
emergent, non-teleological, mutable, communal, and unpredictable. Groundlessness, the illusory 
selfless, virtual, intra-active “I”, is the space of the enactive imaginary, the transformation of 
which demands embodied training and praxis. In the Eastern wisdom traditions that Varela 
espouses, experience and praxis of groundless subjectivity cultivate ever-growing openness, 
compassion, and lack of fixation. Varela’s radical view merges metaphor, philosophy, and 
neurobiology in a counter-narrative of the ethical subject “for the troubled times we have at hand, 
and the even more troubled ones we are likely to have” (1999, p. 75).  
 This sentiment, too, frames Rosi’s motivation, “these are strange times and strange things 
are happening” (2012b, p. 22). Ultimately, Rosi’s self (and I will explain more below), like 
Varela’s, is virtual, “this self is in fact a movable assemblage within a common life space that the 
subject never masters or possesses” (p. 331), linked to temporalities that unfold virtually. She, 
like Varela, likens the ‘empty’ self to the heightened awareness of a meditative state. The hopes 
of her nomadic theory postulate the “materialist dissolution of the self, … the “I” just inhabits 




 Like Barad’s, Rosi’s is a material theory of desires for affirmative, in-depth change, shot 
through with memory and imagination. “Between the no longer and the not yet, desire traces the 
possible patterns of becoming” (2006, p. 197).  Braidotti identifies her notion of desire as drawn 
from Spinozist passion and Deleuzian affirmative thought in service of the ‘enfleshed’ creative 
immanence that undoes the ‘Hegelian trap’ that associates desire with lack and negativity. 
Memory in this, her inherited frame, plays a crucial role in the formation of the politically active 
and ethically conscious subject; memory’s nonlinear temporality is an always already of motion 
that connects to the subject’s affective dimension to sustain, reworked by the imagination, the 
process of change and transformation. Affect, memory, and desire, then, are political tools of 
subjectivity, to be engaged with specific deliberation. Desire for Rosi belongs within a 
nonessentialist ‘vitalistic pragmatism’ that constitutes the nonunitary ‘self’ of complex political 
agency; for her, the subject is “an empirical transcendental site of becoming” (2012b, p. 284). In 
this last aspect, her attachment—to me unfortunate and unproductive—to the transcendental 
reflects a departure from Varela’s and Barad’s theory of the subject. However, Braidotti’s 
following remark takes on new layers of meaning if read through the physics lenses of Kauffman 
and DeLanda’s ‘possibilities and actuals’, through Varela’s autopoietic neurobiology of the 
virtual, and through Barad’s theory of ‘memory’ as an active spacetimemattering of the 
becoming-present. “Memories need the imagination to empower the actualization of virtual 
possibilities in the subject” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 236). For Rosi, the imagination triggers the 
conceptual creativity that ‘propels’ the ‘becomings’ of the subject (p. 155), contextualized by the 
scientific sense of the virtual, the possible, and the actual; the imaginary belongs within that same 
conceptual frame, participating in the dynamic processes of sentience, gap space, the poised 
realm, and entanglement. While these are mysterious, they need not be therefore attributed 
transcendental qualities. Though Braidotti arrives at her remark through her philosophical 




her remark carries specific, meaningful, and material weight in terms of these scientific 
referential frames. Rosi’s conception of the imagination, as the trigger of hopes rooted in 
ordinary, accountable micro-practices of everyday life, and critical to the project of developing 
new social imaginaries, supports this interpretation. 
 Varela, Barad, and Braidotti come together over the centrality of praxis in the becoming 
of matter and meaning, and to the enacting of ethical worlds.49 Varela and Barad specifically 
emphasize training and skills as critical to the ‘know-how’ of praxis, and are conspicuously left 
out in Braidotti; but I would argue that visions and even a ‘pragmatic vitalist’ theory are 
insufficient to accomplish politically transformative goals in cultivating subjectivities. Through 
separate avenues of neurobiology and physics respectively, Varela and Barad arrive at the same 
accounting for the respons-(i)abilities of an ethical human ‘knower’, and at the same 
acknowledgment of ethics and science as inseparable, scientifically. For Barad, the ‘knowing’ 
subject has nothing to do with traditional philosophical models of the “self-contained rational 
human subject that stands outside the physical world the subject seeks to know” (2007, p. 342). 
Knowing is a physical, material (not ideational), ethical practice of differentially constituted 
subjects distributed across ‘boundaries’ through intra-actions. Knowing reflects the 
embeddedness of the subject in larger material configurations of the world and vice-versa. A 
knower embodies ethical enaction, regardless of any particular judgments as to what is and what 
is not ‘ethical’. Ethicality is part of the fabric of subjectivity and of the world, subjectivity is part 
of the fabric of the world and ethicality, and the world is part of the fabric of the subject and 
ethicality. They co-matter in possibility and actuality. The politics of posthuman feminist new 
materialisms center on processes of collective well-being, which stands out in stark contrast to 
politics of capitalist growth and progress. “Each moment is alive with different possibilities for 
the world’s becoming and different reconfigurings of what may yet be possible” (2007, p. 182). 




and skills-acquisition. Thus, ‘knowing’, inclusive of its intra-active, enactive ethical dimension, is 




If you want to change yourself, change your environment,  
if you want to change the world, change yourself. 
Francisco Varela (1992) 
 
 Concurrent to feminism’s reassertion of the centrality of embodiment to subjectivity, a 
resurgence of physiology in genetics and evolution marked a return to the body as a complex 
community of sentient intra-acting communities, (Denis Noble 2008; Gilbert, Sapp, & Tauber 
2012; Margulis and Sagan, 1995; Shapiro, 2011), as opposed to the former model of the body as a 
passive expression and carrier of deterministic DNA mechanics. Underscoring this synchronicity 
are shared understandings across these disciplines of matter as intra-active, that no creature is 
separable from the environment, that qualitative, affective and ethical topologies are part of the 
fabric of materiality, and that the preservation of academic apartheid prevents making sense of 
the complexities of our age. Rosi’s pursuit of an ethical re-grounding of hybrid social 
participations leads, she claims, to the formation of new social and political theory “worthy of the 
third millennium” (2012b, p. 20). I revisit the work of Rosi Braidotti in the remainder of this 
chapter, in light of the science of desire, to assess whether she lives up to these claims, and what 
this represents for the larger feminist new materialist project. 
 To link philosophy to the creation of new forms of subjectivity, Braidotti’s nomadic 
project functions on two intended planes, one inspirational and the other conceptual, in order to 
accomplish two aims, one that is cartographic in sourcing European critical theory (her primary 
inspirations are Spinozist monism and Deleuzian forces) and the other that is conceptual, to link 




claims that her “reinstate[ment of] movement at the heart of thought” actualizes new, non-unitary 
visions of the subjectivity, and “collective experiments” with ways to actualize them (pp. 6-8). 
 Her stance is that a subjectivity constituted in an eco-philosophy of becoming will have 
produced51 pragmatic analytical tools for dealing with our times ‘productively’ (p.  341), a 
nonunitary, complex politics will have disengaged from dialectical schemes of opposition and 
recognition, this politics will not have negated but, rather, resisted the present (and strains of 
memory) in constructing alternatives, echoes of Varela and Barad are heard.  Braidotti calls for a 
social theory that integrates science, technological complexity, and its implications for political 
subjectivity, echoes of Varela are heard. Nomadic theory generates question of ethical values that 
reflect complex temporalities (this is also a Baradian theme); it makes space for conceptual 
creativity in confronting the dissolution of liberal individualism and moral universalism by the 
current historical condition.  Nomadic theory desires disruption of the hegemonic subject. 
 I proffer that Rosi’s key theory of nomadic subjectivity is supported by the sciences of 
desire, and in this way she may be read as extending the transformations in scientific thinking 
about matter and materiality to a transformed feminist theory of the subject that produces a 
different politics. 
 The nomadic subject is ecologically bound, marked and mediated by its environmental 
(inclusive of technological) interdependencies. Reminiscent of the language of the subject used 
by Margulis and Varela, the nomadic subject is a non-unitary collective, and, in language 
reminiscent of the Baradian subject, the nomadic subject is an in-between entity immersed in and 
composed of multiple dynamic systems. Such synthetic analysis breaks down anthropocentrisms 
and foregrounds the predicaments posed when multiple scales of systems —such as 
technological, ecological, transnational, organismic, scientific and militaristic—inter- and tran-
sect. Braidotti describes what I call the Scylla and Charybdis that the nomadic subject of her 




 • “humanistic expectations of decency and dignity” on one side of the channel, and “the 
growing evidence of a posthuman universe of ruthless power relations mediated by technology” 
(2006, p. 4) on the other;  
 • between reductionist science and capitalocentric subjectivity;  
 • between metaphysical naturalism that literally maps cultural, social, and political theory 
according to science principles, and on the other side a naturalized techno-exceptionality (e.g. the 
technological rescue from the dire effects of climate change);  
 • between post-structuralism and transhumanism; 
 • between biogenetic capitalism and climate change;  
 • between domination and exclusion; 
 • between necropolitical ideologies of the state and bare survival (2006);  
 • between humanistic nostalgia and neo-liberal euphoria about bio-capitalism (2007). 
 The ethical posthuman subject is nomadic amongst multiple narratives, adumbrated by both 
restrictive and productive forces of power (material, cultural, political, technoscientific, discursive, 
affective, empathic). Consciousness synchronizes these multiple differences. Unlike consciousness 
in the humanistic subject, as conceptualized by Braidotti in a way that echoes Varela, Margulis, and 
Barad, consciousness is the sentient, embodied, autopoietic becoming process that constitutes the 
ethical core of nomadic subjectivity. Applied to a politics of the third millennium, ethical nomadic 
subjectivity is ultimately about living and leaving this Earth together gracefully (Jensen, 2015, 
quoting Jim Koplin). 
 At this early stage of its development, posthuman theory gropes toward protean 
unknowns, hoping to survive predatory monstrosities in getting to an ‘Other’ side that ‘thinks 
differently about ourselves’, that transposes the subject into a non-unitary, nomadic vision of 
collective community selves. Even Odysseus needed supernatural assistance to survive with only 




Scylla and Charybdis. Like that crossing, nomadic theory is a rescue mission, there is great 
anxiety, fear, and the stakes are high. Survival starts as a function of the imaginary, how which 
narratives transpose memory and danger, how to enact empathically. Embodied, embedded, and 
motile, the imaginary precedes, creates, infuses, and follows what will have been.  
 
 
For the hell of it 
 
What counts is what we are, and the way we deepen 
 our relationship with the world and with others, 
 a relationship that can be one both of love for all 
 that exists and of desire for its transformation.  
      Italo Calvino in interview,  
as cited in MacFarlane, 2013, p. 102 
 
 
 The entry point of Braidotti’s critical theoretical project begins with a feminist politics 
that advocates ethical change. From there her theory takes shape through her citations of 
European philosophers and feminist scholars who help drive forward a ‘joyful’ accountability to a 
future for which we now hope. Her project is politically pragmatic and theoretically visionary 
from the outset; she vests her hopes in a “non-rapacious ethics of sustainable becomings: for the 
hell of it and for love of the world” (2006, p. 278). This elucidation of her affective inspirations 
reflect a kind of outright abandon of determination that emerges from long mourning and which 
celebrates the challenges of fostering ethical subjectivities and political change in an era of global 
advanced technocapitalism.  
 Braidotti establishes nomadism as a thought-style built on former ontologies, and while 
she points out that the necropolitical machine (such as that produces drone warfare) demonstrates 
the potential of nomadic thinking for-profit, her work does not grapple with material praxes for a 




deeply materialist by virtue of its “neo-vitalist immanence of life” (2012b, p. 85) in dimensional, 
situated bodies. She argues for a transversal vision of subjectivity suited to biogenetic life’s 
hybridity of vitalism and machinism.  
This is how I understand vitalism in the context of biogenetic sciences: the 
potency of multiple, self-organizing organisms, most of which are 
technologically mediated, from Dolly the sheep to multiple digital avatars, 
without forgetting genetically modified food, test tube babies and complex 
information and communication technology networks. Central to the 
posthuman turn as I see it is the impact of material vitalism, or vitalist new-
materialism: zoe-driven practices of non-human life forms” (2013, p. 77).  
 
Vital materialism is a transcendentalist accretion that merges 20th century desire with 17th century 
idealisms in reaction against Cartesian mechanistic viewpoints. Bergson in 1888 explains vitalism 
as an understanding of two distinct spiritual principles, the first dictates the organization of matter 
in cells, tissues, organs, and the “marvelous harmony among organs…which resists the forces of 
inorganic nature,” and the second is the domain of “thought, perception, decision-making, 
will…This would be the soul, properly speaking.” The distinction Bergson makes between these 
two principles identifies the former as acting without consciousness of itself and “blindly 
pursu[ing] an aim that the Creator has set” (2002, p. 31-32), while the latter principle is fully 
conscious of what it is doing. Generally, vitalism, as engaged by its many thinkers, “supports the 
notion that something exists in the living creature which cannot be understood by means of 
phyisicochemical analysis” (Kanamori, 2005, p. 13). Historically, vitalism has been largely 
dismissed by biological and medical science research that do not investigate philosophical 
conundrums of “wonder” and “conditions of possibility” that explain that something ‘life’ force 
of organismic development beyond genetic orders and gene expression that (Kanamoori, 2005, p.  
22). The path of vitalism absorbs along its way from Bergson’s élan vital52 to new materialism 
shades of Whiteheadian process and Deleuzian immanence, before arriving in Bennett’s vibrant 




resonances of its dichotomous, transcendant roots of anthropocentric spirituality, posing problems 
for Braidotti’s theoretical reasoning largely due to her uncritical over-reliance on Deleuzian 
metaphysics that recycle and resignify historical concepts. Braidotti’s contribution to Deleuzian 
thought is to extend his brand of vitalism and monism to the body. Prior to Deleuze’s mediations, 
Spinozist monism was situated by Europe of the 17th century and vitalism belonged with 
Bergson’s France of the late 19th-early 20th century, each characterized by traits now viewed 
negatively by new materialist theory, e.g. theistic, universalizing, essentialist, and hierarchical.  
 To be sure, there are aspects of Spinozist thought that explain the perception of  his 
relevance to new materialist thought, but the overwhelming problems show this engagement to be 
a marriage of convenience. For Spinoza, substance is not individualized, the individual is a mode 
of wholeness rather than an interplay of parts. Substance refers to the pervading trait of all 
existence, while not obliterating distinctions between the ‘animate’ sentient organism 
(unreasoning animals, exclusive of conscious and reasoning man) and the ‘vegetative inanimate’ 
(Hans Jonas, 51). Spinoza conceives of mind and matter (idealism and materialism) as belonging 
together and interrelated— and here’s the catch overlooked by post-modernists— in ‘finite brute 
animals’, while the infinite of reason and intellect define the substance of man. Following are 
notes on Spinoza’s philosophy that reveal too many points of conflict between his thought and 
founding views of feminist new materialisms to warrant his recent enamored status.  
 Spinoza’s project was about knowing God as an indivisible totality, the infinite necessary 
existence of absolute being by which all things as they are, are necessary. “Spinoza’s purpose is 
to get us to abandon the imagination. … The Letter on the Infinite has the same pedagogical 
purpose as the Ethics: to teach us to think with the understanding alone, without help from the 
imagination” (Garvey, 2015). Spinoza defined his God as “an absolutely infinite being, that is, 
substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal being and infinite 




Abrahamic, his was a monist, i.e. monotheistic, God. The essence of monotheism in Spinoza’s 
time was the rejection of idolatrous religions. Monism (and its associated quality, reason) was the 
binary opposite of imagination, or abstraction, which constituted the finite. To know Spinoza’s 
God demanded non-representational understandings, and required men to abandon the 
imagination and imagery, for God could only be understood through reason. “The imagination is 
necessary for living and so all of us have good reason to resist its purging, as necessary as that 
might be for understanding God” (Garvey, 2015). Philosophers use only reason, for the 
imagination interfered with knowing God, or divine infinity, which could be known only through 
reason.53 Everything that is real is necessary, there or no potentialities or possibilities, 
indeterminism does not exist. God determines absolutely, all substance is a mode of the monist 
God substance, which defines reason within the infinite and eternal of God, and from which all 
other substances are mere finite modes of that infinite substance. Only understanding, being of 
God, could conceive universality. Thus, in Spinoza, monotheism and knowledge of the infinite 
reject the imagination.   
 Spinoza reasons dichotomously, between substance and mind, between hierarchical 
dialectics of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ power that mark the fitness of an organism. The dialectic of 
individual life hinges on the ratio between the isolated autonomy of individuality “focused in a 
self, [and] the wider [...] periphery of communication with other things; the more isolated, the 
more related it is” (Jonas, 1965, p. 57). Even Bergson lectures on Spinoza as a Cartesianist and 
idealist who relegates the “phenomena of life to the ranks of purely physical phenomena, in order 
to establish a place apart for thought, the only spiritual being, the only free power” (Bergson 
1887-1888, in Bergson and Vaughan, 2007, p. 27). This testament alone of Bergson’s evidences 
the incompatibility of vitalism and monism that contemporary feminisms espousing vital 




 This is, of course, a coarse and simplistic summary of Spinoza’s triangulation of monist 
substance, imagination, and reason that segregate the finite from the infinite. Garvey presents a 
nuanced questioning of Spinozist paradoxes in an attempt glean his position on the relation of the 
intellect to imagination, but for my purposes here, by presenting Spinozist monism in context 
exposes the concept as unsuited to feminist new materialisms. 
 As support of her political ecology of things, Bennett traces the absence of telos in 
Deleuze and Guittari’s abstract machine54 back to Spinoza, quoting, “There is no need to spend 
time in going on to show that Nature has no fixed goal and that all final causes are but figments of 
the human imagination” (Ethics, as cited in Bennett, 2009, p. 154, n.25). Bennett (and Deleuze 
and Guattari) take Spinoza romantically out of context, but if interpreted within the context of his 
denigration and rejection of imagination, Spinoza’s remark is, in fact, an explicit rejection of the 
non-teleologies Bennett’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphysics promote.  The Spinozist move 
inadvertently actually draws a connecting line from Descartes through Spinoza to Kant and 
Bennett, the latter who explicitly supports the teleology of Kantian Bildungstreib,55 causing 
Braidotti’s alignment with Bennett’s vital materialism to be a problematic one. Compare the 
above background with Braidotti’s adoption of ‘Spinozist monism’: 
The conceptual frame of reference I have adopted for the method of de-
familiarization56 is monism, It implies the open-ended, inter-relational, multi-
sexed and trans-species flows of becoming through interaction with multiple 
flows. A posthuman subject thus constituted exceeds the boundaries of both 
anthropocentrism and of compensatory humanism, to acquire planetary 
dimension (2013, p. 89). 
 
Indeed, Timothy Brennan calls the “resurrection” of Spinoza in cultural and literary theory, and in 
post colonialism a fad, and he critiques the invented use of Spinoza. 
The very thinker who stood for an airtight and enclosed system  
of inflexible laws is invoked by the best philosophers as the champion  
of the open-ended productive force and positive potential of the  





While that description does not perfectly match how vitalist new materialisms engage Spinoza, 
clearly, monism is hardly the path to de-familiarization. I concur with the Brennan’s sentiment 
that finds radical philosophy’s readings of Spinoza to be revisionist. Brennan, too, locates 
Spinoza within a Cartesianist genealogy, and offers, as I have in Chapter 4, Vico, Spinoza’s 
contemporary, as an appropriate counter to the romance with Spinoza. Similar translation 
problems come up in Braidotti’s adoption of autopoiesis as transfigured by Guattari. 
 While Maturana and Varela made a distinction between autopioetic and allopietic 
systems, autopoietic being the biological domain self-organizing living entities, and 
allopoietic the domain of “machines that have as product of their functioning something 
different from themselves, as in a car” (Maturana & Varela, 1980, p. 135), Guattari 
extends the principle of autopoiesis to machines or technological others. Braidotti adopts 
Guattari’s notion presumably because it supports the complexity of the posthuman 
subject and her monist conception of matter. It recognizes that the technological, as an 
attribute of Guattari’s “transversalist conception of subjectivity” (2012b, p. 116), 
constitutes a site of post-anthropocentric becoming “which values non-human or a-
personal Life” (2013, pp. 94-5). To think matter in terms of Guattari’s autopoiesis, 
Braidotti somewhat fantastically claims, is an ethical intervention that frees matter from 
the commodifying imperative of advanced capitalism, demonstrating the effectiveness 
of the pragmatic and immanent aspects of nomadic vitalism (2013).  
 This corruption is no longer autopoiesis, it is poetic license taken to such an 
extreme that its inspiring concept (autopoiesis) loses its capacity to generate meaning, 
and thus, its metaphorical power for a new materialist philosophy. To extend autopoiesis 
to the machinic in order to recover the “‘life’ force of inorganic matter” (2006, p. 126) 




which was to counter computational models in biology. Guattari’s autopoiesis “takes the 
life out of biology” (Margulis, 1997) in the same way that neo-Darwinian formalistic 
evolutionary biology does. Braidotti and Guattari make the mistake of relying on a 
superficial understanding of autopoiesis. They are wrong in reading autopoiesis as “a 
dualistic scheme [that] opposes the inert to the living and is thus more oppositional than 
nomadic” (Braidotti, 2006, p. 125). Were Braidotti to have a deeper understanding of 
autopoiesis and enactive cognition, she would recognize these as, indeed, nomadic in 
every way she would wish– free of a re-naturalized evolution led by a deterministic 
master narrative of neo-liberalism, free of a paranoid techno-future that pitches Life and 
nature against the human. Autopoiesis is a systems-thinking that, paradoxically by 
definition, is not systematized, and it materially spatializes sentience, recognition, 
choice, and intra-action. Life hardly needs help from a machinic vitalism to achieve 
diversity and heterogeneity, and nomadism does not benefit from this artificial support. 
Machinic autopoiesis is an expensive tactic in a strategy to give primacy to “transversal 
connections among material and symbolic, concrete and discursive lines or forces…in 
the age of bios/zoe- power” (2006, p. 129, italics in original).  
 This problem casts attention on a slippage in new materialist thought between 
monist matter and making distinctions between living and inert entities. Barad is unclear 
as to how she resolves her concept of matter as entangled with her Levinas-grounded 
ethics. Vital materialists who refuse the distinction in order to be faithful to their dogma 
of monist matter (e.g. Bennett) find themselves awkwardly also trying to argue for a 
politics of life-itself. By grounding her theory in monism and vital materialism, Braidotti 
attaches her thinking to the essentialist, theistic philosophy of Spinoza and, through 
Deleuze and Bennett, to Bergson’s transcendentalisms. Vitalism, reconfigured as a 




of life in an era of advanced techno-capitalism. It is not a ‘legible’ political strategy to 
embrace both monism and vitalism. Matter may be active and entangled, but monism 
fails to shield philosophical and political thought from the effects of binary attachments 
that extend androcentric lineages, even as the politics claim to reject individualistic and 
humanistic controls.  
 Despite her ‘cartographic’ method intended to subvert habits of linear thinking, Braidotti 
structures her argument as an a posteriori logic common in rationalist argumentation (e.g. Žižek). 
Biases drive the argument, which inevitably arrives at its pre-determined conclusion, and 
Braidotti’s ideology contorts and drives methods. For example, autopoiesis does not support vital 
materialism. Though she declares a desire to break with divinely ordained telos, such as that of  
Figure 30. The Still Point. (Betti Franceschi) 
 
Teilhard de Chardin, her embrace of Spinoza and Bennett, ironically, also gathers in the divine 
and deterministic (2013). Consequently, zoe-nomadism wavers towards and away from whiffs of 
essentialism and transcendental empiricism, which Braidotti both hails, in her concepts of zoe and 
vitalism, and rejects, in her concept of nomadism. By skirting the edges of transcendental 




claims to materiality are somewhat aspirational, and belie attachments that, in terms of struggles 
with her own subjectivity, suggest she has not broken free. “The process-oriented vision of the 
subject is capable of a universalistic reach, though it rejects moral and cognitive universalism” 
(2013, pp. 190-191). Her wrong reading of autopoiesis and Spinoza reveals the entrenchments in 
her own thinking habits. She acknowledges the privilege of nomadic theory in her case, made 
possible by the support of a steady job and partner. Nomadism requires a still point.  
 That said, the subject imaginary of the nomadic subject rejects classical ethics tied to 
Kantian moralistic normativity. For Braidotti, a ‘non-unitary’ and ‘non-essentialist’ zoe ethics is 
what emerges from the collision of bios and zoe in the contested and political space marked by 
the body. Nomadism requires agility and precision in its navigations. Given that the subject 
imaginary critically connects how global economic and planetary environmental challenges get 
addressed, becoming-nomad requires a praxis of the imaginary by the ethical subject. The 
imaginary of Rosi’s theorization gets set in motion by nomadic motilities premised on the 
dispersed ubiquity of ‘life-itself’57 across shared spaces of ‘nonprofit micro-political practices.58 
The imaginary Rosi describes reconnects to the past in a Hemmings return narrative that ‘knows 
better and can now move on’ from theoretical and political impasses (Hemmings, 2011, p.  5). 
But Rosi stops short of recognizing the imaginary as a political site of struggle, she misses the 
opportunity to repurpose cyclical time and memory as the imaginary’s capacity to disconnect 
from past undesired topologies in order to reinvent a present becoming-future. This is Rosi’s limit 
that I wish to extend, to mark a gap space for the subject imaginary as both embodied and 
transgressive of its boundaries, which, conversely, are also transgressed. Boundaries, like the 
bodies they entail, and embodiment are made paradoxical by the imaginary, revealing the subject 
imaginary as a nexus of enactions… a site, and even a target, of political contestation. Feminists 
must acknowledge the struggle over the subject imaginary as an out-and-out political conflict. For 




one possible source of new texts for the nomadic subject’s imaginary. New materialisms have 
been critiqued for claiming but not succeeding at connecting their ontological reorientations to an 
ethical vision (Materialism and New Materialism Across the Disciplines, Seminar, Rice 
University, 2014), and for re-inscripting the binaries and silos of disciplinarity it seeks to overturn 
(Willey, ), as well as for neglecting former feminist scholarship of science and the body (Ahmed, 
2008) and for claiming what isn’t to be ‘new’ (Sand, forthcoming). While there is credence to all 
these observations, none of theses criticisms constitute grounds for overlooking or rejecting the 
sense-making energies and political animations of the project altogether. I critique the vitalist 
vein of new materialist thinking for inattentiveness to the residual traits that, lodged in its 
citations, inflect their discourse. As a result, the work fails to escape the conventions of the 
thinking they resist (Grosz, Braidotti, Hird, complete). These citational problems could have been 
avoided by Braidotti were she to have not felt an obligation to legitimize her philosophy with 
former deductive thinking traditions. Her methods cannot support an ethics that claims to produce 
an alternate ontology; Spinozist monism and vital materiality hail the very universalizing 
traditions that new material feminisms debunk. Inadequate historical vigilance sabotages the 
project. This intellectual strategy is unfortunate, because this, that undermines an otherwise 
persuasive project of ethical desires for contemporary conditions, is superfluous to the project 
anyway. Absent the methodological problems, Braidotti’s qualitative cartographies would not 
invite the critical standards imposed by those who represent the thought-styles to which her work 
deliberately does not conform. In the end, held captive by her referential ontologies, Braidotti 




 That said, I am sympathetic to the problem of having to use old words to write new ideas, 
and so I read generously. Overlooking her citational choices allows me to see Braidotti’s (and  
 
 Figure 31. Labyrinthula. Double click to on image to play the video. 
 
Varela’s) concept of ethical subjectivity metaphorically, I imagine them as analogous to the  
microbe labyrinthula. This bacteria lays down new paths on the fly, never complete, a motile 
structuring sentience that, in a strange becoming of filamentous social networks, embodies the 
infrastructure of its entangled environment.  
 Braidotti’s vision of ethical nomadic subjectivity works well as a cognitive, 
transcorporeal figuration, autopoietically situated by a matter-realist, onto-epistemological 
natureculture.59 Her most compelling voice, though, comes through in her affirmative politics of 
hope that takes shape around her drive for an ethical accountability of the future perfect, for a 
future that will have been. Nomadic theory puts forth a compassionate ethics committed to a 
secular, nonunitary vision of the subject, ecophilosophicallly hopeful for living this Earth in a 




scientific base, her arguments would support her transformative theory of subjectivity in a time of 
advanced techno-capitalism. Rosi’s vision moves the subject imaginary a long way toward 
ethicality, and contrary to her claims, her work doesn’t translate from theoretical inspiration to 
embodied praxis. Were there more clarity and attention given the political role of the imaginary 
than Rosi and new materialists offer (though gesture at), feminist analyses and theorization might 
broach this impasse creatively, and persuasively argue the dynamic immediacies of materiality, 






 1  J.K. Gibson-Graham focus on community practices of specifically economic 
subjectivity, and Alaimo focuses on environmental practices.  
 
 2  A common nomenclature of our current time is the ‘Anthropocene’, but remaining 
faithful to official international chronostratigraphic standards, the Holocene is still, officially, our 
epoch. There is currently no ‘golden spike’ for the Anthropocene, nor a determination whether 
the Anthropocene constitutes an epoch or an age in stratigraphical terms. For more information, 
see: http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/ 
 
 3  Others, of many, include J.K. Gibson-Graham and Elizabeth Grosz. 
 4  For the parameters I use, I include Chilean Francisco Varela in this group, and though 
Lynn Margulis rejected feminism, she had little understanding of it and was much more feminist 
than she knew or would have wanted to admit. It could also include John Protevi, William 
Connolly, and Brian Massumi. 
 
 5  And artists, but I am not getting to them in this iteration of my project. 
 
 6  Secular, here, refers to a thinking style and ethical practice that respects difference and 
is free of the qualitative traits of monotheistic origins as discussed in Chapter 3. I do not mean it 
as that which is not religion, nor in the sense that Joan Scott (2010) argued it as a tool of gendered 
power systems that has played a role in the oppression of women. A secularity that does not reify 
binary divisions, etc. becomes a tactical tool for a skilled political activism in a time of a global 
resurgence of fundamentalism. As explained in Chapter 3, I do not consider the leaders of 
Enlightenment thinking as secular, inclusive of Kant and Spinoza, I do consider Bruno, Vico, and 
Darwin as secular thinkers, as explained in Chapter 4. 
 
 7  Some of whom this includes are: Donna Haraway, Karen Barad, Jane Bennet, Stacy 
Alaimo, Claire Colebrook, Elisabeth Lloyd, Moira Gatens, Vicki Kirby, John Protevi, Rosi 
Braidotti. 
 
 8  In this paper, I have associated this list of properties being disrupted with what I call 
the ‘irresistible charismatic of monotheistic thinking’ in Chapter 3. 
 
 9  Here is another alignment of Braidotti’s theory of nomadic subjectivity with J.K. 
Gibson-Graham’s politics of the post-capitalist economic subject.  
 
 10  my insertion 
 
 11 Analyzed in literatures by Hubbard, Haraway, Sandra Harding, Ruth Bleier 
 
 12  Autonomy for Varela is meant scientifically as the operational closure of an 
autopoietic entity that sustains that entity as itself. It does not suggest either cognitive or 
informational closure. Autonomy in feminist discourse may apply disparagingly to systems of 
power or to conceits of biological purity that entitle anthropocentrism.  
 
 13  This is a tenant of autopoiesis, it is also applied philosophically by Hans Jonas in the 








 14  “Zoe stands for the mindless vitality of Life carrying on independently of and 
regardless of rational control. This is the dubious privilege attributed to the non-humans and to all 
the ‘others’ of Man, whereas bios refers to the specific social nexus of humans. That these two 
competing notions of ‘life’ coincide on the human body turns the issue of embodiment into a 
contested space and a political arena” (2006, p. 37). Braidotti’s concept of zoe becomes less 
binary by 2013, when she describes it as an affirmative, posthuman life-force with vital and self-
organizing powers that undoes clear-cut distinctions between living and dying and extinction. It is 
a vital materialism that ‘engenders a transversal relational ethics to counteract the inhuman(e) 
aspects of the posthuman predicament” (2013, p. 115). Zoe allows a transversal redefinition of 
science and humanistic study as to what counts as the subject [and/or object] of posthuman 
scientific practice” (2013,  
p. 159).  
 
 15  nostalgia, paranoia, euphoria, exaltation, manic-depressive, fear, insecurity, 
frustration 
 16  for example, Margulis’ work on symbiogenesis, endosymbiosis, and Gaia; Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela’s early work on autopoiesis, and Varela’s later work on 
cognition; ecology. I do not invoke the term posthuman as a specific critique of Humanism, 
though that would not be unrelated. 
 
 17  Trade winds characterize wind currents and lava flows drive plate tectonics. In 
topological terms, they explain but do not cause, the distinction is critical. A topological object is 
a dynamic object that is emergent in one sense of the term - it is more than the sum of its parts - 
and in another, the effect of its actualization is novel or heterogeneous. Heterogeneity becomes 
quite interesting to philosophical musings on materiality. Chemically, heterogeneity denotes a 
process involving substances in different phases, such as gaseous, liquid, or solid. 
Mathematically, it means incommensurable, through being of different kinds, degrees, or 
dimensions. 
 
 18  Nonlinearity is the norm in topological explorations. 
 
 19  The poised realm hovers unpredictably between classical and quantum worlds, in the 
intersection of continuums between order and chaos, and between quantum coherence and 
classicality. 
 
 20  By ‘responsible,’ Kauffman means the capacity to make decisions, stemming from 
his suggestion that on the quantum level, electrons possibly have the capacity to measure and 
make choices. The quantum level exhibits non-independence of electrons, which exhibit 
preferences, therefor responsibility.   
 
 21  Language gets awkward when it attempts to avoid value-laden terms. Margulis often 
used co-operative, but James Shapiro, to avoid the value-systems, prefers coordinates. Kauffman 
uses jointly functions. 
 
 22  I would prefer the term spontaneous, but that’s a different matter for the next iteration 
that connects such concepts to artists’ engagement of structured improvisation as a creative 
method. 
 






 24  Improvised is my term that I substitute for ‘unpredictably emergent’ in order to hone 
the concept into something with broader application and accessibility, such as the process familiar 
to the construction of performance work by artists. But that is Chapter 6, forthcoming when I get 
that book contract. 
 
 25  Hold this concept in mind while reading the below, by which Kauffman’s adjacent 
possible of future becomings is enriched by Varela’s notions of how temporality and affect 
materially play an integral role in the dynamics and processes by which the world, inclusive and 
indivisible of selves and others, becomes. 
 
 26  Margulis brings to Western light this concept that was first proposed in the 1920s by 
Russian biologist Kozo-Polyansky. 
 
 27  Francisco Varela mentions that a new word is needed here, he finds emergence 
dissatisfying because of its lack of clarity vis a vis parts and wholes. He prefers bringing forth to 
suggest that the emergent whole is really an expression of the relations of the self-organizing, 
self-maintaining component networks. The emergent entity leaves no parts behind, nor is there 
hierarchical privilege given to any level. Varela would not be a Kantian. He preferred the cross-
currents of his work with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, but especially with Buddhism. 
Margulis would agree with Varela, but her philosophical allegiance came through Whitehead. 
What starts to emerge here are the sympathetic overtones between these scientists and the 
feminist new materialists inspired by Deleuze (inspired by Whitehead (inspired by Vico) and 
inspiring Braidotti) and Bergson (who inspires Bennett and Grosz and Whitehead). The web 
keeps expanding and yet it has a focus and a function. Becoming entraps determinism. 
 
 28  Kauffman identifies this stance as positivist science. Kauffman’s subjectivity is 
caught in a liminal zone of biology, a poised realm, stretched thin between two worlds, one being 
that of the Kantian Enlightenment of his training and the other being that of his research, 
complexity. Like Kant and Darwin, he struggles for reconciliation, working in a conflicted place 
that at once privileges Rationalist human exceptionalism (‘we the expected’); he stays loyal to 
neoDarwinian genetic selection at the level of the individual (1995), while challenging its dogma 
as the ‘central directing agency,’ stating that cooperation carries a competitive advantage. 
Kauffman later skeptically acknowledges growing arguments for group selection (2009, p. 261), 
and also argues for creative emergence, the materiality of possibility, and self-organization. 
Kauffman’s reconciliation comes in the form of his call for a reinvention of the sacred, which 
serves the ends of both, retaining the traits discussed in Chapter 3 concerning the irresistible 
charisma of monotheism that gets relocated in science, while also bringing forth heretical ideas of 
the creative becoming of the biosphere. 
 
 29  aka ‘qualia’ in Kauffman  
 
 30  Specifically, Varela promotes Buddhist meditation. 
 
 31  I have not explained here the concepts of quantum coherence and decoherence, a 
nice, simple instructional video can be found at: Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_decoherence. An interesting point to bear in mind in the 
context of Varela’s work that emphasizes the epistemological limits of an observer, is that 
decoherence relates only to the “observation of wave function collapse, as the quantum nature of 





from a coherent system, and acquire phases from their immediate surroundings.” An independent 
mathematician tells me that the formula that collapses the wave function into Euclidian form = A 
+ 1/A. Coherence still exists, but is subject to its interpretation by an observer’s perception. 
(Wikipedia decoherence). Note to self: this decoupling and the decoupling is discussed by Noë of 
Humphrey’s work). 
 
 32 The butterfly effect is also cited by Kauffman and Gibson-Graham. Very small 
changes in initial conditions can lead to profound changes. Kauffman cites this as evidence that 
the empirical unknown obviates prediction, Gibson-Graham cite this as a political vision of 
possibility for world change. Kauffman explains emergence as a radical principle of science, 
Gibson-Graham hopes for it as a radical politics of economic possibility. 
  
 33  My term, building off of Barad’s use of ‘re-membering’ drawn from entanglement, 
and referring to how history marks the future present, is used here as an adjective of desire to 
describe the material-actual temporal/affective inclination, or tendency, that guides expectation 
and possibility.  
 
 34  “By behavior we mean the changes of a living being’s position or attitude, which an 
observer describes as movements or actions in relation to a certain environment” (Maturana & 
Varela, 1987, p. 136). 
 
 35  We see in Varela another instantiation of wonder, also engaged by Kauffman, 
Stengers, and Braidotti. 
 
 36  “A phenomenon, in the most original sense of the word, is an appearance, and 
therefore something relational. It is what something is for something else; it is a being for, by 
opposition to a being in itself, independently of its apprehension by another entity” (Shear & 
Varela, 1999, p. 3). Varela makes neural correlates to phenomenological concepts of temporality 
and language in explaining consciousness and cognition as a science that bridges mind, 
experience, and the co-becoming materiality of subject(s) and world. 
 
 37  Symbiogenesis is defined as “an evolutionary change by the inheritance of acquired 
gene sets” (Margulis, 1998, p. 9). 
 
 38  This echoes Varela’s epistemological stance of the subject. 
 
 39  Perhaps it is the fear of the latter that inspires across the board all too many references 
to and claims of ontology. 
 
 40  For example, two edited volumes on feminist new materialisms stake out different 
grounds, Material Feminisms (2008) edited by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, stakes out its 
ground on explicitly corporeal themes, especially of the human body, while New Materialisms: 
Ontology, Agency, and Politics (2010) edited by Diane Coole and Samantha Frost favors 
theorists who lean more towards vital materialism. At stake seems to be the relationship to the 
linguistic turn which is no longer adequate for making sense of the world’s advancements, is it 
outright rejected or does it become incorporated, modified, appended in theoretical shifts? 
Arguments to one direction or another seem to hinge on various readings of Deleuze. This project 






 41  Yes, Clare Hemmings’ critical sense of the feminist return narrative is appropriately 
hailed. 
 
 42  as opposed to the unitary ‘ruthless’ neoliberal self, experienced by the subject who is, 
in fact, non-unitary, by virtue of the embodied and embedded “ties that bind us to the multiple 
‘others’, most of which are not anthropomorphic (Braidotti, 2006, p. 4) 
 
 43  I will return to questions of secularity and ‘postsecularity’ later (that might be a note 
to self – might not get to it in this draft). 
 
 44  I would counter that neither Žižek nor Braidotti can escape charges of theism in their 
work, albeit for different reasons and different intents. 
 
 45  Though embodiment of knowledge claims are central to Barad, she does not explore 
this deeply in her book, Meeting the Universe Halfway. She is well complemented by Rosi’s 
thorough attention to embodiment. 
 
 46  I do not actually see this in opposition to the topological (properties-based) method I 
engage. In this method, properties are significant insofar as they effect and are affected by and in 
relations; that is, relations manifest properties and vice versa. In this light, this could be a minor 
critique of Barad’s contrast. 
 
 47  Endosymbiosis: a relationship in which a member of one species lives not just near or 
even permanently on a member of another species, but inside it. Together they (the bionts) form 
the symbiont in a holarchy. 
 
 48  This is not meant in any way Lacanian, as a negativity, to the contrary, Varela’s sense 
of emptiness is affirmative, in Rosi’s sense. 
 
 49  Gibson-Graham, too, emphasize diverse non-capiltalist praxes that cultivate new 
economic subjectivities. The differentiation is interesting, JKGG are concerned with economic 
praxis, which in the context of my inquiry, could be positioned as a form expressive of a more 
fundamental level of the role of praxis in the becoming of matter itself. Ethics, as theorized by all 
these thinkers, are operational at every level. 
 
 50  Turns out Haraway and Barad use this term, too. 
 
 51  Braidotti deliberately engages use of the future perfect tense to reflect the temporality 
of this transformation. 
 
 52  Élan vital is the “informing spirit which, through man, evolves into consciousness and 
therefore gives man his favored position as the goal and the apex of creation” (Chiari, Vitalism 
and Contemporary Thought, p. 254, as cited in Bennett, 2009, p. 143, n.40). 
 
 53   Spinoza’s 17th century, imagination referred to representational, iconographic 
picture-thinking and diagrams—inclusive of measurement, time, and motion. The imagination 






 54  The abstract machine is Deleuze and Guattari’s metaphor for the generativity of 
Nature whose pieces and assemblages enter into an infinity of interconnected relations.  
 
 55  Bildungstreib “names a nonmaterial, teleological drive that imparts to matter its 
functional coherence, its “organic” quality (wherein each part of the whole is both cause and 
effect of the others)” (Bennett, 2009, p. 65). 
 
 56  De-familiarization refers to strategies of estrangement from hierarchical relations that 
had privileged ‘Man’ and from dominant visions of the subject and habits of thought and 
representation.  
 
 57  Rosi shares this affinity with post-neoDarwinist evolutionists, geneticists, and 
complexity theorists; she acknowledges Margulis and Varela but not scholars working in other 
fields outside of feminist science. 
 
 58  Ubiquitous dispersal of collective non-capitalist micro-political practices is also a 
theme of Gibson-Graham’s postcapitalist subjectivity. 
 
 59  Consider that sentence a really bad joke when I am up too late to test my reader and 
to let me know that I need to take a break. Cognitive=Varela, transcorporeal=Alaimo, matter-









For years I labored with the idea of reforming the existing institutions of society, 
 a little change here, a little change there. Now I feel quite differently. 
 I think you've got to have a reconstruction of the entire society,  
a revolution of values. …We are treading in difficult water,  
because it [economic and social justice] really means that  
we are saying that something is wrong with capitalism. 
(Told to journalist David Halberstam in early 1968 
 by Dr. Martin Luther King) 
 
 
 The biosphere-geosphere-noösphere that takes shape as planet Earth of the third 
millennium, when seen through the lenses shared by new science, posthumanism and feminist 
new materialism, is an altogether different natureculture than that celebrated by teleological 
Western tales of technocapitalism, progress, and consumption. Material determinism has 
morphed into the monster in our midst. After centuries of determinism, mechanistic telos, 
individualism, human exceptionalism and dialectical transcendence, – and in spite of these 
identitarian logics having been countered scientifically, such patriarchal ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ 
continue to dominate subject and social imaginaries, having come to represent what is ‘natural’ 
and ‘normal’. To critique them constitutes an attack on freedoms and capitalism. To challenge 
these ‘givens,’ so embedded are they in the fabric of social, economic, and political institutions as 
to be invisible, requires a radical act of the imaginary.  
 This radical act provokes strong, even violent response (Occupy!). Overturning that 
applecart, the new materialist political project is not for the feint of heart, nor can it succeed if its 
enactions remain safely sequestered within intellectual discourse, or if it remains grounded by 




normalized as the self, acknowledging the not-necessarily-human subject instead as community, 
hybrid, dispersed and virtual, diffracted across becomings and temporalities, and moving through 
uncertainties. This subject fosters conditions for desired becomings, and recognizes that free will 
is not a dictator, but, rather, a collaborator, there is no autonomous center of controls. This 
challenge at the baseline of subjectivity necessarily confronts the well-educated Western radical 
subject--a self-confrontation acknowledged by Gibson-Graham, Braidotti, Darwin, Varela, 
myself, and remaining unacknowledged by Kant and Žižek, with problematic critical 
consequences. 
 In the natureculture world as represented by my triptych, Francisco Varela, Karen Barad, 
and Rosi Braidotti, the topological qualities and establishing principles of humanism and 
Cartesianism simply have no bearing. The paradigms of that thinking are revealed as illusory by 
light of the changes to the former science with which they ostensibly identify. Alternate 
paradigms, by which the world and lived experience are narrated anew, emerge collectively from 
new perspectives in microbiology, evolution, cellular genetics, ecology, and physics. The scientists 
from these fields I have considered all bring to their inquiries a systems-thinking approach, one 
that reckons with feedback loops, mergers and tangents, uncertainty and complexity. Consistently, 
they find a world of becoming materiality, always already in entangled dynamic process, moving 
from possibility to the actual and back again, sentient, cognitive, affective, contingent, 
indeterminate, and selective in the complex intra-actions taking place at every level, from the cell 
to Gaia. The exuberance1 of life performs a radical dance of bodies and environment moving, as in 
a structured improvisation, between possibility and actuality. The creation is a pre factum 
emergence, 2 neither producible nor deducible, neither aleatory nor a posteriori calculation (1991, 
p. 70), and with no outside, there is no inside. This is Barad’s halfway of the universe. In making 
this sense of the world, disciplinary divides implode, binaries dissolve, and language strains. 




foundations with what it confronts, the Cartesian-Newtonian-capitalist mindset of the  
world-that-is.  
 This new science enacts an academic revolution, liberating ethicality from the narrow 
confines of ‘philosophy’ and locating it within the purview of science, as well. In this, the new 
science represents a fundamental challenge to the dominant and powerful modes of knowing.  
Indeed, science has done this for centuries, as explanations displace the divine and transcendental. 
Of course, power is never happy to have its territory challenged. Bruno burns at the stake. Galileo 
goes under house-arrest. Edward Snowden seeks asylum in Russia. When the authority of western 
Cartesian-style thinking to impose its own patriarchal terms of morality begins to erode, those 
whose subjectivity has been constructed on such thinking feel their institutions of power 
threatened (and, for example, the National Guard dons riot gear to take to the streets to silence a 
Baltimore community). In this context, the fantasy that science is in its nature inoculated against 
politics becomes strained: becomings are accountable to their effects, and materiality has no 
hidden zones in the actual. My exploration of this shift thus reveals [r]evolutionary patterns of 
movement away from telos and toward ethical possibility—toward, as Varela describes it, 
“thinking the living being” (Castoriadis, 2011, p. 61).  
     Challenging disciplinarity in general, this new thinking challenges the disciplinary practices of 
science in particular. The quantum subverts the linear and causal, undermining notions of 
teleology—structures of thought embedded in the scientific method itself. To make scientific 
sense of this different world, then, requires methods that accommodate the unknown and 
unknowable, not as realms science has yet to reveal, but as part and parcel to possibility in the 
materiality of the universe. To accommodate this fundamentally different perspective, the 
practice of science must expand from reductive obsession with proper objects to the primacy of 
relations, and hold open the ‘actual’ space of the vague, elusive, and ephemeral enactive gap. 




from their focus spatial and temporal contexts, or the researcher’s positionality from its 
narratives. The language would not silence or ‘other’ the unknown. The bounds of scientific 
knowledge would be made porous and expandable, in acknowledgment that scientific knowledge 
constitutes just one narrative of many using metaphor to make shared sense.  
 Working in a Continental philosophy and critical theory tradition, Braidotti engages the 
same themes of creative becomings based on which Varela, Barad, and other scientists and 
critical science scholars re-inscribe the bounds and accountabilities of science and its necessary 
implication in the world it interrogates. These themes convene in Braidotti’s theory of 
subjectivity (nomadism) to inform a politics that might interrupt current trajectories of 
neoliberalism. Though the manner of her engagement of Continental philosophy is somewhat 
problematic to the tenets of posthuman feminist new materialisms that she identifies with, 
Braidotti also cites the founding principles of Varela’s autopoeisis, Margulis’ endosymbiosis, and 
Barad’s agential-realism (2013, pp. 93-4, 158-159 and 2012b, pp. 135-6). The dynamics 
constituting her politics for these times, intended to inspire and activate, match those of the 
sciences of desire, and she thus brings to the fore of the subject an affirmative affectivity as a 
strategy of political resistance. Braidotti understands subjectivity itself as a political imaginary 
brought forth by and bringing forth the momentums of all that it connects and processes—the 
concatenation of autopoietically material, ethical, ecological, transcorporeal, economic, 
involutionary, sociable, and companioned becomings. Such expressions of ethical nomadic 
posthuman subjectivity become apparent in, for example, the praxes of Gibson-Graham’s 
community economies, in Stacy Alaimo’s ecologies of transcorporeality, in Myra Hird’s bacterial 
sociable life, in the ecological intimacies of Natasha Myers’ affective involutions, and in 
Haraway’s companion species. Together, the sciences of desire and feminist new materialism 
establish a scientifically grounded, non-Kantian political perspective on subjectivity, the world, 




2012, p. 189).  
 Transforming the political imaginary demands embodied training and practice of new 
skills appropriate to that vision. Subjects need to train for wrestling multiple, protean monsters. 
Accompanying a deeply informed strategy, vigilance against inherited thinking habits is needed, 
and a deliberative engagement of history is requisite. But while Varela refers to meditative 
practices, and Gibson-Graham refers to diverse economic practices--and while the military, a 
variety of fundamentalisms, and perhaps FOX News, model effective modes of training that 
cultivate particular subjects--there has been little attention to the significance of skills training 
and practices for thinking and doing a ‘radical’ politics, such as occurred in the civil rights 
movement of the 1960s and has been being conducted by Mondragon cooperatives for decades. 
If, as the new materialisms and sciences of desire tell us, life is a protean energetic force and 
subjectivity a delicate matter, then ethical becomings of a different world require the learning and 
praxis of new skills and relationalities.  
 Gabriel Rockhill describes Cornelius Castoriadis’ repudiation of the dominant imaginary 
of contemporary unlimited expansion, a dominance leading to “an overall atrophy of the 
imagination and a retreat in creativity in all fields (philosophy, art, science, etc.), [as a] … 
revolutionary praxis and the struggle to demonstrate that history is not a fatality because a 
“break” is always possible”(2011, xvii-xviii).3 For Castoriadis, the “creative capacity of the 
anonymous collective” (Castoriadis, 1997b, p. 131 as cited in Castoriadis, 2011, p. xiv) fueling 
radical social imagination pushes back against the groundlessness that in his philosophy looms as 
a dark threat. He sees the purpose of art, philosophy, and science as to give form to chaos, and by 
so doing remind society that it operates at the edge of the abyss. That concept of the edge of 
chaos carries less apocalyptic meanings as offered by Vico, by complexity theory, and by 
Varela’s theory of groundlessness. In these contexts, the social imaginary4 inhabits the material 




production—a vision aligning with Castoriadis’ view of the social imaginary as self-instituting 
and with his stance on history as creation, and therefore undetermined (though not 
unconditioned). Politics for Castoriadis thus belongs within the domain of creative production, 
being a “collective activity whose object is the institution of society as such” (Castoriadis, 1997a, 
p. 272, in 2011, p. xvi). In sum, Castoriadis presents a view of the social imaginary as inherently 
creative such that history (“a past that has never been present, and which never will be, whose 
future to come will never be a production or reproduction in the form of presence…” (Derrida, as 
quoted by Barad in lecture) preconditions possibilities for revolution against what editor Gabriel 
Rockhill describes the “determined world of blind narcissism and hedonism orchestrated by the 
Eliatic fatalities of neoliberalism” (Castoriadis, 2011, p. xvii). 
 In a late 1990s dialogue on the topic of “Life and Creation,” Castoriadis and Varela 
explore the relationship between their positions, in light of Varela’s expertise in the biological 
phenomena of the origin of life and Castoriadis’ in theorizing the psychological and social 
domain.5 They come to this dialogue each having been influenced by the other, Varela by 
Castoriadis’ theory that there is an excess of the imaginary sourced in the autopoietic origin of 
life, and Castoriadis by Varela’s theory of autopoiesis and autonomy.6 Winding down their 
discussion of how autopoietic biological innovation and the creative social imaginary relate, they 
fall into questioning whether “one can deduce a politics from a philosophy or from a knowledge” 
(2011, p. 71)— the same question that, as I recounted in the Introduction, was posed to Stacy 
Alaimo by the scholar of 19th century German naturphilosophie. Though Castoriadis’ objects to 
reductionist theories of life (for him as for Varela, “being is creation, the propriety of being is to 
make surface new forms” (2011, p. 72)), his style of philosophizing is classical in terms of its 
linear determinisms and anthropocentric premises. On the other hand, Varela, rooted in the hard 
sciences, is an unconventional process-and-systems thinker. It comes as no surprise, then, that 




that a politics may be deduced, though it may be surmised, from a philosophy or knowledge, 
while Varela finds nuance and connection. 
 Castoriadis asserts that a philosophy of creative becoming “liberates us to think politics. 
It liberates us from social determinisms, from the idea that one could never do otherwise…” 
(2011, p. 72). He thus contravenes the disciplinary, academic mandate to ‘deduce’ certainty, and 
instead recognizes in philosophy and politics a “certain complementarity” (p. 72). Certainly, 
complementarity is more than the philosopher of German naturphilosophie would concede to the 
feminist new materialism project whose discourse he called “catty and indecorous,” but 
Castoriadis’ response does illustrate the difficulty that a thinking cemented in conventional 
patterns of rationalist logic has no opening to an altogether other paradigm of thinking. The 
former defines ‘right’ thinking as the product of deductive reasoning, the latter supports 
observation as the process that yields co-(m)motions of relationality—an impasse that must be 
contended with in conceiving strategies for achieving intellectual legitimacy or, of course, for 
shaping political and social change.  
 Varela, outspoken in his political engagements, responds to the question about 
philosophy and politics not in terms of what is proper and improper according to deductive logics, 
but in terms of his own subjectivity as scientist and as citizen, a non-unitary nomadic subjectivity 
in Braidotti’s sense. With only vague reference to his own published work, Varela affirms that 
philosophy, science, and politics are multiply and mutually implicated, but that his very active 
political engagements arise not from his knowledge as a scientist, but from his intuitions as a 
citizen. The pitfall of succumbing to pressures for deductive reasoning, he implies, is that it 
signals finality, and thus risks proposing either some sort of utopia (one charge levied against 
Spinozist new materialists), or in Žižek’s model, dystopia.  
 While Varela’s cautions are crucial, I suggest that feminist scholars working in the 




by remaining more vigilant about how the discourse gets constituted. We should avidly resist, that 
is, speaking in the language and resorting to the methods of reasoning and thinking, that conform 
to monotheistic / humanistic topologies. This does not mean we should ignore history—quite to 
the contrary. But it does mean we should err on the side of extreme caution in the resources we 
hail and how we engage them, so as to avoid those that conjure the very modes of thought we 
seek to indict. No Spinoza. No monism. No Lacan. No transcendent empiricism. No 
manipulations of concepts with already established meanings.7 No deduction. Inspiration must be 
appended with informed, enactionable strategies. We must work with methods of uncertainty and 
unknowing, such as diffraction, (Haraway and Barad), cartography (Braidotti), tactical recitation 
(Cummings), topologies and technê (Sand). As we embrace uncertainty, the limits of self-
knowledge and of knowledge of the other, emerge as the starting point of political engagement, 
enabling “a present and a future with some unpredictability in them” (Hemmings, 2011, p. 226).  
 What may we hope now? The theories of life and subjectivity presented in this project 
continue to be marginalized by an academic establishment whose defensiveness, in the face of the 
evidence proffered by scientists and science studies scholars, suggests that feminisms must be 
onto something big. Even if we can’t quite know exactly what, something important is happening. 
The material and metaphorical powers of the quantum and new biology foster new imaginaries 
and political possibility for subject and social transformation. A sea-change in thinking practices 
is underway. Yes, there is plenty of hope for our future, in theory, as demonstrated by the 
theoretical work of many scholars, but the actualization of these hopes depends on transposing 
memory and desire into skilled, collective praxis. This hope keeps optimism in reserve. But 
another, deeper strata of hope provide the baseline for all others, and as Margulis and Sagan 
remind us, “Nature has not ended, nor does the planet require saving,” (1995, p. 242). From the 





 1 ‘Exuberance’ is a common descriptor used by Margulis. 
 
 2  Varela acknowledges that new words are needed for what he means by emergence, 
non-linearity, and he clarifies his meaning of enaction as bringing together the gestures and tasks 
that accompany ‘making-something-emerge’, inclusive of its conception and its history that gets 
set in motion. Varela’s meaning of emergence is particular, a non-separability between created 
phenomenon and the specificity of its locality. 
 
 3  An affective vector (passion), and a desire to know and experience, accompany the 
imaginary’s self-representation of the world. 
 
 4  For Castoriadis, the human subject is by definition social, there is no individual human 
subject, so the social imaginary parallels the radical creative imaginary of the individual subject, 
and functions collectively to institute society. 
 
 5  They are in full agreement on the rootedness of the imaginary in corporeality. They 
depart on the exceptionality of the human, which Castoriadis supports and Varela rejects. This 
divide maps their ensuing disagreement, Varela objects to the anthropocentricity of Castoriadis’ 
deterministic ‘indentitarian logics’ that reject non-linear dynamics.  
 
 6  Varela objects to Castoriadis’ application of his sense of autonomy beyond biology. 
 
 7  e.g. Deleuze’s reworking of autopoiesis and machinic symbiosis; I wish scholars 














Adams, S., & Ebooks Corporation. (2014). Cornelius Castoriadis: Key concepts. New York: 
Bloomsbury.  
 
Addelson, Kathryn Pyne. (1994). Moral passages: Toward a collectivist moral theory. New 
York: Routledge.  
 
Adorno, T. W. (1973). Negative dialectics [Negative Dialektik.]. New York: Seabury Press.  
Ahmed, S. (2008). Open forum imaginary prohibitions some preliminary remarks on the founding 
gestures of the new materialism. European Journal of Women's Studies, 15(1), 23-39.  
 
Alaimo, S. (2014, February 3). Seminar Presentation by Stacy Alaimo (Follow-up Q&A ed.). 
Houston: Rice University.  
 
Alaimo, S., & Hekman, S. J. (2008). Material feminisms. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
Albright, A. C., & Gere, D. (2003). Taken by surprise: A dance improvisation reader. 
Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.  
 
Angerer, M., Bosel, B., Ott, M., & Gatens, M. (2014). Timing of affect: Epistemologies, 
aesthetics, politics. Zurich; Berlin: Diaphanes.  
 
Antarctic black smokers [Online photograph]. (2012). livescience.com: NERC ChEsSo 




Aquinas, T. (1485; 1921). Summa theologica: Part one (2nd ed.). London: Burns, Oates, & 
Washbourne, Ltd.  
 
Arendt, H. (1953). On the nature of totalitarianism: An essay in understanding. Essays in 
understanding (pp. 328-360). New York: Random House.  
 




Aristotle & Greenwood, L. H. G. (1909). Aristotle nichomachean ethics [Ethica Nichomachea.]. 
Cambridge: University Press.  
 
Aveling, E. B. (1883). The religious views of Charles Darwin. London: Freethought Publishing.  
Ayres, E. (1999). God's last offer: Negotiating for a sustainable future. New York: Four Walls 
Eight Windows.  
 
Barad, K. (1998). Getting real: Technoscientific practices and the materialization of reality. 
Difference: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 10, 94.  
 
_______. (2003). Posthumanist performativity: Toward an understanding of how matter comes to 
matter. Signs, 28(3), 801-831.  
 
 
_______. (2007). Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter 
and meaning, Durham; London: Duke University Press.  
 
_______. (2010). Quantum entanglements and hauntological relations of inheritance: 
Dis/continuities, spacetime enfoldings, and justice-to-come. Derrida Today, 3(2), 240-268.  
 
_______. (2012). What is the measure of nothingness?: Infinity, virtuality, justice. Documenta, 13.  
 
_______. (2013). Ma(r)king time: Material entanglements and re-memberings: Cutting together-
apart. In P. R. Carlile, D. Nicolini, A. Langley & H. Tsoukas (Eds.), How matter matters: 
Objects, artifacts, and materiality in organization studies (pp. 16-31) Oxford University 
Press.  
 
_______. (2014a). Keynote: Re-membering the future, re(con)figuring the past: Temporality, 
materiality, and justice-to-come. Feminist Theory Workshop, Duke University.  
 
_______. (2014b). Diffracting diffraction: Cutting together-apart. Parallax, 20(3), 168-187.  
Bargetz, B. (2014). Mapping affect: Challenges of (un)timely politics. In M. Angerer, B. Bosel & 
M. Ott (Eds.), Timing of affect: Epistemologies, aesthetics, and politics (2014). Zurich; 
Berlin: Diaphenes.  
 
Bennett, J. (2009). Vibrant matter: A political ecology of things, Duke University Press.  
Bergin, T. G., & Fisch, M. H. (1948). The new science of Giambattista Vico. Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press.  
 




Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theory of science. Hassocks, Sussex; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: 
Harvester Press; Humanities Press.  
 
Bohm, D. (1981; 1980). Wholeness and the implicate order. London; Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul.  
 
Braidotti, R. (2002). Metamorphoses: Towards a materialist theory of becoming. Cambridge; 
Malden, MA: Polity; Blackwell.  
 
_________. (2005/2006). Affirming the affirmative: On nomadic affectivity. Rhizomes, 
Fall/Spring (11/12).  
 
_________. (2006). Transpositions: On nomadic ethics. Polity.  
_________. (2007). Biopower and necropolitics. Springerin, Hefte Fur Gegenwartskunst, 13(2).  
_________. (2007). Feminist epistemology after postmodernism: Critiquing science, technology 
and globalisation. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 32(1), 65-74.  
 
_________. (2008). Of poststructuralist ethics and nomadic subjects. In M. Duwell (Ed.), The 
contingent nature of life (pp. 25-36) Springer.  
 
_________. (2011). Nomadic subjects, embodiment and sexual difference in contemporary 
feminist theory (second edition ed.). New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
_________. (2012b). Nomadic theory, the portable Rosi Braidotti. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
 
_________. (2012a). Afterword. Angelaki, 17(2), 169-176. doi:10.1080/0969725X.2012.701056  
_________. (2013). The posthuman. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA, USA: Polity Press.  
Brennan, T. (2010). Vico, spinoza and the imperial past. Retrieved from 
http://www.cornell.edu/video/timothy-brennan-vico-spinoza-and-the-imperial-past  
 
Brown, W. (1995). States of injury: Power and freedom in late modernity. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
BRS & BMW. Lichens: Life history and ecology. Retrieved from 
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/fungi/lichens/lichenlh.html  
 




___________. (2011). In translated by G. Rockhill [trans.], J. V. Garner (Eds.), Postscript on 
insignificance: Dialogues with Cornelius Castoriadis (English ed.). New York, London: 
Continuum International Publishing Group.  
 
___________, & Curtis, D. A. (1997b). World in fragments: Writings on politics, society, 
psychoanalysis, and the imagination. Stanford University Press.  
 




Chemical sensitivity [online photograph]. (2014). In Curra, What is multiple chemical 
sensitivity?. cleanambiente.com: Retrieved from http://cleanambiente.com/en/que-es-la-
sensibilidad-quimica-multiple/ 
 
Clark, T. (2013). What on world is the earth?: The anthropocene and fictions of the world. Oxford 
Literary Review, 35(1), 5-24.  
 
Clarke, Bruce, & Hansen, Mark. (2009). Emergence and embodiment new essays on second-
order systems theory.  
 
Coole, D. H., & Frost, S. (2010). New materialisms: Ontology, agency, and politics. Durham 
N.C.: Duke University Press.  
 
Cozier, M. (2009). Exxon Mobil partners with synthetic genomics on R&D. Biofuels, 
Bioproducts, Biorefining, (3), 12/12/15.  
 
Darwin, C. (1838). Notebook M. Unpublished manuscript. Retrieved from http://darwin-
online.org.uk 
 
________. (1838; 2002-). In J. Van Wyhe (Ed.), The complete work of Charles Darwin online 
Retrieved from http://darwin-online.org.uk  
 
________. (1859; 1936). The origin of species by means of natural selection; or, the preservation 
of favored races in the struggle for life and the descent of man and selection in relation to 
sex [On the origin of species.]. New York: The Modern Library.  
 
________. (1861). Online variorum of Darwin's origin of species: Third British edition. In B. 
Bordalejo (Ed.), (2008-9) Retrieved from http://darwin-online.org.uk/Variorum/1861/1861-
208-dns.html  
 
________. (1871). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. New York: D. Appleton 





________. (1888). In Darwin F. (Ed.), The life and letters of Charles Darwin (volume III ed.). 
London: John Murray.  
 
Dawkins, R. (2006). The selfish gene. Oxford University Press.  
_________. (October 19, 2012). Homage to Darwin, part one. Retrieved from 
https://vimeo.com/51768266  
 
DeLanda, M. (1997). A thousand years of nonlinear history. New York: Zone Books.  
 
Debeljak, I., Kosir, A., Buffetaut, E., & Otonicar, B. (2002). The late cretaceous dinosaurs and 
crocodiles of Kozina (SW Slovenia): A preliminary study. Memorie - Società Geologica 
Italiana, 57, 193-202.  
 
DeLanda, M. (2011). Emergence, causality, and realism. In L. Bryant, N. Smicek & G. Harman 
(Eds.), The speculative turn: Continental materialism and realism (pp. 381-392). 
Melbourne, Australia: re.press.  
 
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and repetition. Columbia University Press.  
_________. (1995). Negotiations, 1972-1990 [Pourparlers, 1972-1990]. New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
 
d'Entreves, M. P. (2014). Hannah Arendt. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer, 2014 ed.).  
 
Deutscher, P. (1997). Review of 'telling flesh' by Vicki Kirby. Australian Humanities Review, 
8(November). Retrieved from http://australianhumanitiesreview.org/1997/11/01/a-review-of-
telling-flesh-the-substance-of-the-corporeal-by-vicki-kirby/ 
 
Dimock, P. (2012). George Anderson: Notes for a love song in imperial time (First ed.). 
Champaign, Ill.: Dalkey Archive Press.  
 
Dromaeosaurids [Online image]. (2005-2016). Dinosaurs and paleontology dictionary. Retrieved 
from http://www.enchantedlearning.com/subjects/dinosaurs/glossary/Dromaeosaur.shtml  
 
Dryden, D. (1997). Whitehead's influence on Susanne Langer's conception of living form. 
Process Studies, 26(1-2), 62-85.  
 
Satellites encircling the earth [Online image: A beehive of satellites]. (2013). European Space 






Eyres, H. (2014, March 15). Poetry's true objective. Financial Times.  
 
Fausto-Sterling, A. (2000). Sexing the body: Gender politics and the construction of sexuality  
(First ed.). New York, N.Y.: Basic Books.  
 
Fitzgerald, F. S. (1925). The great gatsby. New York: C. Scribner’s Sons. 
  
Flat earth [online image]. Retrieved from 
http://s158.photobucket.com/user/OnlyObvious/media/Front_Groups/flat_earth.jpg.html  
 
Fleischaker, G. R. (1988). Autopoiesis: System logic and origins of life (Unpublished doctoral 
dissertation). Boston University, Boston.  
 
Frank, A. (2013, August 21). Welcome to the age of denial. The New York Times, p. A27. 
  
Franklin, S. (2000). Life itself. global nature and the genetic imaginary. Franklin, Sarah, Lury, 
Celia, & Stacey, Jackie. Global nature, global culture. Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
  
Freeman, J. (2013, October 29). J. Craig Venter returns to UCSD: I think my mind works 




Freeman, W. J. (1978). Spatiotemporal patterns of induced waves in the bulbar EEG in spatial 
frequency analysis of an egg event in the olfactory bulb [EEG image]. In D. A. Otto (Ed.), 
Multidisciplinary perspectives in event-related brain potential research, December ed., pp. 
533-542. National Institute of Mental Health, Washington, D.C. Retrieved from 
http://sulcus.berkeley.edu/freemanwww/manuscripts/IIIF2/78.html  
 
Garvey, E. (2015). Spinoza on the infinite. Lecture series: Philosophy of science. University of 
Texas, Austin.  
 
Geison, G. L. (1969). Darwin and heredity: The evolution of his hypothesis of pangenesis. 




Gibson, W. S. (1840). The certainties of geology. London: Smith, Elder, & Co.  
 






_________________. (2008). Diverse economies: Performative practices for ‘other worlds’. 
Progress in Human Geography, 1, 613-632.  
 
_________________, & Roelvink, G. (2010). An economic ethics for the anthropocene. 
Antipode, 41(Supplement), 320-346.  
 
Gilbert, S. F. (2014). Symbiosis as the way of eukaryotic life: The dependent co-origination of 
the body. Journal of Biosciences, 39(2), 201-209.  
 
Gilbert, S. F., Sapp, J., & Tauber, A. I. (2012). A symbiotic view of life: We have never been 
individuals. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 87(4), 325-341.  
 
 
Gilligan, C. (1993; 1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Ginsborg, H. Kant's aesthetics and teleology. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (Fall 2014 ed.). 
 
Goguen, J., & Varela, F. J. (1979). Systems and distinctions: Duality and complementarity. 
International Journal of Gen Systems, 5, 31-43.  
 
Goldman, S. (1989). Science, technology, and social progress. Bethlehem; Cranbury, N.J.: 
Lehigh University Press; London: Associated University Presses.  
 
_________. (2007). Great scientific ideas that have changed the world (Lecture 27). 
thegreatcourses.com  
 
_________. (2008). The science wars: What scientists know and how they know it. 
thegreatcourses.com 
 
Grant, A. (2014). Science News, (December 27), 8.  
 
Grene, M., & Depew, D. J. (2004). The philosophy of biology: An episodic history. Cambridge, 
UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Grosz, E. (2011). Becoming undone: Darwinian reflections on life, politics, and art. Durham, 
North Carolina: Duke University Press.  
 






Habermas, J., Rorty, R., & Kołakowski, L., J. Niznik, & J.T. Sanders [Eds.], (1996). Instytut 
Filozofii i Socjologii.. Debating the state of philosophy: Habermas, Rorty, and Kołakowski. 
Westport, Conn.: Praeger.  
 
Haeckel, E., & McCabe, J. (1905). The wonders of life; a popular study of biological philosophy. 
New York, London: Harper & Brothers.  
 
Haldane, J. B. S. (1928). Possible worlds, and other papers. New York, London: Harper & 
Brothers.  
 
Hansen, M. (2014). Feelings without feelers or affectivity as environmental force. In M. Angerer, 
B. Bosel, M. Ott & M. Gatens (Eds.), Timing of affect: Epistemologies, aesthetics, and 
politics. Zurich; Berlin: Diaphenes.  
 
Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of 
partial perspective. Feminist Studies, 14(3), 575-599.  
 
Haraway, D. J. (1997). Modest₋Witness@Second₋Millennium.FemaleMan₋Meets₋OncoMouse: 
Feminism and technoscience. New York: Routledge.  
 
Haraway, D. (1991). Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature. New York, NY: 
Routledge.  
 
__________. (2008). When species meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
 
__________. (2003). The companion species manifesto: Dogs, people, and significant otherness. 
Chicago, Ill.: Prickly Paradigm.  
 
Harding, S. G. (1986). The science question in feminism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
___________. (1991). Whose science? whose knowledge?: Thinking from women's lives. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press.  
 
___________. (1993). The “racial” economy of science: Toward a democratic future. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
 
___________. (1995). Strong objectivity: A response to the new objectivity question. Synthese, 
104(3), 331-349.  
 
___________. (1997). Comment on Hekman's “truth and method: Feminist standpoint theory 





Hartsock, N. C. M. (1983). Money, sex, and power: Toward a feminist historical materialism. 
New York: Longman.  
 
Hayles, N. K. (1993). The materiality of informatics. Configurations, 1(1), 147-170.  
 
Hemmings, C. (2011). Why stories matter: The political grammar of feminist theory. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.  
 
Hetero- [online definition]. (2002). The American heritage® science dictionary. Retrieved from 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/hetero-  
 
Hird, M. J. (2004). Sex, gender, and science. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
________. (2009). The origins of sociable life: Evolution after science studies. Basingstoke; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Hubbard, R. (1990). The politics of women's biology. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press.  
 
Hull, D. L. (1988). Science as a process: An evolutionary account of the social and conceptual 
development of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Humanities Research Center Seminar: Materialism and New Materialism Across the Disciplines, 
(2014). Rice University, Houston, Texas.  
 
Huxley, A. (1894). Evolution and ethics: Prolegomena. Evolution and ethics (1920 ed.). New 
York: D. Appleton & Company.  
 
Innis, R. E. (2009). Susanne Langer in focus. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
  
Irigaray, L. [J. Collie & J. Still trans.]. (1992). Elemental passions. New York: Routledge.  
 
Jacobus, M., Keller, E. F., & Shuttleworth, S. (1990). Bodypolitics: Women and the discourses of 
science. New York: Routledge.  
 
Janvey, D., Penn, J., & Gottwald, M. (Producers), & Zeitlin, B. (Director). (2012). Beasts of the 
southern wild. [Motion Picture] United States: Fox Searchlight Pictures.  
 
Jasanoff, S. (2005). Designs on nature: Science and democracy in Europe and the United States. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Jensen, R. (2015). Plain radical: Living, loving and learning to leave the planet gracefully Soft 





Jonas, H. (1965). Spinoza and the theory of organism. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 3(1), 
43-57.  
 
_______. (1966). The phenomenon of life: Toward a philosophical biology. New York: Harper & 
Row.  
 
Jones, A. F. (2011). Developmental fairy tales. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 
Joyce, J. (1939). Finnegan's wake. London: Faber & Faber.  
 
jrh, & Smith, D. (2006). Retrieved from 
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/diapsids/saurischia/dromaeosauridae.html  
 
Kanamori, O. (2005). The problem of vitalism revisited: From Barthez to Bernard. Angelaki 
Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 10(2), 13-26.  
 
Kant, I., & Pluhar, W. S. (1987). Critique of judgment [Kritik der Urteilskraft.]. Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing Company.  
 
Kauffman, S. A. (1990). Random grammars: A new class of models for functional integration and 
transformation in the biological, neural, and social sciences. 
 
Kauffman, S. A. (1993). The origins of order: Self-organization and selection in evolution. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
_____________. (1995). At home in the universe. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
_____________. (2008). Reinventing the sacred. New York: Basic Books. 
 




_____________. (2012). On ethical and intellectual failures in contemporary economics. Ethics 
at the Foundations of Economics, 1-23.  
 
_____________. (2014a). Beyond the stalemate: Conscious mind-body - quantum mechanics - 
free will - possible pansychism - possible interpretation of quantum enigma. ArXiv.Org, 





_____________. (2014b). Foreword: Statable and Non–prestatable fitness landscapes. In H. 
Richter, & A. Engelbrecht (Eds.), Recent advances in the theory and application of fitness 
landscapes. Emergence, complexity, and computation volume 6. pp. i-xiv) Springer-Verlag.  
 
_____________. (2015). What is life? Israel Journal of Chemistry, 55(8), 875-879.  
 
Keats, J. (1819). Ode to a nightingale. Retrieved from 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173744  
 
Keller, E. F. (1978). Gender and science. Discovering reality (pp. 187-205) Springer.  
 
_________. (1985). Reflections on gender and science. New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
_________., & Longino, H. E. (1996). Feminism and science. Oxford; New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Kirby, V. (1997). Telling flesh: The substance of the corporeal. New York: Routledge.  
 
Kiviat, E., & MacDonald, K. (2004). Biodiversity patterns and conservation in the Hackensack 
Meadowlands, New Jersey. Urban Habitats, 2(1) Retrieved from 
http://urbanhabitats.org/v02n01/biodiversitypatterns_pdf.pdf  
 
Klee, P. (1920). Angelus novus [painting]. Retrieved from http://paulkleepaintings.org/angelus-
novus/ 
 
Klose, J. (2007). Process ontology from whitehead to quantum physics. In Atmanspacher, H. & 
Primas, H. (Eds.), Recasting Reality: Wolfgang Pauli's Philosophical Ideas and 
Contemporary Science (2010, pp. 151-170). Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag. 
doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-85198-1_8  
 




Kolkman, M., & Vaughan, M. (2010). Henri Bergson’s creative evolution 100 years later: 
Special issue of SubStance, issue 114, 36: 3 (2007) University of Wisconsin Press.  
 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd English ed.). Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  
 
Langer, S. K. (1953). Feeling and form; a theory of art. New York: Scribner.  
 





___________. (1967; 1982). Mind; an essay on human feeling, volume I. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins Press.  
 
___________. (1971). The great shift: Instinct to intuition. In J. F. Eisenberg, & W. S. Dillon 
(Eds.), Man and beast: Comparative social behavior (pp. 313-332). Washington, D.C.: 
Smithsonian Institution Press.  
 
___________. (1974). Mind: An essay on human feeling. Johns Hopkins University Press.  
 
Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1986). Laboratory life: The construction of scientific facts. Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Law, J. (2007). Making a mess with method. In W. Outhwaite, & S. P. Turner (Eds.), The sage 




Law, J. (2004). After method: Mess in social science research. London; New York: Routledge.  
 
Lehrman, D. S. (1970). Semantic and conceptual issues in the nature-nurture problem. In L. R. 
Aronson, E. Tobach, D. S. Lehrman & J. S. Rosenblatt (Eds.), Development in evolution of 
behovior: Essays in memory of T.C. Schneirla (pp. 17-42). San Francisco: W. Freeman.  
 
Leidy, J. (2000). The intestinal microbial community of the millipede Julus marginatus 
[illustration]. Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia, Ewell Sale Stewart Library and 
the Albert M. Greenfield Digital Imaging Center for Collections.  
 
Lepp, H. (2011).  Baeomyces heteromorphus [photograph]. Retrieved from 
http://www.anbg.gov.au/lichen/photos-captions/baeomyces-heteromorphus-f-321.html  
 
Levin, J. (2014). Mathematics, purpose, and truth (April 3 ed.). Minnesota Public Radio: On 
Being with Krista Tippett.  
 
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and infinity; an essay on exteriority [Totalite et infini.]. Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press.  
 
Levinas, E. (1981). Otherwise than being, or beyond essence (A. Lingis, Trans.). Dordrecht; 
Boston; London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Lloyd, E. A. (1995). Objectivity and the double standard for feminist epistemologies. Synthese, 





_________. (1996). Science and anti-science: Objectivity and its real enemies Springer.  
 
_________. (2008). Science, evolution, and politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Longino, H., & Doell, R. (1983). Body, bias, and behavior: A comparative analysis of reasoning 
in two areas of biological science. Signs, 9(2), 206-227.  
 
Longo, G., Montévil, M., & Kauffman, S. (2012). No entailing laws, but enablement in the 
evolution of the biosphere. Proceedings of the 14th Annual Conference Companion on 
Genetic and Evolutionary Computation, 1379-1392.  
 
Lorde, A. (1982). Chosen poems, old and new. New York: Norton.  
 
Lovelock, J. E., & Margulis, L. (1974). Atmospheric homeostasis by and for the biosphere: The 
Gaia hypothesis. Tellus, 26(1-2), 2-10.  
 
MacFarlane, E. (2013). Reading Coetzee. Rodopi.  
 
Mali, J. (2012). The legacy of Vico in modern cultural history. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Malik, J. (2014). Photograph: American giant millipede. Wikimedia CC:  
 
Mann, C. (1991). Lynn Margulis: Science’s unruly earth mother. Science, (5004), 378-381.  
 
Margulis, L., a.k.a. Sagan, L. (1967). On the origin of mitosing cells. Journal of Theoretical 
Biology, 14(3), 225-IN6.  
 
_________. (1981, 1993). Symbiosis in cell evolution: Microbial communities in the Archean and 
Proterozoic eons (second ed.). New York: Freeman.  
 
_________. (1982). Early life. Boston, MA.: Science Books International.  
 
_________. (1997). Big trouble in biology. Slanted truths (pp. 265-282) Springer.  
 
_________. (1998). Symbiotic planet: A new look at evolution (first ed.). New York: Basic 
Books.  
 
Margulis, L., Asikainen, C. A., & Krumbein, W. E. (Eds.). (2011). Chimeras and consciousness. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Margulis, L., MacConnell, A., & MacAllister, J. (2006). Lectures on the theory of creativity: The 





Margulis, L., Matthews, C., & Haselton, A. (2000). Environmental evolution : Effects of the 
origin and evolution of life on planet earth. Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press.  
 
Margulis, L., & Sagan, D. (1986a). Microcosmos: Four billion years of evolution from our 
microbial ancestors. New York: Summit Books.  
 
____________________. (1986b). Origins of sex: Three billion years of genetic recombination. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.  
 
____________________. (1995). What is life. New York: Simon & Schuster.  
 
____________________. (2002). Acquiring genomes: A theory of the origins of species (1st ed.). 
New York, NY: Basic Books.  
 
Maturana, H. R. (2002). Autopoiesis, structural coupling and cognition: A history of these and 
other notions in the biology of cognition. Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Maturana, H. R., & Varela, F. J. (1980). Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. 
Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company 
 
_________________________. (1987). The tree of knowledge. Boston, MA: New Science 
Library.  
 
Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a new philosophy of biology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.  
 
McQueen, P. (2015) Social and political recognition. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/recog_sp/  
 
Menelaus capturing Proteus [Online image]. Retrieved from https://s-media-cache-
ak0.pinimg.com/736x/d5/e0/77/d5e0776647eba83cf8a20321cdadab12.jpg 
 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. New York: Humanities Press.  
 
Morph- [online definition]. (2002). The American heritage® abbreviations dictionary, third 
edition. Retrieved from http://www.dictionary.com/browse/morph?s=ts 
 
Morris, D. (2011). The place of the organism in Kantian philosophy: Geography, teleology, and 
the limits of philosophy. In S. Elden, E. Mendieta & ebrary (Eds.), Reading Kant's 
geography (SUNY series in contemporary continental philosophy ed., pp. 173-194). Albany: 





Munchkin land [Online image]. The Wizard of Oz [Motion picture]. Retrieved from 
https://thebestpictureproject.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/wizardofoz1.jpg  
 
Nelson, L. H. (1993). Epistemological communities. In L. Alcoff, & E. Potter (Eds.), Feminist 
epistemologies (pp. 121-159). New York: Routledge.  
 
Newman, S. A. (1995). Carnal boundaries: The commingling of flesh in theory and practice. In L. 
I. Birke, & R. Hubbard (Eds.), Reinventing biology: Respect for life and the creation of 
knowledge (pp. 191-227) Georgetown University Press.  
 
Noble, D. (2008). The music of life: Biology beyond genes. Oxford University Press.  
 
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 









Page, L. (1998-2010). In Crowell B. (Ed.), Photograph: Wave interference patterns [Light and 
Matter] (section 34.3 ed.) Retrieved from 
http://www.lightandmatter.com/html_books/lm/ch34/ch34.html  
 
Parry, R. (2014).  Episteme and technê. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (Fall 2014 ed.).  
 
Polanyi, M. (1962). The republic of science: Its political and economic theory. Minerva, Autumn, 
54-73.  
 
_________. (1967; 1966). The tacit dimension. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.  
 
_________., & Grene, M. (1969). Knowing and being; essays. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.  
 






Protevi, J. (2009). Beyond autopoiesis: Inflections of emergence and politics in the work of 
Francisco Varela. In Hansen, M. & Clarke, B. (Eds.). Emergence and Embodiment: New 
Essays on Second-Order Systems Theory, pp. 94-112.  
 
Rickard, J. S. (1999). Joyce's book of memory: The mnemotechnic of Ulysses. Durham NC: Duke 
University Press.  
 
Rose, H. (1983). Hand, brain, and heart: A feminist epistemology for the natural sciences. Signs, 
9(1), 73-90.  
 
Rudrauf, D., Lutz, A., Cosmelli, D., Lachaux, J., & Le Van Quyen, M. (2003). From autopoiesis 
to neurophenomenology: Francisco Varela's exploration of the biophysics of being. 
Biological Research, 36(1), 27-65.  
 
Scheffler, I. (1967). Science and subjectivity. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.  
 
Schuessler, A. (2005). Geosiphon periforme [online image]. In Deacon J. (Ed.), Fungal Biology 
(4th ed.), chapter 13 Fungal Symbiosis. Malden, MA; Oxford, UK; Victoria, Australia: 
Blackwell Publishing.  
 
Scott, J. W. (2010). Gender: Still a useful category of analysis? Diogenes, 57(1), 7-14.  
 
Scylla. (2014). Retrieved from http://en.protothema.gr/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/scylla.jpg  
 
Seibt, J. (2016). Process philosophy. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (Spring, 2016 ed.)  
 
Shapiro, J. A. (2011). Evolution, a view from the 21st century. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: 
FT Press Science.  
 
Shear, J., & Varela, F. J. (1999). The view from within: First-person approaches to the study of 
consciousness. UK: Thorverton, Imprint Academic.  
 
Singer, D. W. (1950). Giordano Bruno: His life and thought. New York: Henry Schuman, Inc. 
Retrieved from http://www.positiveatheism.org/hist/bruno03.htm  
 
Skrepnick, M. (n.d.) Velociraptor mongoliensis [online illustration]. Retrieved from 
http://www.dinosaursinart.com/velociraptor.htm  
 
Smith, N., Katz, C., Keith, M., & Pile, S. (1993). Place and the politics of identity. Grounding 





Snell, B. (1982; 1960). The discovery of the mind: In Greek philosophy and literature. New York: 
Dover.  
 
Spencer, H. (1970). Social statics: The conditions essential to human happiness specified, and the 
first of them developed. New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation.  
 
Teleology. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/teleology  
 
Telos. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/telos  
 
Thallus [online definition]. (n.d.). Merriam-Webster medical dictionary. Retrieved from 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/medical/thallus  
 
Thompson, E., & Varela, F. J. (2001). Radical embodiment. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(10), 
418-425.  
 
Thompson, W. I., & Lindisfarne Association. (1987). Gaia, a way of knowing: Political 
implications of the new biology. Great Barrington, MA; Rochester, VT: Lindisfarne Press; 
Distributed by Inner Traditions International.  
 
____________________________________ & Università di Perugia. Dipartimento di 
epistemologia e scienze cognitive. (1991). Gaia 2: Emergence: The new science of 
becoming. Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Press.  
 




Topology types [online figure]. (2002). Retrieved from www.esri.com.  
 




Trappman, H. (1994-2011). Surface of the earth during the hadean eon [online illustration]. 









_______. (1996). Revaluing science: Starting from the practices of women. In L. H. Nelson & J. 
Nelson (Eds.), Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. (pp. 17-35), philosophical 
research online. 
 
Underdown, P. (2005). Grassland #127, #466, #394 [Photographs]. 
 
Van der Tuin, I., & Dolphijn, R. (2012). New materialism: Interviews & cartographies. Open 
Humanities Press.  
 
Varela, F. J. (1978). The cultural contradictions of power—a LIndisfarne talk (Summer Fellows' 
Meeting ed.). New York City: Schumacher Center for a New economics.  
 
_________. (1979a). Reflections on the chilean civil war . Lindisfarne Letter, 8(Winter), 13-19.  
 
_________.  (1979b). Principles of biological autonomy. Matt - Pseudo: Monograph Collection.  
 
_________.  (1999a). Ethical know-how: Action, wisdom, and cognition. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press.  
 
_________., Maturana, H. R., & Uribe, R. (1974). Autopoiesis: The organization of living 
systems, its characterization and a model. Biosystems, 5(4), 187-196. doi: 10.1016/0303-
2647(74)90031-8 
 
_________., Rosch, E., & Thompson, E. T. (1992). The embodied mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Vaughan, M. (2007a). Introduction: Henri Bergson's creative evolution. Substance, 36(3), 7-24. 
 
Vaughan, M. (2007b). The metaphysics of life: Leçons de psychologie et de Métaphysique given 
at Clermont-ferrand, 1887-88. Substance, 36(114), 25-32.  
 
Vernadsky, V. (1986). The biosphere [Biosfera.]. Oracle, AZ: Synergetic Press.  
 
Vernadsky, V. (2014). In Ross J. (Ed.), 150 years of Vernadsky (volume II): The noösphere. 
Leesburg, VA: 21st Century Science & Technology.  
 
Virgil, & Day Lewis, C. (1940). The georgics of Virgil. London: J. Cape.  
 
von Arnim, H. F. A., Zeno, Chrysippus, & Cleanthes. (1964; 1903). Stoicorum veterum 
fragmenta. Dubuque, IA: W. C. Brown Reprint Library.  
 
Wade, N. (2015). A troublesome inheritance: Genes, race and human history. New York: The 





Weber, A., & Varela, F. J. (2002). Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic 
foundations of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1(2), 
97-125.  
 
Weisstein, E. W. Topology. (n.d.) From MathWorld--A wolfram web resource. Retrieved from 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Topology.html  
 
Werskey, G. (2007). The Marxist critique of capitalist science: A history in three movements? 
Science as Culture, 16(4), 397-461.  
 
Whitehead, A. N. (1925). Science and the modern world.: Lowell lectures, 1925. New York: The 
Macmillan company.  
 
_____________. (1933). Adventures of ideas. New York: The Macmillan company.  
 
_____________. (1938). Modes of thought. New York: The Macmillan company.  
 
_____________. (2010, 1929). Part V: Final interpretation. In D. R. Griffin, & D. W. Sherburne 
(Eds.), Process and reality, an essay in cosmology (Corrected ed.). USA, distributed by 
Simon & Schuster: The Free Press. Retrieved from 
http://theology.co.kr/wwwb/data/koreabank/Whitehead_PR_Part5_Final_Interpratation.pdf  
 
Wilson, E. A. (2004). Gut feminism. Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, 15(3), 
66-94.  
 
Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press.  
 
Yar, M. (2002). Recognition and the politics of human(e) desires. In M. Featherstone, & S. Lash 
(Eds.), Recognition and difference: Politics, identity, multiculture. London: Sage.  
 
Zammito, J. H. (2004). A nice derangement of epistemes: Post-positivism in the study of science 
from quine to latour. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
___________. “Biology” around 1800 in Germany: Towards a redemption of naturphilosophie 
in history and philosophy of science. Unpublished manuscript.  
 
Žižek, S. (2011). Is it still possible to be a Hegelian today? In L Bryant, N. Smicek, & G. Harman 
(Eds.), The speculative turn, continental materialism and realism (pp. 202-223). Melbourne, 





________. (2012). Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism. London ; 
New York: Verso. 
 
________. (2012, April). Radio interview with Julian Assange. Retrieved from 
http://www.wikipedia.or.ke/index.php/Slavoj_%C5%BDi%C5%BEek  
 
________. (2013, July 18, 2013). Trouble in paradise. London Review of Books, 35: 14, 11-12.  
 
________., & Woodard, B. (2011). In L. Bryant, N. Smicek & G. Harman (Eds.), The speculative 
turn (pp. 406-415). Melbourne, Australia: re.press.  
 
 
 
	
 
